In Tapia v. United States the Supreme Court held that under Federal statutory law judges can not consider rehabilitation in determining how to sentence a defendant or the length of the sentence. The Ninth Circuit last week in United States v, Grant held that Tapia applied not only to the original sentence but also to violations of supervised release conditions.

Leon W, Grant was convicted of two counts of bank fraud. He was sentenced to two days in jail and five years supervised release. Among the conditions of the supervised release was that he abstain from alcohol and drugs. But it became apparent that he was unable to do so. Eventually the court sentenced him to two years in prison, a sentence significantly above the guidelines, in order that he could be rehabilitated. The Ninth Circuit revoked the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Generally when we incarcerate a person we do it because they intentionally committed an act that violates societal rules. Leon Grant is an addict. The court found that he had no control over his behavior. While he certainly needed rehabilitation, we do not generally deprive an individual of his/her personal liberty for for long periods ¹ for acts for which were not committed intentionally.

While most prisons have rehabilitative programs,they generally do a poor job of rehabilitation. Often they do not have the resources to provide rehabilitation to everyone who needs it. There is a long wait to get into a program and rehabilitation has only a limited effect when people are in a location where they do not have access to drugs or alcohol. The real test occurs when they leave the prison. But by then they no longer have access to the rehabilitative facilities and they often relapse.

Hershel Oscar Rosenbaum received free tickets to the Nevada State Fair from radio station KOZZ. He did not want to use the tickets. Rosenbaum, his wife and his two young children went to the fair. His wife stayed in the car while Rosenbaum and the children got out of the car. Rosenbaum proceeded to sell the tickets for five dollar each while he was standing in front of the fair.

Deputy Sheriff Lieutenant James Forbus approached Rosenbaum, took the children to their mother and arrested Rosenbaum. He was booked on charges of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment of a child and for obtaining money by false pretenses. He was charged with only one count of receiving money by false pretenses and eventually the charge was dismissed. There is no scalping law in Nevada.

Rosenbaum and the children sued the county and several officers claiming he was arrested without probable cause and violation of their rights to family integrity in Federal Court.

The defendants moved for summary judgement on the grounds of qualified immunity. The motion was granted and the Rosenbaums appealed. Summary judgement should be denied if the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated and it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that the violation existed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision. It held that Rosenbaum’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment due to a lack of probable cause to arrest him. On appeal the defendants argued that there was probable cause to arrest Rosenbaum for obtaining money by false pretenses and violation of an obscure law, “collecting for benefit without authority.” The elements of obtaining money by false pretenses are this crime are: the intent to defraud, a false representation, reliance on that representation, and that the victim is defrauded. There was no evidence of any of these elements. Likewise there is no evidence that Rosenbaum attempted to defraud a charity as required by the collecting for benefit without authority statute. Since no reasonable officer could find a violation of either statute the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. As a result the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgement.

When the officers took the children to their mother they told the children that their father had done something wrong and was going to jail. The court found that the officers’ actions were inappropriate but that they did not shock the conscience and did not rise to the level of violating the right of family integrity.

Julian Tzolov and Eric Butler were charged in a three count indictment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York with security fraud. Both in the trial court and on appeal they challenged venue in the Eastern District of New York. In Count I they were charged with Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud. In Count II they were charged with Securities Fraud in relation to the collapse of the auction rate securities (“ARS”) market in 2007. ARS were high grade securities backed by debt obligations, such as student loans, mortgages, municipal bonds, corporate debt and preferred stock issued by closed-end mutual funds. The government guaranteed 98 per cent of the value of student loan backed ARS. Investors had the choice of holding on to the securities until they matured in thirty years or auctioning them off as a short term investment–sometimes as short as seven days. Most chose the short term turn around.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees venue in the district in which the crime occurred. In some cases venue is defined by statute and in other cases venue is defined by the location of acts forming the crime. As to Count II, Security Fraud, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff defines venue as “[a]ny criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred.” The only act alleged to have occurred in the Eastern District of New York was that the defendants flew in and out of Kennedy International Airport. The Second Circuit had no problem finding that merely flying out of Kennedy International Airport was not an act constituting the crime and reversed the securities fraud conviction. On the other hand conspiracy venue exists wherever an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred. An overt act is any act performed by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. Flying through Kennedy International was an act in furtherance of the conspiracy and the Second Circuit upheld the conspiracy convictions alleged in Counts I and III.

A jury in the Northern District of New York found Mark Desnoyers guilty on a number of counts including conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act and to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The judge overruled the jury and entered a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count finding the evidence both factually and legally insufficiency.

Factual insufficiency is fairly easy to understand. If no rational jury could find the defendant guilty based upon the evidence presented factual insufficiency exists. But in this case Desnoyers was charged with conspiracy to commit violations of both the Clean Air Act and mail fraud. With factual innocence, if there is more than one way a defendant can be found guilty, the conviction is upheld if there is any way the jury could have found the defendant guilty. Desnoyers claimed that a jury could not find him guilty of conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act but he made no claim about mail fraud. Since he could have been convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud the appellate court reversed the trial judge’s reversal of the jury finding in regard to factual innocence.

