C. Zadik Shapiro

The Third Circuit refused to find incompetence of counsel where trial counsel failed to make a Batson claim. In Batson v. Kentucky the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection mandates that jurors not be selected by race.

James Douglas Clausell was convicted of murder in New Jersey state courts. His trial counsel failed to raise a Batson motion despite the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges on five of the eight African American and Hispanic jurors in the venire.

In Clausell v. Sherrer he appeals the denial of his writ of habeas corpus to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on the Batson issue as well as on incompetence of counsel grounds for his attorney’s failure to raise the Batson issue in the trial court.

There are three steps to a Batson challenge. First, the defense must raise the issue and make a prima facie case. Second the prosecutor must show that he/she had legitimate not-racial reasons for the use of the peremptory challenge. Finally, the court must decide whether or not there was purposeful discrimination.

The Third Circuit denied the Batson claim. The Court ruled that since Clausell did not make a Batson claim in the trial court he waived the issue on appeal. Therefore he has to rely on his incompetence of counsel claim.

At the time of his trial, New Jersey followed a rule that to show a prima facie case you had to show that there was a “substantial likelihood” that the peremptory was based on race. Later the United States Supreme Court made it clear that Batson mandated that the initial showing only had to be enough to allow the trial judge to draw an inference of discrimination. Yet the majority opinion in Clausell found that there was insufficient evidence to meet the “substantial likelihood” test. Therefore, Clausell’s trial counsel was not incompetent in failing to raise the Batson issue. The concurring opinion by Judge Ambro points out that the majority uses the wrong standard by using the substantial likelihood test instead of the inference test but it claims that Clausell cannot even meet the inference test.

Thus Clausell’s incompetence of counsel claim is denied even though he may have had a legitimate Batson claim. His counsel, not only, did not make the claim but did not preserve a record upon which the appellate court could determine if there was sufficient information for the Batson claim. But it was his attorney’s job to preserve a record allowing for a Batson claim. Is it not incompetence not to investigate the claim?

James L. Green was convicted in Georgia State Courts of rape and related offenses involving two sexual assault on different victims. He appealed and eventually filed an in pro per petition for habeas corpus in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

One of the issues was the incompetence of counsel. Green argued that his counsel was incompetent for failing to move to suppress DNA evidence. The Court ruled that even though counsel should have moved to suppress the evidence due to misstatements in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, Green was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure since there was more than enough evidence to convict him even if the DNA evidence had been excluded. The victim testified that she knew Green prior to the attack and she recognized him when he raped her. Therefore counsel’s incompetence did not prejudice Green and the conviction was upheld with the exception of the aggravated sodomy conviction.

Under Georgia law aggravated sodomy is “any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another that is committed with
force and against the will of the other person.” The only evidence to support the charge was one of the victim’s testimony that

while threatening her with a knife, Green forced her to perform oral sex on him and to lick his anus. She further testified: “He pushed me down on the bed and
raped me.

The court found this to be insufficient, as a matter of law, to convict Green on the charge. The jury could not assume based upon this testimony that Green’s penis touched the victim’s anus. Therefore the conviction on this count was reversed.

A couple of days ago we reported on People v. McKee in which the California Supreme Court opened up the opportunity to challenge Proposition 83, also known as Jessica’s Law on equal protection grounds. Monday the court in In re E. J. again considered Jessica’s Law. This time it rejected claims that it was being used retroactively against parolees and remanded to the lower courts to consider on an individual basis whether it violates the constitutional rights of those required to register as sex offenders by preventing them from living within 2000 feet of “any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”

The law was challenged by four parolees who were released on a new grant of parole after the effective date of the proposition for non-registerable offenses but who due to previous convictions have a lifetime registration requirement. Compliance with the Proposition 83 requirements was made a condition of the new parole grant.

