Robert Simmons was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He appealed on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.,

His housemate called the police and complained that a couple of days beforehand Simmons threatened him with a gun. The police arrived at 1:00 a.m. His housemate was waiting for them. Simmons was in his bed.

Simmons got up and the police asked him questions in the hallway about whether he had a gun, where the gun was located and disputes he had with his housemate. Simmons was cooperative and told the police that he had a gun in his room.

The police then searched the room.

The questions raised on appeal was the admissibility of Simmons answers to the police questions since they were asked without the giving of Miranda warnings and the admissibility of the items found in the room including the gun.

The Second Circuit found the statements admissible under the Fifth Amendment exception to the MIranda rule for the answers to questions asked for public safety reasons. The public safety exception does not require that Miranda warnings “precede questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety or for the safety of the arresting officers for a suspect’s answers to be admitted as evidence of his guilt.” The court found that the officers had sufficient concern about possible injury to themselves, Simmons ant the housemate to avoid giving the Miranda warnings, even though the scope of the questioning exceeding that necessary to find out whether there was a gun and where it was located. Considering the pressure of the moment the officers could be excused for the additional questioning.

But the Circuit Court reversed the District Court’s upholding the search of the room and remanded the case to the District Court. The government claimed that the search of the room was justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant rule. The exception allows a warrantless search “when the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” But the court did not find the existence of exigent circumstances. Simmons was in the hallway. The apartment was full of police. One of the officers was blocking the door to the bedroom so he could not get the gun. There was no reasons that the search could not be delayed until a search warrant was obtained. A person’s house is particularly protected from warrantless seaches and therefore the court reversed the conviction pending further action of the trial court.

Recently we seem to be having a run of double jeopardy cases. I don’t believe we should credit the Roger Clemens case for the run but it did seem to start with him. Today, we look at a rather unique Ninth Circuit case.

Gabriel Alvarez-Moreno was charged in Federal Court with two counts of transporting undocumented immigrants for profit. Shortly before his trial his attorney and the Assistant U. S. Attorney agreed that a jury trial would be waived and a court trial would be held. However, Alvarez-Moreno never signed the necessary documents and the judge did not voir dire him to insure that the waiver was voluntary. He was convicted on both counts.

Shortly after the trial and before sentencing his attorney moved to vacate the sentence based on the failure to comply with the waiver requirements. The government suggested that the motion be considered an untimely motion for a new trial or in the alternative that the judge sua sponte declare a mistrial.Alvarez-Moreno objected to the new trial motion. The court ordered a new trial and Alvarez-Moreno appealed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there are three occasions when a new trial can be ordered without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, when the defendant appeals a conviction and the court orders a new trial. By appealing the defendant waives his/her right against double jeopardy. Second, when a mistrial is declared pursuant to federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Section 26.3. It only operates to permit a second trial if manifest necessity exists and there is no judicial or prosecutorial overreaching aimed at triggering the mistrial. Furthermore the court held that the mistrial must be declared before the verdict is reached. Finally a new trial is permissible if it is as a result for a motion for a new trial is made by the defendant. Again a motion for a new trial acts as a waiver of double jeopardy claims. None of these applied to Alvarez-Moreno and therefore a second trial was prohibited.

José A. García-Ortiz was convicted on three counts: Hobbs Act robbery; aiding and abetting the unlawful carrying and use of a firearm during and in relation to the robbery, and aiding and abetting the death of an accomplice in the commission of an armed robbery. He raised a number of issues on appeal, the most important of which was that convicting him of both using a gun in the commission of an armed robbery and aiding and abetting the death of an accomplice in an armed robbery violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy.

The unlawful use of a firearm during a robbery is a lesser included offense of using a gun during the commission of an armed robbery resulting in the death of an accomplice. A lesser included offense is one that has all of the elements of the greater offense. All of the elements of using a gun during an armed robbery are also elements of aiding and abetting the death of an accomplice during an armed robbery. Of course the greater offense, aiding and abetting the death of an accomplice during an armed robbery has the additional element of the death of an accomplice. In other words anyone who commits the offense of aiding and abetting the death of an accomplice during an armed robbery necessarily also commits the offense of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during an armed robbery.

