ACCIDENTAL WEAPONS DISCHARGE RESULTS IN TEN YEAR PRISON ENHANCEMENT

The Supreme Court ruled that an accidental discharge of a gun during a drug trafficking or violent crime results in a mandatory ten year sentence in addition to the punishment for the underlying offense pursuant to Title 18 U. S C. Section 924(c)91)(A).

Under Title 18 U. S C. Section 924(c)91)(A) the possession of a gun during certain crimes results in an additional sentence of five years, the brandishing of a weapon during the commission of the same crimes results in an additional seven years and the discharge of a weapon during the commission of the crimes results in an additional sentence of ten years. The question before the Supreme Court in Dean v. United States was whether the government had to prove that the discharge occurred with a particular intent or whether the accidental discharge of the weapon was sufficient.

Reading the statute, it is not surprising that the court found that the government did not have to prove any intent. The statute states:

“[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime–

“(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;

“(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and

“(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.”

But as Justice Stevens points out in dissent:

Accidents happen, but they seldom give rise to criminal liability. Indeed, if they cause no harm they seldom give rise to any liability. The Court today nevertheless holds that petitioner is subject to a mandatory additional sentence–a species of criminal liability–for an accident that caused no harm. For two reasons, 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A)(iii) should not be so construed. First, the structure of §924(c)(1)(A) suggests that Congress intended to provide escalating sentences for increasingly culpable conduct and that the discharge provision therefore applies only to intentional discharges. Second, even if the statute did not affirmatively support that inference, the common-law presumption that provisions imposing criminal penalties require proof of mens rea would lead to the same conclusion.

As any first year law student learns each crimes must have a mens rea or in English an intent. With exception of minor crimes such as traffic violations we do imprison individuals unless they commit an act which society finds to be a crime and that the act is committed with a particular intent to do the act. In some cases it may suffice that the act was knowingly done. In others it may be with the intent to injure someone. But rarely, except in minor crimes, is no intent or mens rea needed. Again quoting Justice Stevens:

[T]he presumption that criminal provisions include an intent requirement would lead me to the same conclusion. Consistent with the common-law tradition, the requirement of mens rea has long been the rule of our criminal jurisprudence. . . . The concept of crime as a “concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand … took deep and early root in American soil.” . . . Legislating against that backdrop, States often omitted intent elements when codifying the criminal law, and “courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.” . . . Similarly, absent a clear statement by Congress that it intended to create a strict-liability offense, a mens rea requirement has generally been presumed in federal statutes. . . . With only a few narrowly delineated exceptions for such crimes as statutory rape and public welfare offenses, the presumption remains the rule today. . . .