The parolees argued that the law was illegally being enforced retroactively. The majority opinion finds that it is not a violation of either Penal Code Section 3 which prohibits the retroactive enforcement of criminal law unless the law specifically allows retroactive enforcement or the ex post facto sections of the state and Federal constitutions. The court found, as to the four petitioners, it was only being alleged as a condition of parole granted after the effective date of the proposition and it was only governing activity that happens after the effective date. Generally ex post facto laws are prohibited because they punish activity without prior notice of the illegality of the activity. Here the petitioners were given notice when they were placed on parole that they could not live in certain areas. They were not being punished for the original offense which led to the registration requirement. Rather they could be punished for moving into certain areas when they were paroled after the proposition’s effective date.

As to the constitutionality of the stay away requirement, the Supreme Court requested superior courts in the county of parole to hold hearings to determine whether the residential restrictions violate the petitioners constitutional rights. The court indicated that there might be a constitutional violation if there was only a limited area in the county of parole where the petitioner could live. Many sex registrants have become homeless or at least have registered as being homeless because the parole boards have treated the homeless as not being in violation of the residential restrictions as long as they do not stay in an area within 2000 feet of a park or school for an extended period of time.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and to those who can afford private counsel it guarantees the right to counsel of their choice. But it also guarantees a fair trial. In some instances those rights contradict each other. For example, part of a right to a fair trial is the right to have counsel who will zealously defend you. But when counsel has a conflict that prevents him/her from zealously representing a defendant the right to a fair trial is violated. The right is only preserved when counsel does not have conflicting responsibilities. This question comes up, for example, when counsel represents two defendants in the same trial. If the defendants have conflicting defenses such as to require counsel for one defendant to point the finger at the other defendant a defendant is denied a fair trial since his/her lawyer ends up pointing the finger at one of the clients jointly represented by the lawyer.

In United States v. Turner The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced the question of conflicting rights when one member of a multi-defendant drug case was arrested after all of the other defendants had either plead of been convicted. The same lawyer who represented one of the other defendants in sentencing was hired to represent Roosevelt Turner who had recently been arrested. The United States Attorney complained about a possible conflict and the United States District Judge removed Turner’s attorney. Turner went to trial with another attorney and appealed. The appellate court reversed the conviction because Turner had been denied the attorney of his choice.

The only evidence the United States Attorney raised to show a conflict was that either Roosevelt or Anthony Womack both of whom were represented by Irl Baris might want to testify against the other or that one of them might be subpoened to testify against the other. But the appellate court said that the fact that something might happen was not enough to deny a defendant his choice of attorneys. In fact neither turned against the other or was subpoenaed to testify against the other.

Since the denial of Turner the right to the attorney of his choice is a structural error Turner is entitled to a new trial. Afterall no one could tell if he would have been convicted with a different attorney.

The California Supreme court ruled in People vs McKee that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP) is subject to an equal protection challenge.

Proposition 83, also known as Jessica’s Law,passed by California voters, changed the SVP from a civil commitment that had to be renewed every two years, only if the government proved by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard that a person met the SVP requirements, to an indefinite commitment where the committed person must prove that he/she does not meet the standards by a preponderance of the evidence standard.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with an order to hold a hearing, using a strict scrutiny standard, to determine if the SVP violates equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires equal treatment for people equally situated. This does not mean all people must be treated equally. But it does mean that people who are similar circumstances, as to relevant criteria must be treated equally. In this case the California Supreme Court determined that those alleged to be sexually violent predators are similarly situated with those alleged to be mentally disordered offenders (MDO) and those found to be not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). All three groups involve people who committed violent felonies as a result of mental illness. While the predicate felonies for each of the categories is somewhat different, they all involve violent offenses and they are all determined to be a danger to society.

But unlike the MDO and NGI, the SVP ia given an indeterminate sentence and is not given a jury trial, after the initial determination, where the jury must find that the people have proven their case by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The MDO is give a one year commitment. After the initial commitment the SVG has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard. The NGI’s term is limited to the maximum for the alleged crime.