Thus Garcia-Ortiz argued that he was convicted twice for the same offense. The First Circuit Court of Appeals did not rule directly on the double jeopardy issue. But it found that Congress did not intend to punish individuals twice for the same crime. Under Rutledge v. United States there is a presumption that Congress did not intend to punish for convictions on both offenses. Since the Court could find nothing to the contrary in the charged offenses, it remanded the case to the trial court to dismiss the lesser offense.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a grand jury subpoena against a Fifth Amendment claim for M.H.’s personal records regarding an account in a Swiss bank. The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being forced to make self incriminating statements.

The grand jury subpoenaed from M.H.

[a]ny and all records required to be maintained pur-
suant to 31 C.F.R. § 103.32 [subsequently relocated
to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420] relating to foreign financial
accounts that you had/have a financial interest in, or
signature authority over, including records reflecting
the name in which each such account is maintained,
the number or other designation of such account, the
name and address of the foreign bank or other per-
son with whom such account is maintained, the type
of such account, and the maximum value of each
such account during each specified year.

In plain English the grand jury subpoenaed M.H.’s bank foreign bank records which M.H. was required to maintain by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA). M.H. argued that the provision of the records or the admission that such records do not exist would incriminate him and he claimed that he was protected from providing such by the Fifth Amendment. The government argued successfully that the documents were excluded from Fifth Amendment protection under the Required Documents Doctrine(RDD). Under the RDD documents are exempt from the Fifth Amendment if “(1) the purpose of the government’s inquiry is regulatory, not criminal; (2) the information requested is contained in documents of a kind the regulated party customarily keeps; and (3) the records have public aspects.”

The Court found that the documents subpoenaed under the BSA met the requirements of the RDD for exclusion from the Fifth Amendment requirements. First, as long as the BSA has a regulatory purpose, even though it can also have a criminal purpose, it meets the first criteria of the RDD. Second, most people keep some records regarding their bank accounts. It matters not that the bank also keeps records. Third, while the mere fact that the law requires such records to be kept does not mean that it has a public aspect, that together with the regulatory nature of the act indicates a public purpose.

But who do they think they are fooling. The government admits that the purpose of the grand jury investigation is to determine if M.H. is using the foreign account to avoid paying income tax, which is a crime. Furthermore I suspect that most investigations under the BSA are primarily criminal in nature. The material they are requesting may not be direct evidence of a crime but it certainly helps the government make a criminal case.

Former Lucerne County, Pennsylvania Juvenile Judge Mark Ciavarella Jr. was sentenced to 28 years in Federal prison for excepting bribes from a company that builds private jails in exchange for sending children to the company’s facilities in the “Kids for Cash” scandal. He received a million dollar from the companies building the private jails and he attempted to extort money from the owner of the jails. A colleague on the bench, Michael Conahan, who is yet to be sentenced on related charges, received another million dollars.

In his rush to send juveniles to the private prisons he often denied juveniles their basic constitutional rights. He did not offer them appointed counsel and he demanded statements from them in violation of their right to remain silent. A fifteen year old girl was sentenced to three months for mocking the assistant principal of her school on her MySpace page and a 13 year old boy was locked up for trespassing in a vacant building. As a result the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed over 4000 convictions

A thirteen year old North Carolina boy was removed from his classroom by a uniformed officer. He was taken to a room where he was interrogated by a police officer, a school security guard, and an assistant principal. He was not Mirandized. During the interrogation he made statements that incriminated himself in two burglaries.

An unmirandized statement cannot be used against a defendant if the statement was made while the defendant was being interrogated while the defendant is in custody. The question in juvenile court proceedings and on appeal was whether the teenager was in custody at the time of the interrogation . The defendant does not actually have to be in custody. It is sufficient if the defendant is in a custody-like situation. The juvenile court ruled that he was not in custody. On appeal his attorneys argued that in determining whether the teenager was in custody the juvenile court should have taken into consideration that the teenager was a juvenile. The state argued that the same definition of custody should be used for all regardless of the age of the defendant.

