A complicated area of the law is whether to run sentences on different counts or different cases concurrently or consecutively. The issue becomes much more difficult when different judges of different courts are sentencing an individual on different charges. The Supreme Court addressed one aspect of the issue last week in Setser v. United States.

Monroe Ace Setser was charged in both Federal and state courts with methamphetamine related charges. The District Attorney also move to revoke a state probation in another case. While the Federal sentencing occurred prior to the state sentencing the Federal judge order that his 151 month Federal sentence run run concurrent with his state methamphetamine sentence but consecutive to the time he would get on his probation violation. The Texas state court threw a curve into the process by ordering the sentence on the five year probation violation to run concurrent with the ten year state methamphetamine case.

Since the state methamphetamine case runs concurrent to the probation violation it is obviously impossible to carry out the Federal sentence mandating that it run concurrent with the state methamphetamine crime but consecutive to the probation violation. The question before the Supreme Court was who gets to decide whether the Federal sentence will run concurrent to the state sentence or consecutive to it. Both Setser and the government argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) should make the decision. The Bureau through its power to decide whether the the Federal sentence should be spent in the Federal Prison or the state prison can make that decision. If the Bureau credits Setser’s time in the state prison against his Federal sentence he will have a de facto concurrent sentence. Otherwise he will have a consecutive sentence.

But the Supreme Court said “no.” It held that the decision of whether a sentence should run concurrently or consecutively is traditionally a judicial decision and it upheld the lower court decision running the cases consecutive to each other.

It should be noted that Selser can challenge the BOP’s refusal to credit his time in state custody administratively and if need be through a writ of habeas corpus.

On the evening of September 22, 2009 Jamie Shetler called the Pomona, California police department to report that her father, Scott, was using and manufacturing methamphetamine in his house. The police immediately went to the house. The garage attached to the residence was open and according to the officers a chemical odor emanated from the garage. The rear portion of the garage was partitioned off. In order to determine if anyone was behind the partition or whether methamphetamine was in the process of being manufactured the officers entered the garage. While they saw a few items associated with methamphetamine they did not see anyone and nothing was being manufactured.

The officers left the garage and knocked on the front door. Scott Shetler came out a side door. He was handcuffed and detained outside the house. Officers entered the house and began searching it. Guns and items associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine were found.

Half way through the search they obtained a waiver from Shetler’s girl friend. At no time did the officers obtain a search warrant.

In the early hours of the 23rd Scott Shettler gave a statement in which he confessed and he was arrested. The next day the DEA took him to the house, found another gun and took a statement about the gun. The trial court suppressed all of the physical evidence except that which was found in the original search of the garage but it allowed the various statements to come into evidence. On appeal admission of the statements was contested.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the government failed to carry its burden to show that Shetler’s statements were not the product of the illegal searches. A statement is considered the fruit of an illegal search if the officers confront the defendant with evidence illegally taken or if the defendant’s statement is a result of his knowledge of the government’s possession of items illegally taken. There was no evidence at the hearing that Shetler was not confronted with illegally seized items and as he was detained he watched the government seize numerous items which the court later decided to be seized illegally.

Not only were the statements the result of the illegally seizure, they were not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal acts. “Three factors are relevant in determining whether Shetler’s statements were sufficiently attenuated from the underlying illegality to be admissible: (1) the temporal proximity of the search to the confession; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” The Ninth Circuit found that the searches were sufficiently close to the statements as to not be overly attenuated. The initial confession occurred outside Shetler’s house during the search. While the second statement was made a couple days later there were no intervening circumstances that would have influenced Shetler to confess as “to dissipate the taint.” The officers were clearly looking for evidence without a search warrant. They waited until the search was half over before getting consent. There lack of good faith is apparent.

The evidence at the trial that Shetler maintained the residence for a primary or principle use was the manufacture, distribution, or use of methamphetamine was weak and the statements were a major part of the government’s case. Therefore the conviction was reversed and the case remanded to the District Court.

Humboldt County California prosecutors charge Maggie Jean Wortman with murder of her six week old son who died from methamphetamine poisoning. Authorities say the baby consumed methamphetamine while drinking his mother’s breast milk.

Initially Wortman was charged with involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment but last week the prosecutor upped the charges to second degree murder. Second degree murder requires malice aforethought or “an abandoned and malignant heart.” An abandoned and malignant heart” is defined as “reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk of death.”