Legal innocence is a more complicated issue. ” A legal challenge . . . questions whether a conviction rests on a mistake about the law, as opposed to a mistake concerning the weight or the factual import of the evidence.” Another difference between legal insufficiency and factual insufficiency is that with legal insufficiency if under any theory before the jury the conviction was legally insufficient the conviction must be reversed. Desnoyers was charged with violating the Clean Air Act in regard to eight buildings. He was an asbestos inspector. The Clean Air Act applies to commercial buildings and residential buildings with more than four units. “[A]dditionally, buildings must contain “friable” asbestos and at least 260 linear feet of asbestos on pipes or 160 square feet of asbestos on other facility components in order to be subject to the regulations.” After the trial the government admitted that seven of the eight buildings did not meet the requirements. In the eighth building no one measured the amount of asbestos since it was removed before the government agents arrived. However a number of people referred to the building as “a large job.” In the trade “a large job” means that it is covered by the Clean Air Act. Desnoyers claimed that there was legal insufficiency because their was insufficient evidence to prove a violation of the law in that the amount of asbestos had not been measured. However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Desnoyers failed to understand what was meant by legal insufficiency. Desnoyers explanation does not meet the test of whether a conviction rests on a mistake of law. The question should be whether what Desnoyers did was legal but he was convicted because of a mistake of law. For example if the judge misdirected the jury and he was convicted of an action that was actually legal.. If the judge misdirected the jury then the conviction would rest on a mistake of law and would be reversed for legal insufficiency. But in this case the judge correctly instructed the jury and the jury found Desnoyers to be in violation of the law.

The Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and to sentence Desnoyers, accordingly.

Former Luzerne County Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. was found guilty of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, honest services mail fraud, money laundering conspiracy and a host of tax fraud charges in what has become known as the“Kids for Cash Scandal.” As a juvenile court judge, it was alleged that Ciavarella received money from a for profit company in exchange for sending children to the company’s private jail. Many of the children were sent to the facility for lengthy periods of time while being denied various rights guaranteed by the constitution. Often Ciavarella denied the children their right to counsel before sending them to the private jail.

It was a mixed verdict with Ciavarella being cleared of extortion, bribery and honest services wire fraud charges. Overall he was convicted of 12 of the 39 counts, including most of the serious allegations, in the indictment. But it is not exactly clear what the jury believed. For example it convicted him of racketeering and honest services fraud but it found him not guilty of bribery. Honest services fraud is a rather complicated crime. It is defined in 18 U.S.C. §1346 as a “scheme or artifice to defraud includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” The Supreme Court has limited it to cases which involve a “fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party who ha[s] not been deceived”. In the case of Ciavarella he received money from the private corporation to deprive the Common Pleas Court of his “honest services.”

Racketeering is a form of conspiracy under which money is obtained illegally often by extortion. The jury found that Ciavarella illicitly obtained $997,000 in kickbacks from the builder of the PA Child Care and Western PA Child Care detention centers.

While this trial did not concentrate upon the juveniles’ denial of constitutional rights, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed 4000 juvenile convictions in Ciavarella’s court.

Furthermore there remains a pending civil suits by thousands of juveniles ¹ who appeared before Ciavarella.

In a multi-defendant prosecution for bank fraud the government informed the defendants that it planned to use statements made by co-conspirators, but not to call them as witnesses. The statements would come into evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule which allows the admission of statements made during the pendency and in furtherance of a conspiracy.

The defendants requested the complete notes taken during the proffers of those co-conspirators who’s statements the prosecution planned to use during trial. The trial court refused their request.

The Second Circuit upheld the ruling in United States v. Shyne et al. Under the Jencks Act which governs discovery of statements made by witnesses in a Federal criminal trial the government is required to provide statements made by a witness after the witness testifies but before cross examination. The Second Circuit held that since the Jencks Act does not mention non-testifying witnesses the proffers of the non-testifying co-conspirators is not discoverable.

But the Jencks Act is not the end of the question. Constitutional mandates trump the Jencks Act. The appellants raised Fifth and Sixth Amendment objections and of course the biggest exception to the Jencks Act is the Supreme Court Decision in Brady v. Maryland. In Brady the court ruled that due process requires the prosecution to provide the defense with mitigating evidence in the possession of the prosecution. The prosecution provided the defense with a letter listing the various mitigating factors for each of the co-conspirators. Assuming that the letter provides all the needed information, it does not help the defendants get the information into evidence.

The court did not discuss Rule 106 of the Rules of Evidence which states:

When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.

How can a defendant move to admit the entire statement or know whether or not an entire statement has been entered if he/she is not given discovery of the entire proffer which is in the possession of the prosecutor?

Is the Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair trial met if the prosecutor has the entire proffer while the defense only has a summary of those parts the prosecutor wants to give him/her?

A former assistant United States attorney who prosecuted fraud cases against Lyndon LaRouche in the 1980′s has been disqualified to represent a woman suing LaRouche. After prosecuting LaRouche, John Markham II left the United States Attorneys office in 1989 and formed a private practice. Now he has been retained by Marielle “Molly” Kronberg, a former government witness against LaRouche to sue LaRouche and others for harassment.

But according to The BLT: The Blog of LegalTimes Judge Anthony Trenga of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia disqualified Markham from representing Kronberg due to confidential Federal files that he viewed while prosecuting LaRouche. Judge Trenga found that Kronberg had a unnecessary advantage as a result of Markham’s knowledge obtained from viewing the confidential files.

Disqualifying Markham is unusual. Most cases involving the disqualification of a lawyer occur where she/he has represented both sides. For example, if Markham was representing LaRouche and as part of his Federal duties he had interviewed Kronberg or had read confidential reports of her interviews he should be disqualified because he could use confidential information obtained from Kronberg against her. But that is not the case. He has consistently represented parties opposing LaRouche and information obtained from Kronberg while he worked for the government will only be used to help her now. She could tell him the same information now that she did twenty years ago. There is no conflict of interest.