The Ninth Circuit denied an appeal by the Coronado, California Police Department and Officer Brian McPherson from a denial of a summary judgment motion in a 42 U. S. C. 1983 action by Carl Bryan after McPherson used a taser on Bryan during a stop for failure to wear a seatbelt.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action claiming qualified immunity. The court refused to dismiss the action finding that use of the taser was unconstitutionally excessive and a violation of Bryan’s clearly established rights.

One day in the summer of 2005 McPherson stopped Bryan for failure to have his seatbelt on. He ordered Bryan to pull his car over to the curb and to turn down his radio. After first blankly staring ahead Bryan complied with the order. There is some question about what happened next. McPherson says he ordered Bryan to stay in the car. Bryan said he did not hear McPherson and and he got out of the car. McPherson claims that Bryan took a step towards him but the physical evidence showed that Bryan was fifteen to twenty five feet away from McPherson and not facing him. McPherson then shot Bryan with his taser causing hospitalization.

When a motion for summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, is denied on appeal the court must determine whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right and whether the right was “clearly established in light of the specific context of the case”

When excessive force is used the Fourth Amendment is violated. The court “balance[s] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” The court found that the taser which uses an electrical impulse to override “the victim’s central nervous system, paralyzing the muscles throughout the body, rendering the target limp and helpless” to be a weapon of intermediate or medium force requiring “a strong government interest that compels the employment of such force.”

The government’s interest is determined by examining three core factors:

(1) the severity of the crime at issue,
(2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
(3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

The court found that none of these exist. The charged crime was an infraction and even if McPherson thought that misdemeanor had occurred violence was not involved. The trial court and the evidence before the appellate court showed no evidence of any attempt to resist arrest or of a threat to the officer. Furthermore the officer failed to warn Bryan of the possible use of force and McPherson knew that back up officers were on the way and would soon arrive. As a result the Ninth Circuit found that considering all of the circumstance McPherson use of the taser was the use of excessive force.

Finally the court found that McPherson was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer facing a situation where it was only a minor crime alleged and knowing that a taser injury can cause severe damage should know that the use of the taser would violate the Fourth Amendment.

Joshua Lee Howe was indicted and tried on charges of conspiracy to commit a robbery and kidnapping resulting in felony murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; felony murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a) & 2; kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) & 2; being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1) in the Eastern District of Arkansas in relation to the robbery, kidnapping and murder of Jeremy Deshon Gaither.

Howe was acquitted of of felony murder and of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence He was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury hung on on the conspiracy and kidnapping counts.

Over the objection of Howe the government’s motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice to refiling charges was granted. Then he was reindicted on various charges including the conspiracy and kidnapping counts. He moved to dismiss the conspiracy and kidnapping charges on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel ground. His motion was denied and he appealed.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no one shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”

Accordingly, once jeopardy has attached and terminated as to a particular offense, the government may not bring a new prosecution or punish the defendant again for the same offense.

But a defendant can be retried on charges where he/she has been placed in jeopardy but jeopardy has not been terminated. This is the case where the jury is hung. But it is not the case where the jury finds a defendant not guilty and then the government charges him/her with a lesser included offense. A lesser included offense is in which all of the elements of the offense are found in the greater offense, For example kidnapping is a lesser included offense of kidnapping resulting in felony murder. For both you must prove kidnapping but for the greater offense you must also proved that it resulted in felony murder.

The Eighth Circuit found that the charging of the lesser included kidnapping charge was not a successive prosecution to the kidnapping resulting in felony murder charge since jeopardy never terminated on the kidnapping resulting in felony murder charge. In the original trial the government charged both the greater offense and the lesser included offense. The jury in that case found him not guilty of the greater offense and hung on the lesser offense. Therefore jeopardy never terminated on the lesser offense and the government can recharge in the new indictment.

As to the conspiracy to kidnap resulting in felony murder in the original trial and the conspiracy to kidnap lesser included offense in the second trial, since the jury hung in the first trial, jeopardy did not terminate and the Fifth Amendment is not violated by pursuing the lesser included offense.

Collateral estoppel prevents the retrial of a charge where a jury in a prior trial necessarily found against the government on an element that the government must prove in the second trial. Since the original jury could have acquitted Howe on the felony murder charges by finding that he was not guilty of the robbery and by hanging on the kidnapping the jury did not necesarily find against the government on the kidnapping charge and the government is not collaterlally estopped from bringing the kidnapping charge in the second trial.

