The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction in a case where the District court wrongly denied the defendant motion to dismiss on illegal search and seizure grounds.

Two United States marshals went to the Missouri residence of Gary McMullin, looking for Daryl Crowder who was wanted on an Illinois warrant. While Marshall Newlin knocked at the front door, Marshall Davis covered the back door. McMullin consented to Newlin coming in and he told the marshal that he was having coffee with his uncle.

Simultaneously Crowder ran out into the back yard and he was arrested by Davis. Newlin went into the back yard to assist in the arrest and McMullin also went out.

Newlin handcuffed McMullin and physically brought him back into the kitchen. Back in the house, Newlin noticed some ammunition in an ashtray. He then asked whether there were any guns in the residence. McMullin pointed out several weapons and McMullin was arrested for possession of weapons by a convicted felon.

There is no question that Marshal Newlin had consent to enter the residence. But the issue on appeal is whether he had consent for the second entry into the residence.

The core value behind the Fourth Amendment is to protect an individual’s privacy in his/her home. As the court stated

In particular, Fourth Amendment law recognizes the inherent sanctity of a person’s house. The caselaw has consistently recognized that considerably more protection is to be afforded a home than other premises. The leading decisions . . . are each heavily predicated upon the ancient precept that ‘a man’s home is his castle. . . . Therefore, “to search a private place, person, or effect, law enforcement must obtain from a judicial officer a search warrant supported by probable cause.

The court considered two exceptions to the warrant requirement — exigent circumstances and consent. The court found no exigent circumstances requiring the reentry into the residence which would require that “lives are threatened, a suspect’s escape is imminent, or evidence is about to be destroyed.”

The issue of consent is a little more difficult. Does the consent for the initial entry cover the second entry. The court found it did not. While there are cases where courts have found the contrary. Generally in those cases the re-entry occurred shortly after a brief exit to get help or some similar purpose.

The court gives only short consideration to what I consider to be a major issue. At the time of the re-entry McMullin is in handcuffs and he was physically moved into the house. He was under the control of the marshal he may have well felt that he did not have the power to refuse consent. So I doubt any withdrawal of consent or giving of consent would have been in voluntary.

In any case the court came to the right decision and reversed the conviction.