On remand the people must attempt to show that there is a reasonable distinction between those who come under the SVP and those who are either MDO or NGI and that as a result of that distinction indefinite commitments and putting the burden of proof on the person committed is reasonable. If they cannot do that, pending any changes the legislature wants to make in the law those alleged to be sexually violent predators will be dealt with in the same manner as mentally disordered offenders.

Lawyers for U. S. Attorney Daniel Zachem filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court challenging a D. C. Circuit Court decision denying him immunity in a case in which Zachem and Suzanne Bailey-Jones, a District of Columbia Superior Court official removed Peter Atherton from the grand jury. The rule allows only the presiding judge or his/her designate to remove grand jurors. But after complaints from other members of the grand jury that Atherton was disruptive Zachem went to Bailey-Jones who removed Zachem from the grand jury.

The District Court dismissed Atherton’s suits after ruling inter alia that Bailey-Jones and Zachem were entitled to absolute immunity. The D. C. Circuit ruled that neither Bailey Jones or Zachem had absolute immunity. Absolute immunity only applies to officials when they are acting in judicial or advocacy roles. Both Bailey-Jones and Zachem were carrying out administrative duties and therefore were only entitled to limited immunity. Therefore the Circuit Court revived Altherton’s suit at least until the Supreme Court decides on the writ of certiorari.

In United States v. Johnson the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Terry search of Anthony Johnson and affirmed his conviction for possession of a weapon by a convicted felon.

Tammy Anderson a resident of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania called 911. She told them that she saw a white taxicab pull up next to a van across the street from her residence. She said she saw two men get out of the taxicab and she heard a shot. It was too dark to get a decent description of the men but she saw the cab and it had a green light on top. She told the operator her name and telephone number. She described the lot across the street. She told the operator when the the taxicab left and the direction it was going.

Officer John Doll arrived at the lot across the street from Anderson’s house before Anderson got off the phone with the 911 operator but after the taxicab left. He quickly found the taxicab and developed eye contact. However he waited until other officers arrived to stop the vehicle.

For the safety of the officers they took out their guns and ordered Anthony Johnson and the driver of the taxicab, Kenneth Cobb, out of the taxicab and handcuffed them. A revolver with two spent shells was found in the back seat near where Johnson had been sitting.

In analyzing a Terry stop the courts follow a two step process, First they look at the initial stop and then they look at whether steps following the stop were limited to discovering a weapon.

The court found that Anderson provided sufficient information to allow Officer Doll to stop the taxicab and that the searches were appropriate since Anderson’s claim that she heard a gun shot was credible and the safety of the officers demanded the search.

However, I would like to concentrate for a moment on Kenneth Cobb. Apparently he was not arrested. But he was ordered out of the vehicle, handcuffed and searched. When Officer Doll and his colleagues pulled over the taxicab they had a reasonable suspicion that someone in the vehicle had shot a gun. Both Johnson and Cobb had prison records so it was presumably illegal for either one to be in possession of a gun. But Terry says:

At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.

Anderson only heard one gun. Officer Doll only had a reasonable suspicion that one of the men was “armed and dangerous.” So it is equally possible that either Johnson or Cobb had the gun. Thus does that give Officer Doll the right to search both men or neither man?

The Supreme Court in Hemi Group, LLC v. City Of New York limited the use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in cases where the alleged violation of the law is too attenuated from the loss of money.

“RICO provides a private cause of action for ‘any person injured in his business or property’” as a result of 18 USC 1962, the criminal provisions of RICO. “Specifically, §1962(c), makes it ‘unlawful for any person employed by. . . any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate . . . commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”

The City of New York sued Hemi an internet seller of cigarettes for the violating the Jenkins Act which required cigarette sellers who sell cigarettes in interstate commerce to report to each state the names of those who live in the state who buy cigarettes in interstate commerce. Hemi’s failure to comply made it difficult for the State of New York and New York City to collect taxes which they levy for the possession of cigarettes.

