SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF MICHIGAN DECISION

Burt Lancaster was convicted of first degree murder in Michigan for killing his girl friend. He plead diminished capacity but was convicted any way. At the time of the offense there were a number of Michigan appellate decisions upholding a defense of diminished-capacity but the Michigan Supreme Court had not acted on the matter. A diminished-capacity defense allows “a defendant . . . although he was legally sane, [to present] evidence of some mental abnormality to negate the specific intent required to commit a particular crime.”

He obtained a writ of habeas corpus on an unrelated issue and the case was set for a second trial. By the time of the second trial the Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Carpenter, reversed the lower court decisions and found that Michigan law did not permit a plea of diminished-capacity.

The trial court held that Carpenter was retroactive and refused to give a diminished-capacity instruction. Upon losing for a second time Lancaster appealed. “The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that applying Carpenter retroactively to Lancaster’s case did not violate due process, for Carpenter concerned an unambiguous statute that was interpreted by the Michigan Supreme Court for the first time.” The United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision, Monday.

It held, that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Michigan Supreme Court did not “unreasonably [apply] clearly established Federal law, as determined by” the United States Supreme Court as is required under the AEDPA for a Federal Court to grant a writ of habeas corpus. “Only where [the change in the law] is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue” is a failure to apply the law retroactively a violation of due process. Here the Michigan Supreme Court gave a reasonable interpretation of state law on its initial consideration of the law. In such a situation, the court found that, due process does not demand that the change in the law be given solely a prospective application. As a result it reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ grant of habeas corpus.

FLORIDA MANDATES SEARCH WARRANT TO SEARCH CELL PHONE OF IN CUSTODY SUSPECTS

The Florida Supreme Court held this month, that once a cell phone is seized from a suspect who is in custody, the police need a search warrant to view the contents on the phone.

Tyrone Smallwood was a arrested for a robbery of a convenience store. While he wore a mask the cashier recognized his voice as that of a regular customer. At the time of his arrest police seized his cell phone. After Smallwood was arrested and placed in a police car, the arresting officer looked at pictures found on the phone. Among the pictures was one of Smallwood with a gun. Others showed him and his girlfriend with bundles of money simillar to those taken in the robbery. His attorney objected to the pictures being used at trial on Fourth Amendment grounds. But the judge denied the motion. The pictures were introduced at trial and Smallwood was convicted.

On appeal he again argued that the pictures in the phone were viewed in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that a search warrant was necessary to view pictures and data on a cell phone. The United States Supreme Court has previously ruled in

The state Supreme Court agreed and reversed the conviction. The Court pointed to the United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. G in which the Supreme Court ruled that if there is not probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is in a vehicle, a search warrant is needed to search an automobile pursuant to a legal arrest unless the suspect is still in the car. The warrant exception for a warrantless search concurrent with a lawful arrest is based upon two criteria. First, it allows the officer to search for weapons which might be used to injure the officer or others. Second, it prevents the suspect from destroying evidence. Once Smallwood was confined in the police car and no longer within reach of his phone which was in police custody there was no danger that he would use the phone as a weapon or that he would attempt to destroy evidence on the phone. As a result there was no basis under the search pursuant to a legal arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause to search the contents of the phone without obtaining a warrant first.

The Court found that while there was considerable evidence that Smallwood committed the robbery that, a “reasonable possibility [exists] that the improperly admitted photos. . . contributed to his conviction” and remanded the case for a new trial.

As the court made clear, one of the issues in the case involves the changing role of technology in the world. Prior decisions generally found that if an item was legally found in the search of a vehicle or in a search pursuant to a legal arrest officers could open it up and search the contents. The attorney general in Smallwood argued that the search of the contents of a smart phone was no different than the search of the contents of a container. However, the Florida Supreme Court refused to see it that way. It pointed out that a cell phone was a computer and people kept their most private information on the phone. As a result it refused to follow prior “container” decisions of its own Court, the United States Supreme Court and other judicial bodies. We can expect more decisions in the future by various judicial bodies struggling with attempting to interpret technological questions in light of a Federal Constitution that was written in the Eighteenth Century.