Recentlly, measures to legalize marijuana have been introduced in Washington and New Hampshire. Earlier this year simillar measures were introduced in California and Massachusetts. Other states are considering proposals which would either legalize medical marijuana or decriminalize its possession. In California, sufficent signatures have been raised to place legalization on the ballot.

The Washington bill would mandate the sale of marijuana in the 160 state run liquor stores and it place a 15 per cent tax on the sales. In Washington, as in other states, measures to reform marijuana laws are largely motivated by the need to find new sources for taxes.

According to Allen St. Pierre, executive director or NORML, a marijuana advocacy organization, fourteen states legalize medical marijuana and thirteen states passed decriminalization statutes.

While there is increased support for reform of marijuana laws it is unlikely that marijuana will be legalized in any state this year. There is still much opposition. Ron Brooks, president of the National Narcotics Officers’ Associations’ Coalition, for example, points out that legalization may lead to more automobile accidents.

But the stimulus for reform is growing and we are likely to see major change over the next several years. After all fifteen years ago medical marijuana was unheard of.

An article in the New York Times raises the question as to whether the trial of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed On charges of masterminding the 9/11 attack on the Word Trade Center and on United Flight 93 will be tried in New York or whether the venue will be changed to another city.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendent in a criminal case , among other rights, the right to an” impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” But the right to venue can be waived. In such cases the defendant must make a motion and the court must find that a change of venue is necessary to guarantee a fair trial.

Thus, the first question is whether Khalid Shaikh Mohammed will request a change of venue. Of course this assumes that there will be a trial. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed has stated that he wants to plead guilty. In which there will be no need for a trial or to consider the venue question.

But assuming that he does not plead guilty Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and his attorney will have to decide whether to request a change of venue. The question is not as easy as it might seem. At first glance one would want to get out of New York City as fast as possible. Many New Yorkers had friends and relatives killed on 9/11 and may be quite biased. Picking a jury that will give Mohammed a fair trial may be a near impossible task. But New York is a diverse community known for not imposing the death sentence. Thus if the goal is to save his life his defense team may decide not to move for a change of venue.

But even if the defense decides to consider a change in venue they may find that it is inappropriate. They will be required to hire experts to see if Mohammed is more likely to get a fair trial in each city. The expert will poll individuals in New York City and several other cities to determine the liklihood of getting a fair trial in New York and other chosen cities. In previous terrorist trials polls have have found that it is not the advantage of the alleged terrorist. In the case of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman the defense planned to request a change of venue but after the polling was done they changed their mind since there did not seem to be a clear advantage to a change of venue. The 9/11 attack is known nationwide and it may be impossible a better jury outside of New York City. While the attack on the World Trade Center occurred in New York it resulted in nationwide consequences and a nationwide stigma against anyone who may have been connected to the attack.

U. S. District Judge Charles Breyer refused a request by the ACLU for an order to forbid the state of California from enforcing a proposition which requires that everyone arrested on felony charges be required to give a DNA sample.

The ACLU has sued the state to forbid the enforcement of Proposition 69 which required the taking of a DNA sample from everyone arrested on a felony charge. Prior to the passage of Proposition 69 only those convicted of a sex crime or a serious felony were required to provide DNA samples. The ACLU moved for an order pending the resolution of the suit requiring the state not to enforce the proposition. The ACLU claimed that taking of DNA samples on everyone who is arrested on a felony instead of limiting the samples to those who committed crimes that can be detected by DNA testing. The Fourth Amendment allows only reasonable searches and the ACLU is arguing that the taking of a DNA sample from one’s mouth is a search and that it is unreasonable to take a saliva sample from someone who is not convicted of a crime or from someone charged with a crime where a DNA sample could not help prove guilt or innocence.

But Judge Brewer ruled that DNA is a tool used to identify people such as finger prints and therefore it is not unreasonable to take a sample. As a result he held that the ACLU is unlikely to win its suit. Therefore he denied the request for a temporary order prohibiting enforcement of the proposition while the suit is pending.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the forfeiture of the proceeds of the sale of a warehouse worth $345,000 used to grow marijuana in Oakland.

Thomas Grossi owned an Oakland warehouse raided by the California Highway Patrol and the DEA in June of 2004. They seized 2400 plants. He was indicted and convicted of maintaining a property where marijuana was grown and sentenced to two and a half years in prison and forfeiture of the warehouse.

On appeal he argued that forfeiture of the warehouse violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. However the Ninth Circuit ruled that since the maximum permissible punishment is over $345,000 the punishment is not cruel and unusual.