The Supreme Court held last week that the juvenile court should have taken into consideration the defendant’s age. The Supreme Court ruled that a minor’s age must be taken into consideration due to the increased pressure juveniles feel to answer questions posed by law enforcement officials.

Justice Alito dissented saying that the purpose of Miranda was to create a uniform rule. Necessarily when you create a uniform rule it is both over inclusive and under inclusive. Miranda covers some people who do not need the warnings and other people who need stronger warnings. By giving children more protection you are destroying the uniformity of Miranda and opening up the door to more exceptions. However, the Court ruled that it was more important to prevent police from circumventing Miranda than providing one rule for both adults and juveniles.

In Florida v.Powell the Supreme Court decided, last year, that while there is a right to an attorney, under Miranda, both before and during an interrogation, merely telling a suspect that he had a right to an attorney before the commencement of an interrogation and not telling him/her that the right also covered the assistance of an attorney during the interrogation did not violate his/her rights under Miranda. The Court ruled that a logical person would feel that the attorney would not leave at the beginning of the interrogation and would still be present during the interrogation.

The question facing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Jermaine Antwon Warren,his week, was, after Powell’s determination that the right to an attorney existed both before and during the interrogation must the Miranda warning include a temporal section.

Jermaine Warren was arrested on narcotics charges. He was interrogated twice. The first time was at his residence by a parole officer who did not give him any Miranda warning. The trial court excluded this interrogation and the exclusion was confirmed by the Third Circuit. The second interrogation occurred at the police station by the police. He was given a Miranda warning but it was not read from a card. Instead the officer recited it from memory. It included no temporal statement that the right to an attorney would be available either before or during the interrogation.

The Third Circuit found that the post Miranda statement was admissible even if it did not state that the attorney would be available before and during the interrogation. The court found that nothing in the officer’s recitation of the Miranda warnings temporally limited the time the attorney would be able to held and further more that Supreme Court rulings only require that the substance of Miranda warnings be conveyed and that was accomplished. As a result the court upheld the conviction.

Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani the first Guantanamo detainee to be tried civilly was sentenced to life in prison yesterday after a trial on charges stemming from the bombing of the 1998 U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya that killed 224 people by U. S. District Judge
Lewis Kaplan. A New York jury convicted him of one count of conspiracy to damage or destroy U.S. property and found him not guilty on 284 counts of murder and conspiracy.

Ghailani was accused of buying gas tanks and a truck used in the embassy attacks. He did not actually participate in the attack. He flew to Pakistan the day before the attack. ¹After the bombing he worked as a driver and a bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden.

The life sentence was not unexpected. The judge has said that he thought the government was the victim of a lenient jury. While some have questioned the not guilty verdicts on the 284 murder and conspiracy charges, the truth of the matter is that the jury has spoken. The government did not prove its case on the remaining 284 counts beyond a reasonable doubt. Part of this is due to the suppression of evidence seized as a result of torture and the failure to Mirandize Ghailani prior to interrogating him. But this is the law which protects due process and prevents coerced self incrimination. Unlike those who are upset with the not guilty verdicts because they assumed guilt regardless of the facts, the important thing is that Ghailani got a fair trial.

The problem with the sentence, however, is that it does not take into consideration the fact that he was found not guilty on 284 out of 285 counts. Ghailani would have gotten the same sentence if he had been found guilty on all of the counts. While the judge may think that he is guilty on all counts the jury only convicted on only one and a lesser sentence is appropriate based on the sole conviction of a relatively minor count.

Andre Johnson was convicted of possession of a gun by a convicted felon, possession of cocaine and possession of a weapon in connection with a drug offense.

An undercover officer, Jason Bolte, parked his car in a high crime area on the west side of Cincinnati. A car with three people in it pulled up and parked behind him. A passenger wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt got out of the car and made a transaction, trading money for a couple of small piece of a white substance. Bolte called for uniformed officers to make the arrest. Johnson, no longer wearing the sweatshirt, attempted to flee when the officers tried to perform a pat shirt on him. An officer used a taser on him. He fell to the ground revealing a gun in his waistband. He was arrested. The car was searched. The sweatshirt was found. Crack and powder cocaine were found in its pockets.