MIRANDA WARNINGS AND THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING

There are many interesting legal issues surrounding the Boston Marathon bombing. Today I would like to discuss the Miranda Warning issue. Peace officers investigating the Boston Marathon bombing did not read Dzhokhar Tsarnaev his Miranda rights prior to interrogating him. As any watcher of crime programs on TV knows the cops are supposed to tell a defendant that she/he has the right to remain silent; the right to have his/her attorney present during there questioning and that anything they say may be used against them and if they cannot afford an attorney, an attorney will be appointed to represent them. But contrary to the beliefs of many people the failure to read a defendant the Miranda rights does not result in the dismissal of any charges. Nor does it have any effect unless the person is in custody and is subject to interrogation. But if the defendant is interrogated when he/she is in custody and the Miranda rights are not given normally the statements can not be used against the defendant in court.

However the courts have determined that in some cases it is so important to get information from a person following an arrest that it is not necessary to read the person the Miranda rights which might scare the arrestee into not providing the authorities with vitally important information. For example in the 1984 case of New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court ruled in a case where a suspected rapist hid a gun in a supermarket while being chased by the police that public safety mandated that the officer do whatever was necessary to find the gun even if it required inducing the arrestee to provide information about the gun’s whereabouts without the reading of the Miranda rights.

The Justice Department decided not to immediately give Tsarnaev his Miranda rights on the grounds that they believe that public safety demanded answers to questions such as whether there were additional bombs set to go off and whether he and his brother had help in the bombings. They wanted to know whether other people had similar bombs ready to explode and cause more harm. The feeling was that giving the Miranda warnings would encourage Tsarnaev to remain silent with possible negative effects on public safety if other bombs were exploded.

Of course an arrestee has the right to remain silent regardless of whether the Miranda rights are given. For his own good Tsarnaev had the right to say, “I’m not talking.” No law requires an arrestee or anyone else to answer questions from law enforcement. While the evidence against Tsarnaev seems to be strong he may well have been better off if he asserted his right to remain silent. It is not clear to me that the government could have obtained evidence of his fundamentalist religious views and of the alleged terrorist motive for the bombing without Tsarnaev’s statements to government agents following his arrest. Without such information the case would probable have been prosecuted by the state instead of by the Federal government. Massachusetts, unlike the Federal government does not have capital punishment. Thus if Tsarnaev had kept quiet he might not be facing the death penalty at 19.

SUPREME COURT RULES THAT POSSESSION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA NOT NECESSARILY AN AGGRAVATED FELONY REQUIRING MANDATORY DEPORTATION

Adrian Moncrieffe plead guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute after law enforcement officers found 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. 1 Moncrieffe is a Jamaican citizen, having moved to this country with his parents when he was three years old, and following his conviction the government attempted to deport him. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a person convicted of an aggravated felony must be deported.

While the act does not clearly define the term “aggravated felony” it does state that “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” is an aggravated felony. Generally these are drug crimes punishable by more than one year in prison. But under Federal law “distributing a small amount of marihuana [sic] for no remuneration” is a misdemeanor.

The Supreme Court, last week, ruled that since the Georgia statute does not differentiate between significant quantities of marijuana and small quanitities of marijuana and since it does not distinguish between distribution for remuneration and distributions that are not for remuneration, a conviction under the statute for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana can not be considered an aggravated felony. This does not mean that those convicted of violating the statute will not be deported. It only means that since violations of the statute are not aggravated felonies the judge will have more leeway in determining whether the particular offense deserves deportation.

Notes:

  1. Maybe I am naive living on the left coast but I’ve never heard of anyone being charged with intent to distribute marijuana with only 1.3 grams seized from a automobile. ↩

SUPREME COURT REQUIRES SEARCH WARRANT BEFORE THE NONCONSENSUAL TAKING OF A BLOOD SAMPLE

The Supreme Court, today, in Missouri v. McNeely refused to grant the State of Missouri a per se rule allowing the warrantless taking of a blood sample to determine the blood alcohol level, in cases of suspected driving under the influence.

In a driving under the influence of alcohol case the question that the jury must answer is whether at the time the defendant was driving was she/he under the influence. There are a number of methods of determining whether a person was under the influence but all states allow the use of a blood alcohol test. The blood alcohol tests determines the percentage of alcohol in the blood. Most if not all states now require that the blood alcohol level be below 0.085 percent.

