McDONALD v. CHICAGO–PART II

Besides Alito’s plurality decision in McDonald v. Chicago there are concurring opinions by Thomas and Scalia as well as dissents by Stevens and Breyer. It was a 5-4 decision with Alito, Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and Roberts in the majority. The most interesting of the decisions is Thomas’. He agreed with the plurality that the Second Amendment applies to the states. But instead of basing his decision on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he based his decision on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

During the Twentieth Century the courts incorporated most of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. They found that the Fourteenth Amendment required state governments to respect the rights found in most of the first eight amendments to the
Constitution. They did this by saying that the Due Process Clause incorporated the rights.

The problem with this interpretation is that the language of the Due Process Clause only applies to procedural rights and not to substantive rights. It states: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.] Thus it would apply to the procedural guarantee of the right to a jury but not to the substantive right guaranteeing the right to assembly or to bear arms. Scholars have long recognized this fiction.

The easy answer to the problem is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause governs the incorporation of the substantive rights. It reads: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States[.]” The language “privileges or immunities” is taken from Article IV, §2, cl. 1 of the Constitution which provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” At the time the Constitution was written the term “privileges” was synonymous with the term “rights.” Thus on the face of it the Privileges or Immunities Clause guarantees that the states will not violate the rights that citizens of the United States are entitled to under the Federal Constitution.

But the problem with this is a long history of interpretation going back to the Nineteenth Century prior to any decisions involving incorporation. The Supreme Court in the 1873 Slaughter House Cases ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause only applied to those rights “which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws” and three years later in United States v. Cruikshank it ruled that the right to peaceably assemble codified in the First Amendment was not a privilege of United States citizenship because ‘the right . . . existed long before the adoption of the Constitution.’” Likewise it ruled that “the right to keep and bear arms was not a privilege of United States citizenship because it was not ‘in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.’”

One of the cardinal rules of interpretation is that no section of a document is meaningless. There must be a reason for every section. Yet if you accept the Slaughter House Cases and Cruikshank, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is meaningless. It adds absolutely nothing to the document. So the question is why is the plurality opinion based upon the Due Process Clause where it obviously does not fit and not on the Privileges or Immunities Clause where it is a much better fit. The answer is “tradition” or to put it in legalese “stare decisis.” “Stare decisis,” according to my old edition of Black’s Law Dictionary means “to abide by, or adhere to decided cases” or, alternatively, the “[d]octrine that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same.” Alito’s plurality opinion says

We see no need to reconsider that interpretation here. For many decades, the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. We therefore decline to disturb the Slaughter-House holding.

Thus no one is saying that Thomas is wrong. But the other justices are merely saying we have accepted this fiction for years and we see no reason to change it. But as Thomas says, “stare decisis is only an “adjunct” of our duty as judges to decide by our best lights what the Constitution means. . . . It is not an inexorable command.”