Unlike other recessions, crime has decreased during the current  recession. During the first half of the year murder and manslaughter decreased by ten per cent according to the FBI’s latest report. Property crimes fell by cent and violent crimes by 4.4 per cent.

At the same time the number of people sentenced to death has decreased. But the number of executions has increased. Due to the time lag between the time an individual is charged with murder and the time the person would be convicted of murder this cannot be credited to the recession. The length of time between a conviction and an execution can be 20 years.

Nashville police went to the residence of Derrick Archibald to serve an arrest warrant. It took approximate ten minutes from the time they knocked on the door for Archibald to open the door. During that time the officer nearest the door only heard one person inside.

When Archibald opened the door an officer momentarily stepped inside the residence, grabbed him, pulled him outside, handcuffed him and arrested him. Then officers conducted a protective sweep of the unit. During the sweep the officers found cocaine on a table. They used the cocaine to show probable cause for a search warrant. Whille searching the residence pursuant to the search warrant they found a gun. He was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a gun.

In Maryland v. Buie

the Supreme Court . . . identified two types of warrantless protective sweeps of a residence that are constitutionally permissible immediately following an arrest. The first type allows officers to ‘look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.’ . . . The second type of sweep goes “beyond” immediately adjoining areas but is confined to “such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers. ‘. . . The first type of sweep requires no probable cause or reasonable suspicion, while the second requires “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.’

Before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals the government argued both Buie prongs. But the court found that the government had not argued that the search was permissible under the first prong which does not require probable cause but which does require the search to be in an area adjacent to the arrest before the District Court and therefore it waived the argument.

But in any case the court found that the search of the residence did not meet either Buie prong and therefore the search warrant was not based upon probable cause and the gun must be suppressed. It did not meet the first prong because the arrest occurred in the doorway and therefore the`search of the entire unit was not in the`area immediately adjacent to the arrest. Nor did it meet the second prong. The officers did not have articulable facts to base a reasonable belief upon that there was another person in the residence. The government’s argument that Archibald was a dangerous criminal is not relevant since it is not related to the requirement that there be facts showing that the officers were in danger from other people in the unit.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled yesterday that an Idaho conviction for which the defendant received a pardon under Idaho law remains a prior conviction for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Clinton DeWitt Bays, Jr. pleaded guilty to a charges of being a drug user in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 78 months in the Federal Penitentiary and he appealed claiming that the District Court judge wrongly considered 1992 convictions in Idaho for two counts of vehicular manslaughter and one count of aggravated driving under the influence. The state charges were pardoned in 2007 by State of Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole. The pardon restored “all civil, political, and other rights enjoyed prior to the commission of the crime.”

Section 4A1.2(j) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
. . . states that sentences for expunged convictions are not included when determining a defendant’s criminal history category. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(j) (2008). Application Note 10 to section 4A1.2 states, however, that previous convictions which are “set aside or . . . pardoned for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law” are to be counted. Id. § 4A1.2 cmt.
n.10.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Idaho pardon was not an expungement for the purpose of the Guidelines because it was not a complete removal from Bays’ criminal record. Nor was it necessarily unrelated to innocence or errors of law. Rather it was given in order to restore his civil rights and to remove the stigma associated with a conviction. As such it is not an expungement under the Guideline and it can be used to determine Bays’ criminal history. In fact Idaho has a separate expungement statute which allows a defendent to petition the court for an expungement that vacates the conviction and it becomes a nullity. While this statute was not before the Ninth Circuit it is likely that an expunged conviction under this statute would not count in determining a criminal history score.

The one thing that is certain is that each state has different pardoning and expungement statutes. Each pardon statute and each expungement statute must be considered separately to determine whether it is exempt from the criminal history score granted as part of a guidelines determination.

The California Third District Court of Appeal ruled that El Dorado County Superior Court Judge Douglas Phimister wrongly removed Gilbert Maines as counsel for Nancy Garrido in the kidnapping case of Jaycee Duggard.

Last month Judge Phimister removed Maines as counsel for Garrido who is charged along with her husband Phillip with kidnapping and sexually abusing Duggard 18 years ago in South Lake Tahoe. Judge Phimister claimed to have information that Maines shared confidential information about Gerrido while he was drunk at his country club and removed him from the case. But Maines provided affidavits to the Third District Court of Appeals from witnesses stating that he was not drunk and that he did not discuss any confidential information.

However, the appelate court did not reinstate Maines as Duggard’s counsel. Phimister claims to have additional evidence of misconduct by Maines so the Court returned the case to Judge Phimister and ordered him to decide wheter or not to remove Maines from the case by December 24.