The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant be obtained prior to any search, and particularly when the search requires the invasion of the human body with a needle. However there are numerous exceptions to the rule. A search warrant is not necessary when exigent circumstances such as the destruction of evidence would occur during the time needed to get a search warrant.

The amount of alcohol in the blood dissipates over time. The blood loses between 0.015 and 0.02 percent per hour. The State of Missouri argued that the dissipation necessarily causes an exigent circumstance due to the fear of the loss of evidence during the time it would take to get a search warrant signed by a judge. But the Supreme Court ruled that the dissipation of the alcohol was a factor in determining whether a search warrant was necessary but courts must make a factual inquiry in each warrantless, nonconsensual case to determine if exigent circumstances exist which would excuse the necessity for a search warrant.

Does this mean that anyone stopped for a DUI should refuse to take a blood, urine or breath test and force the officer to get a warrant which can be tested in court. Perhaps but many states including Missouri have a law mandating a one year suspension of one’s driver’s license if you refuse to take an alcohol test.

SECOND CIRCUIT UPHOLDS FIREARMS STATUTE AGAINST SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGE

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Ron Bryant for possessing a firearm to further a drug trafficking offense against a Second Amendment challenge. It held that District of Columbia v. Heller only applies to those who possess weapons for legal reasons and possessing a gun to further a drug offense is illegal and therefore not covered by the Second Amendment.

Bryant was arrested after officers executing a search warrant at his residence found just under a gram of cocaine and a gun in his room. He was indicted and conviction for possession for sale of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm in the furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.

He appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals claiming that the firearms statute as applied to his situation violated the Second Amendment. The Court quoted Heller as saying “whatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” . . . We read this exegesis as an implicit limitation on the exercise of the Second Amendment right to bear arms for “lawful purpose[s],” As a result it upheld Heller’s conviction.

THE SUPREME COURT TIGHTENS THE KNOT ON THE USE OF HABEAS CORPUS

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) prohibits Federal Courts from granting writs of habeas corpus unless the state court decision was:

1)contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
2)based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

Otis Lee Rogers was charged with making criminal threats, assault with a firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Prior to his arraignment he made a Faretta motion demanding his right to represent himself. The motion was granted. However, by the time of his preliminary examination he hired a private attorney. Two months later he fired the attorney and again asserted his Faretta rights. After another two months he asked the court to appoint an attorney for him. The court complied but shortly before trial Rogers reasserted his Faretta rights. He was convicted at trial. After the trial he asked the court to appoint a lawyer to represent him in the filing of a motion for a new trial. The California court refused stating that Rogers did not provide a reason for the appointment of counsel.

He lost his appeals and filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U. S. District Court. The court denied the writ and he appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which granted the writ. The State of California appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit erroneously granted the writ because the state court did not violate “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” In its opinion the Ninth Circuit had cited general Federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the Sixth Amendment and it also cited its own precedent and that of other Courts of Appeal upholding the right to the appointment of counsel for post conviction motions. But the Supreme Court said that was not good enough since the Supreme Court, itself, had not ruled there was a right to appointed counsel for post conviction motions.

It is important to note that the Supreme Court stated:

The Court expresses no view on the merits of the underlying Sixth Amendment principle the respondent urges. And it does not suggest or imply that the underlying issue, if presented on direct review, would be insubstantial. This opinion is instead confined to the determination that the conclusion of the California courts that there was no Sixth Amendment violation is not contrary to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” §2254(d)(1).

The problem with the Supreme Court decision and with AEDPA is that no attempt is made to do justice. Even the Supreme Court admits that Rogers may have unconstitutionally been denied his right to counsel and that if he had counsel the conviction may have been reversed. Justice has not been obtained and an innocent man may be sitting in prison. The AEDPA should be repealed.

SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE RIGHT OF A RESIDENT TO PREVENT AN OFFICER AND A POLICE DOG FROM ENTERING THE FRONT PORCH

Yesterday the Supreme Court ruled in Florida v. Jardines that a police officer may not enter the area surrounding a house with with a drug sniffing dog in order to obtain probable cause to get a search warrant for the house.