But the Supreme Court found the loss by the City of New York to be too attenuated. to accept the city’s theory. It requires, first, for Hemi to report the names of its purchasers to the State of New York. Then the State of New York must report the names to the City of New York. Then purchaser must refuse to pay the tax. And finally the City of New York must go after the buyers who fail to pay the tax.

To make a claim under RICO the legal violation must be both a “but for” cause of the injury and a proximate cause of the injury. Proximate cause requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” But considering the numerous steps between Hemi’s failure to report to the State of New York the names and the city’s failure to enforce the tax law a direct relationship does not exist. Regardless of whether Hemi reported the names the city would not have lost any money if the cigarette purchasers paid their taxes. Also, even if Hemi provided the names the Che supreme court finity would not have collected the unpaid taxes if the State did not provide the names to the City. Thus the city cannot collect from Hemi for its failure to report the names.

Marcus A. Wellons was tried and convicted for rape and murder in Georgia.He was sentenced to death. They must have a strange sense of humor in Georgia. At the end of the trial the jurors gave the judge a chocolate penis and the bailiff a chocolate imitation of a women’s breasts. I do not know what the judge or the bailiff thought but the United States Supreme Court was not amused.

But before the matter got to the Supreme Court Wellons moved for formal discovery and an evidentiary hearing regarding the incident. First he raised the issue on appeal. But he was told that was inappropriate because there was not a written record. Then he raised the issue on a writ of habeas corpus in the state court but he was told that since the issue was decided on appeal a writ of habeas corpus was inappropriate. Finally he went into Federal Court. By the time he got to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals he was told that since the issue was decided in the state court he could not raise it in Federal Court and in any case he loses on the merits.

The United States Supreme Court saw it differently. First, between the time the Eleventh Circuit decided the case and the Supreme Court heard the case, it decided Cone v. Bell, ruling that the fact that the question was raised on direct appeal does not provides an independent and adequate state ground for denying review on habeas. All agree that the Eleventh Circuit violated what was decided in the Supreme Court Cone’s decision. Second the Supreme Court in reviewing the work of the lower courts came to the conclusions that the lower courts did not answer the question as to whether Wellons gets formal discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Rather they attempted to answer whether the conviction should be reversed for the jury’s bad judgment. But as the majority points out that question cannot be answered until after the discovery and the evidentiary hearing is completed. They therefore remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit to consider the Cone issue.The minority (Roberts, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito) feel that since the Eleventh Circuit ruled not only on the Cone issue but also on the merits that the decision on the merits remain and a remand is inappropriate.

Well if anyone thought that Justice Sonia Sotomayor was a bleeding heart liberal they were wrong. Nor is she a Justice Thurgood Marshall or a Justice William J. Brennan who thought that the death penalty was cruel and unusual. Yesterday she wrote on behalf of a 7-2 majority (Justices Stevens and Kennedy in the minority) upholding the death penalty for Holly Wood against claims of incompetence of counsel.

The primary question on appeal was whether counsel’s decision not to investigate was a stategic decision or negligence. The Supreme Court will not reverse a trial court decision in a competence of counsel case if the attorney’s decision is made for strategic reasons and if the decision is reasonable even if the Supreme Court disagrees with the decision. Prior to trial counsel obtained a psychiatric report which showed borderline intelligence. But counsel did not call the psychiatrist to testify nor did the defendant’s lawyers further investigate the report or introduce it into evidence.

The court found that there was enough damaging information in the report that it was a reasonable decision not to place it into evidence or to call the psychiatrist to testify. A second report or investigation of the allegations done in the first report was not done. Justice Stevens’ dissent points out that even if it was not used in the case in chief there was no stategic reason not to use it in the penalty phase of the trial. But Sotomayor claims that since at least two of Wood’s three lawyers thoroughly read and considered the report the rejection of the report had to be for strategic reasons. Therefore according to the majority decision counsel’s actions were not below that which would be expected by competent counsel and therefore they upheld the conviction.