Prosecutors be ware: the only person convicted of second degree murder in California for transmitting methamphetamine to a baby in breast feeding, Any Leanne Priem, had her conviction reversed by an appellate court.

It is unlikely that prosecutors will claim that Wortman showed malice aforethought since there is no evidence that she wanted to kill the child.

But it is going to be almost as difficult to prove “reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk of death.” First they are going to have to show that Wortman knew that methamphetamine in breast milk could be transmitted to a child in breast milk and that she knew that methamphetamine could kill a child. The district attorney will also have to prove that Wortman’s addiction gave her a choice to use or not use the drug. If she was so addicted to methamphetamine that she had no choice but to take methamphetamine she was not reckless.

But the one thing for sure is that meth is no good for you whether or not you are breast feeding a child.

The Department of Justice is urging the Supreme Court to take up the Fourth Amendment issue of Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Various courts have ruled on the constitutionality of the use of GPS without getting a warrant and rulings have come down on both sides of the issue,

The Ninth and the Seventh Circuits have ruled it constitutional while the D. C. Circuit found it unconstitutional. Courts in New York, Massachusetts, Washington and Delaware have found it unconstitutional while courts in Ohio and Virginia have approved of the practice.

The Justice Department is challenging a D. C. Circuit opinion that overturned the conviction of Antoine Jones on cocaine trafficking charges after GPS evidence played a mayor role in his conviction. The DOJ argues that since law enforcement officers could have followed Jones as he traveled on the public roads he could not have had a legitimate expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment only applies to individuals who have an expectation of privacy that is recognized by society.

However his attorneys argue that using a GPS device on Jones’ Jeep Cherokee for over a month and reporting his whereabouts every seven seconds was a tremendous invasion of his privacy and is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

The Courts that have upheld warrantless GPS searches have cited the 1983 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Knotts in which the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man in a methamphetamine case after the wholesaler of necessary chemicals placed a beeper in a barrel of chemicals. The barrel was placed in a codefendant’s vehicle and followed by agents to the suspect’s residence.

Knotts has been cited by the courts in upholding warrantless GPS decisions. Most of the Courts have said that if it was constitutional to follow a car with a beeper, it is constitutional to keep track of a vehicle with a GPS deviced placed under the car’s carriage while it is either parked on the street or in the defendant’s driveway.

But while the lower courts do not have the power to reconsider Knotts the Supreme Court does. It is a decision that may have had some validity 30 years ago but with the technological advances in the last 30 years allowing greater and greater invasions into citizen’s privacy it is time for the Supreme Court to reconsider the decision.

Arkansas Department of Community Correction Officer Craig Robie went to to a hotel in Fort Smith where he had heard one of his parolees, David Oteri was dealing drugs. They saw him enter and leave the hotel twice. When Officer Robie, accompanied by police approached Oteri he ran. When they caught him he had a large quantity of methamphetamine on him and he said he was dealing with DA in room 416. The only drug dealer Robie and the police knew with the initials of DA was Donnell Alston. As the officers entered the hotel they saw Alston leave. They detained him. When they checked at the desk they found out that room 416 was rented by Angela Groves. They went to the room and got Groves’ permission to search the room. They found more narcotic and Groves told them that the drugs belonged to Alston. They arrested Alston.

After he was indicted Alston moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal detention. But at the time of his arrest he was on parole. Conditions of his parole included that he not associate with felons or people involved in crime and that he not change his address or sleep away from his approved residence without approval from his parole officer.

Under Arkansas law, parolees are subject to arrest if a police officer or a parole officer has a reasonable suspicion that the parolee is violating the terms of his/her parole. A reasonable suspicion is considerably less than probable cause. The court ruled that the fact that Oteri said that he was dealing with DA and that Oteri was a convicted felon provided a reasonable suspicion that Alston was associating with a convicted felon. Furthermore, Alston admitted to staying at the hotel, a violation of his parole.

As a result Robie had a reasonable suspicion that Alston was in violation of his parole conditions. Under the Federal Constitution parolees are considered to have waived their Fourth Amendment rights against illegal search and seizure. In any case Groves rented room 416 and she gave the officers permission to search the room.