Miami-Dade Police Officers Douglas Bartelt and William Pedraja entered the porch in front of Jardine’s residence with a police dog trained to smell marijuana. The dog indicated that there was marijuana in the residence. Based on this information Bartelt obtained a search warrant. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Dade County court and the Florida Supreme Court that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and dismissing the case.

The area “immediately surrounding and associated” with a home is known as the curtilage. Traditionally this area is given the same protection as the residence itself. The homeowner may explicitly or implicitly give consent to entry into this area. For example, by placing a door knocker on the door, the homeowner gives consent to friends relatives and, others to enter the property, knock on the door, wait a brief period, and leave if there is no reply. But such consent does not extend to allowing police to enter the property with a drug sniffing dog for the purpose of obtaining probable cause to arrest the residents.

COURT REMANDS CASE FOR HEARING ON WHETHER COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Jose Gilberto Portillo, who does not speak English, was convicted along with two of his friends of the murder of an elderly couple during a residential burglary in Washington D. C. Prior to the trial the court appointed a lawyer to represent him and then appointed a second lawyer who spoke Spanish.

Portillo wrote a letter to the judge complaining about his inability to communicate with his lawyers. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that indigent defendants receive competent legal representation. The court has a duty to appoint counsel when a defendant is unable, for financial reasons, to retain counsel. In determining whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel the court must determine:

(1) whether counsel conferred with the defendant as often as necessary and advised him of his rights, (2) whether counsel elicited from the defendant matters of defense and then ascertained if any potential defenses were unavailable, and (3) whether counsel conducted both factual and legal investigation sufficiently in advance to permit reflection and to determine if matters of defense could be developed. 1

While the trial court held a hearing on Portillo’s letter and gave Portillo a chance to answer questions it failed to ask questions regarding the concerns Portillo raised in his letter or the Monroe/Mathews criteria name above. Rather most of the questions seemed to belittle Portillo. 2 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that

[T]he trial court’s inquiry was insufficient to determine whether defense counsel’s preparation was within the range of competence required in preparing criminal cases. The only question the trial court asked regarding counsel’s preparation for trial was whether they had an investigator working on the case. However, factual investigation is only one criterion of defense counsel’s preparation. Furthermore, appellant’s concerns were primarily related to what he perceived as a lack of communication, and the trial court did not follow up on appellant’s concerns with questions to appellant or counsel to determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations.

Therefore the Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Portillo received adequate assistance of counsel and if not to grant him a new trial.

Notes:

  1. Matthews v. United States, 459 A.2d 1063, 1065 (D.C. 1983) (citing Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 821) ↩
  2. See link to Portillo v. United States above for extensive quotations. ↩

MARYLAND APPEALS THE DEATH PENALTY

Maryland became the eighteenth state to not have a death penalty. Under the leadership of Governor Martin O’Malley the legislature repealed the death penalty. Legislators gave four primary reasons for repealing the death penalty:

It’s too expensive. You may assume that executing prisoners is more cost-effective than housing them for life. However, someone typically remains on death row for many years and will accrue massive legal bills in an effort to save his life. These costs can sometimes exceed the price of housing an inmate for life.

It’s prone to errors. The criminal justice system is not infallible, and sometimes mistakes are made. Perhaps there is no greater tragedy of justice than when an innocent man is put to death only to be exonerated of the crime posthumously.

It’s racially biased. Of the five men currently on death row in Maryland, four are African-Americans who have been accused of killing a white person, reports Reuters. This speaks volumes of the possible prejudice and bias with juries, prosecutors, and the justice system.

It’s not a deterrent. There is no support for the notion that states with the death penalty have a lower murder rate than states without it, lawmakers argued. In fact, the opposite may be true, Gov. O’Malley has said.

The State Senate passed repeal on March 6 by a vote of 27-20 and the House of Delegates passed the legislation, Friday, by a vote of 82-56. O’Malley has promised to sign it.

Since 2007 five other states: Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, New York, and New Jersey have abolished the death penalty. There are five people currently on death row in Maryland. They are not directly affected by the legislation but Governor O’Malley may commute their sentences to to life without parole.