SECOND CIRCUIT REVERSES CONVICTION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL TO ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL SEX

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that United States law does not prohibit travel between two countries “with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct.” ¹

Israel Weingartin, a U. S. citizen, living in Belgium repeatedly sexually molested his daughter. When it became clear that he was no longer wanted in Belgium, he moved his family to Israel. In 1997 Weingartin and his daughter flew to New York where his father was dying. In 2008 they returned to the United States. During the trips he continued to molest his daughter. ²Whenever she complained he beat her.

Years later ³ when the abuse became known to New York authorities he was tried on a five count indictment. Counts One and Four alleged in relation to the travel from Israel to New York in 1997 that he violated 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) by transporting his daughter in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct and 18 U.S.C. 2423(b) by traveling in foreign commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct. Similarly he was charged in Counts Two and Five in relation to their 2007 travel from New York to Antwerp. Count Three, the subject of the decision involved a charge of violating Section 2423(b) for the travel from Belgium to Israel.

The general rule is that, unless the intent of Congress, is to contrary laws do not applies outside of United States territory. While the Court had no problem finding that Congress intended Section 2423 to apply outside of United States territory, at least as far as travel to or from the United States, it could find no proof of intent to apply the law for travel between two foreign nation without a nexus involving the United States. ⁴After all the statute applies to one who “travels in foreign commerce.” ⁵

Whether the “victory’ will mean anything to Weingartin is questionable. The case was returned to the District Court for resentencing. During the original sentencing he was sentenced to ten years on each of the first three counts to run consecutively and to ten years on each of the last two counts to run concurrently with each other and with the first three counts for a total of thirty years. The court using the same scheme could reduce the sentence to twenty years but it is not mandated to do so.