After he was indicted he moved to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle. The Court ruled that the original detention was a valid Terry stop. In Terry v. Ohio the Supreme Court ruled that an officer could temporarily detain an individual if he/she had “a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Based upon Bolte’s observation of the crack purchase the officers easily had a reasonable suspicion. Finding the gun gave the officers probable cause to arrest him. ¹ An arrest would provide probable cause to search Johnson. To search the vehicle they would need probable cause to believe that they would find evidence in the car. Since Johnson was in custody and could not obtain a weapon from the car. But they had probable cause to believe that the gray sweatshirt was in the car and the court felt that they had probable cause to look for ammunition.

During the trial Johnson complained to the judge that his lawyer had not properly told him about the possible consequences of a conviction and that if he had known he would have accepted the proffered plea bargain. The judge said “Mr. Johnson, you’re the person in this room with felony convictions and that makes your credibility suspect. I know [your attorney] to be a capable, talented, honest attorney whose intentions are always to represent his client to the best of his ability.” The Sixth Circuit while admitting that the statement might not be appropriate did not find it to violate the Constitution or to mandate a reversal of the conviction. The Court refused to hold a hearing on whether the lawyer was providing incompetent counsel. To provide incompetent counsel the lawyer must not only act in a way that competent counsel would not act but the lawyer’s actions must result in injury to the defendant. Since at the time of the request, the trial was in progress the judge refused to hold a hearing since she did not know the effect of counsel’s actions on the conclusion of the trial. Therefore the appellate court found no error on the part of the trial judge and it pointed out that Johnson could file a writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawyer’s representation.

A defendant has an absolute right to testify or not to testify at his/her trial. When the judge found out that Johnson planned to testify she asked Johnson’s attorney if he had gone over the possible consequences of Johnson testifying with Johnson. (If the lawyer was so great–see above, the judge should have assumed that the lawyer as any decent lawyer would have done had gone over the possible consequences with Johnson.) She then told Johnson that if he testified the U. S. Attorney would be allowed to cross examine him about the details of his prior conviction. She then called a recess so Johnson could talk the matter over with his lawyer. On appeal Johnson claimed that the judge’s lecture scared him into giving up his right to testify. The appellate panel disagreed saying that the judge was merely explaining his rights to him so that he could make an intelligent choice and upheld his conviction.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed denial of a writ of habeas corpus due to a failure to comply with the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have counsel present at all critical stages of the prosecution after the initiation of the adversarial process. Thus once charges are filed the prosecution cannot deny the defendant the right to have counsel present at significant events in the case. One of those significant event, of course, is the giving of a statement by the defendant. ¹

David Ayers was a security guard for the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority. As part of his compensation and to insure the safety of the residents he was given a low cost apartment in the building. Accompanied by one of the residents he went to the apartment of Dorothy Brown to pick her up after she fell down. The next day her body was found with numerous injuries. Ayers was eventually arrested and indicted.

While he was in custody he was befriended by Donald Hutchinson, a fellow inmate assigned to the same jail pod as Ayers. Hutchinson contacted the inspectors assigned to Ayers’ case and told them that Ayers had admitted to murdering Brown. After the officers apparently hinted ² to Hutchinson that they needed to know what weapon Ayers used and how much money he stole from Brown, Hutchinson returned to the cell and obtained the information from Ayers. He then contacted the officers again and gave them the information.

In the trial court Ayers moved to suppress the statements given to the officers at their second meeting with Hutchinson. The trial court denied the motion but the appellate courts granted the writ of habeas corpus finding that the police use of Hutchinson to “intentionally create a situation likely to induce Ayers to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel” violated the Sixth Amendment.

Here is the problem with jail house snitches. Hutchinson, who was in custody for crimes of moral turpitude involving financial misconduct, gave three different stories on different occasions regarding what he had been told by Ayers. Therefore he is not very trustworthy and the use of his testimony at trial is questionable. Furthermore since the police could not questions Ayers without his attorney present without violating the Sixth Amendment, they should not be allowed to manipulate the situation by either hinting to Hutchinson that he find out the nature of the weapon and the money stolen or by asking him to find out the information.