SUPREME COURT RULES ON THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

Some Supreme Court decisions are earthshaking (Brown v. Board of Education, Miranda, etc). Others are not. United States v. Tinklenberg is in the later group. I suspect we will rarely see it cited. It affects only those who live in the boundaries of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) and it only rules on the meaning of a phrase in the Speedy Trial Act. But it was important enough that the Supreme Court granted certiorari and gave a full signed decision.

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 provides that in a criminal case the trial shall begin within 70 days from the later of the filing of an information or complaint or from the defendant’s first appearance in the case. However it excludes a number of occurrences from the seventy day period. One of these is “ delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.”

While the other circuits have excluded all of the time necessary to file, here and rule upon motions the Sixth Circuit ruled that only the time which actually delays a trial should be excluded. Both interpretations are reasonable and the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation is perhaps more literal. But the Supreme Court ruled against the Sixth Circuit, yesterday. It based its ruling on six points:

First, subparagraph (D) clarifies that the trial court should measure the period of excludable delay for a pretrial motion “from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of such motion,” but nowhere does it mention the date on which the trial begins or was expected to begin. . . Second, we are impressed that during the 37 years since Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act, every Court of Appeals has considered the question before us now, and every Court of Appeals, implicitly or explicitly, has rejected the interpretation that the Sixth Circuit adopted in this case. . . . Third, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would make the subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to administer. And in doing so, it would significantly hinder the Speedy Trial Act’s efforts to secure fair and efficient criminal trial proceedings. . . . Moreover, what is to happen if several excludable and several nonexcludable potential causes of delay ( e.g., pre-trial motions to take depositions, potential scheduling conflicts, various health examinations, etc.) coincide, particularly in multidefendant cases? . . . Fourth, we are reinforced in our conclusion by the difficulty of squaring the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation with this Court’s precedent. In Henderson v. United States , 476 U. S. 321 (1986) , the Court rejected the contention that the exclusion provision for pretrial motions governs only reasonable delays. The Court there concluded (as the Court of Appeals had held) that the exclusion “was intended to be automatic.” . . . Fifth, for those who find legislative history useful, it is worthwhile noting, (as this Court noted in Henderson ) that the Senate Report concerning the reenactment of the provision in 1979 described it, along with the other provisions in §3161(h)(1), as referring to “specific and recurring periods of time often found in criminal cases,” and characterized them as “automatically excludable delay,” . . . Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one under paragraph (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting from,” the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would potentially extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical competency examinations, interlocutory appeals, consideration of plea agreements, and the absence of essential witnesses. .

But what it all comes down to, despite the legal jargon, is most of the country has been interpreting the phrase one way and we see no reason to change. Contrary to popular thought the law is not black or white and the Supreme Court has considerable discretion when it comes to interpreting the law and in this case it used its discretion. It is neither wrong nor right but it dictates an interpretation that will be universally followed throughout the country and that in itself is part of the reason we have a Supreme Court.