Glen Ray Briggs plead guilty to a series of crimes involving methamphetamine and cocaine. The most serious charges related to his participation in a reverse sting operation organized by government agents to rob an alleged stash house.

As part of the plans for the robbery Briggs was to brings guns to be used in the robbery. He was arrested after he got into a vehicle that was going to be used in the robbery. No guns were found.

While the Ninth Circuit court refused refused to allow him to withdraw his plea it found that the two level enhancement for possession of a weapon was inappropriate since no weapon was found.

Briggs claimed that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea since he did not understand the consequences of the plea. Specifically he expected a sentence of approximately 200 months and the actual sentence was 324 months. He pointed to the fact that he has an IQ of 70 as a reason he did not understand the possible consequence. But the court pointed out that it is only in rare circumstances that a plea can be withdrawn for misunderstanding the possible sentence. It examined the plea transcript and the psychiatric records. Both point to Briggs understanding the plea and asking questions when he did not understand the proceedings.

Briggs also claimed that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because of sentencing entrapment. Sentencing entrapment occurs when the government pushes the quantity of drugs up beyond the expectation of the defendant in order to increase the possible sentence. While in a reverse sting the government has practically total control over the amount of drugs and the court must be leery of drug quantities the facts here showed that Briggs was excited over the large quantity to be seized and he had no problem with it. In this circumstance there is no sentencing entrapment since Briggs agreed to the quantity.

The case was remanded for reconsideration of the gun enhancement.

The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision upholding a search at the residence of Pamela Robbins.

Officer Bruce Rhoads of the Tama County Sheriff’s Department obtained a search warrant for Robbins residence and for the residence of Michael Watson. The search warrant was based upon Rhoads’ experience, Watson’s criminal history, Watson’s purchases of pseudoephedrine, Robbins’ purchases of pseudoephedrine, suspicious traffic near Watson’s house, and the presence of Robbins’ car parked at Watson’s house. Pseudoephedrine is a drug commonly found in cold medications and it can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

During the search of the houses drug related items were found. Robbins and Watson were charged with various drug charges.

The Fourth Amendment mandates that a search warrant must be supported by probable cause. In other words there must be a nexus between criminal activity and the place to be searched. The nexus must be great enough that “under the totality of the circumstances a person of reasonable prudence would believe that evidence of a crime might be located on the premises to be searched.”

Nowhere was it alleged that Robbins purchased pseudoephedrine in amounts that exceeded the legal maximum or that she purchased it more often than permitted by law. The appellate court ordered the suppression of all evidence found at Robbins’ home due to the lack of probable cause. Probable cause, according to the court cannot be based purely upon the legal purchase of a precursor drug.

Franklin Woods plead guilty to conspiring to manufacture fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 108 months. In determining his sentencing guidelines the District Court applied an enhancement for possession of a firearm. There was no evidence that Woods had a firearm or that he knew that a firearm was present. The evidence of manufacturing was found in a co-defendant’s residence. But the District Court assumed that Woods knew that there was a high likelihood that a gun would be present in a residence used to manufacture methamphetamine.

The District Court found that Woods was responsible for 53.64 grams of methamphetamine, which has a value of approximately $5,000. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. Previously it has determined that when there is a large amount of narcotics it is safe to assume that one of the defendants has a gun. But in those cases, barring evidence to the contrary, it has never assumed that a co-defendant had a gun when the value of the drugs was less than $60,000.

What I do not understand is why based solely upon the value or the quantity of the narcotics one can assume that a gun is present. Certainly it is not unusual to find a gun when narcotics are present. Often a gun may be present when the value of the narcotics is considerably under $60,000. But if we assume that those who would conspire together to manufacture of sell drugs know each other fairly well, based upon their knowledge of each other or the history of their relationship they may know whether a gun is likely to be present or not be present. Certainly there are any number of cases where guns are not present.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the search of three residences in a Kansas City methamphetamine case in United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent Mark King set up surveillance at 323 South Brighton Avenue. Along with other agents he decided to conduct a “knock and talk.” A “knock and talk” is used by narcotics agents when they want to search a residence but they do not have probable cause to get a search warrant. They knock on the front door and when someone answers it they try to talk their way into the house and get consent from the residents to search the house. Of course the residents do not have to answer the door. Nor do they have to talk to the officers or give them permission to enter the house.

But King was either good or lucky. Justino Ruiz-Ramos answered the door. He said he did not live at the residence but Salvador Jesus Velasco-Saldana came to the door. Velasco-Saldana said he resided there and gave the officers permission to enter. He consented to the officers searching the residence. They found methamphetamine and related items. They interviewed Velasco-Saldana and he told them that Gerardo sold him three pounds of methamphetamine and that Gerardo’s brother delivered it. He drew the officers a map explaining how to get to Gerardo’s house.

Several officers including King and Luis Ortiz of the Kansas City Police Department Gang Unit went to 430 Donnelly Avenue and conducted another “knock and talk.” Miguel Angel Garcia-Bobadilla answered the door and again the officers were let in. They asked Garcia-Bobadilla if he was alone. When he answered yes they asked asked if they could perform a protective sweep in order to confirm that no one else was in the house. He gave permission. A protective sweep is done to make sure the officers are safe while in the house. But they also know that any illegal substances they see in “plain view” can be seized. They found a significant amount of methamphetamine in the house.

During the sweep they ran into Alfredo and Dehli Hernando-Pena. Alfredo and Garcia-Bobadilla said they lived in the house. Both gave verbal and written consent to the search. Dehli agreed to cooperate. She told them that Alfredo’s brothers lived at 3907 East 12th Terrace. After the officers search the Donnelly Avenue house they went to the 12th Terrace house. They knocked on the door and Gerardo answered. While talking to Gerardo they noticed Alphonso entering the kitchen with large baggies of powder and they heard what they thought to be Alphonso flushing something down the sink. The officers thinking that evidence was being destroyed entered the residence without a warrant.

After they were indicted the defendants brought motions to suppress the evidence. The court upheld all of the searches. As to the South Brighton Avenue search, it found that Velasco-Saldana gave consent to the entry and search. As a result it was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.While there was some question about the facts of the Donnelly Avenue search. The police claim that the residents gave their consent and the residents say the police forced their way in, the court found the officers to be credible and the residents not to be. As a result it found that the entry and search was also the result of consent. As to the 12th Terrace search there is an exception to the Fourth Amendment when exigent circumstances exist. The courts have found that the eminent destruction of evidence is an exigent circumstance allowing the authorities to enter a residence without a warrant.

The question that constantly comes up in my mind is why would anyone allow the police to enter their house and search it knowing that there is a significant amount of methamphetamine in the house. If any of the defendants had just said “no” I will not talk with you or “no” you cannot come in, or “no” you cannot search none of this would have happened and they would not have be serving decades in prison. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments give people the absolute right not to talk to the police. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments Amendments give people the right to refuse entry to any officer who does not have a search warrant into their residence and to deny the officers the right to search the residence.

Even assuming that the police do not always tell the truth it is obvious that the defendants talked themselves into being arrested. Did they think that when talking with experienced officer they could talk themselves out of being arrested–unlikely. And I do not know about this case but by talking they endanger themselves because others get arrested and they may be killed. It makes no sense.

The Sixth Circuit found that probable cause supported the search warrant in United States v. Dyer and affirmed the conviction.

A Tennessee police officer swore out an affidavit for a search warrant for a cabin rented by Stacy Lee Glance and used by Glance and Kenneth J. Dyer. The bulk of the information in the affidavit came from an unnamed confidential informant who was facing drug charges and hoping to get the charges dismissed in exchange for his/her assistance in convicting Glance and Dyer. Glance went to trial and was found not guilty. Dyer entered a conditional plea allowing him to challenge the search warrant on appeal.

The informant claimed to have seen a drug deal involving methamphetamine in the cabin. The authorities corroborated some minor details of the informant’s statement. The informant took the officer to the cabin. Cars owned by Glance and Dyer were outside the cabin. Furthermore Dyer and Glance were seen at the cabin. Dyer and Glance have criminal records for methamphetamine related crimes and Dyer had an outstanding warrant for methamphetamine from North Carolina.

On this information the Sixth Circuit found that probable cause supported the warrant. The issue here is the reliability of the information received from the informant. The problem with this is that all of the corroborating evidence involves innocent behavior. All we really know is that the informant knows Glance and Dyer. We also know that the informant has reason to provide false information since any information that he/she provides will be used to dismiss the charges against him/her or to ameliorate the sentence for his/her criminal behavior.