Randall Lee Fields, a prisoner in a Michigan jail was taken from his cell to a separate part of the building sometime between 7:00 pm and 9:00 pm. He was then interrogated by two armed officers for five to seven hours. He was not given his Miranda rights although he was told he could go back to his cell if he wanted to. During the interrogation he admitted to having sexual acts with a 12 year old prior to his current interrogation. His admission was admitted at trial. The question the Supreme Court faced in Howes v. Fields was whether Fields’ Miranda rights were violated. Under the seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona a defendant’s must be warned of the admissibility of a statement and the availability of counsel prior to making a statement if the defendant is in custody and if the statement is the result of interrogation.

Since Fields’ conviction was upheld in the state courts and comes to the Supreme Court as an appeal by the state of a grant of habeas corpus by the Federal Court the primary question is whether the State Court decision clearly violated Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court, this week, ruled that it did not. The Supreme Court reviewed its prior decisions regarding the use of Miranda in interrogations of defendants who are in custody for unrelated matters and found no decision setting a categorical rule regarding the applicability of Miranda to in custody interrogations regarding unrelated matters. In previous case it either refused to consider the issues or assumed that Miranda applied without decided whether it applied. Therefore, the Court reversed lower court decisions granting the writ of habeas corpus.

But the court went further, in what must be considered dicta, and stated that Miranda was not applicable to the situation in Fields.

For Miranda purposes the Court ruled the phrase “in custody” has a special meaning. “In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of ‘the objective circumstances of the interrogation, . . . a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’” The Court gave three reasons for finding that Fields was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. First, it stated that questioning a person who is in custody does not effect the same type of shock that questioning a person who has recently been arrested. Second, a prisoner is unlikely to give an incriminating statement as one who has recently been arrested since his/her release date will not be effected by the statement. Finally, the interrogating officer has less authority to affect the release date on an in-custody inmate as compared to a recently arrested defendant.

While it is true that Fields was told that he could go back to his cell if he did not want to answer the officers questions, ¹the feeling of coercion when being interrogated in a jail setting is strong. Jailers have near complete control over inmates while they are in custody. Inmates are constantly called before custodial officers for disciplinary hearings. There is no Miranda right in these hearings and they can be disciplined if they fail to answer the officer’s questions. They can be thrown for extensive periods of time into solitary confinement. Commissary and phone rights can be taken away. They can be denied the right to have visitors. And perhaps most importantly they can lose “good time” and have their release date delayed. Thus, the coerced nature of in-custody statements is great and to deny those interrogated while in custody the right to remain silent or the right to have an attorney present violates the basic requirements of Miranda.

Jimmy Brown was placed in a squad car on a firearms charge. He was then given his Miranda rights. When asked if he understood them. his response was “pshh.” He then answered several questions and asked for a “deal.” ¹ He was later given the Miranda warnings again as the station house. This time he responded, “Yeah.”

Prior to his trial Brown moved to suppress his answers to the questions. The District Court denied the motion and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It held that his request for a “deal” and his selective answering of questions was sufficient evidence that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

To me, it sounds as if it is, at most, a conditional waiver. He may be saying, if you give me a “deal,” I will talk. For that matter is the continued questioning of Brown after he asks for a deal an agreement by the officer to give Brown a deal?

Archie Dixon and Tim Hoffner kidnapped Chris Hammer, murdered him, stole his car and sold it.

Hammer’s mother reported his disappearance the day after he was buried alive by Dixon and Hoffner. ¹ On November 4, 1993 the police had their first conversation with him when he dropped by the police station to retrieve his car which had been towed. They gave him his Miranda rights. He refused to answer questions and left. On November 9 he was arrested for forging Hammer’s name on the check he received for selling Hammer’s car and interrogated without Miranda warnings. He admitted to forging the name but denied being involved in anything else. During the interrogation detectives told him that Hoffner was cooperating and only one of them would get a “deal” therefore he better start talking. Later that day Hoffner led the detectives to the body and Hammer was charged with murder. He was Mirandized and admitted to the killing.

At trial the unMirandized admission to the forgery was excluded but the Mirandized admission to the murder was admitted. He filed a habeas alleging that the admission to the murder should have been excluded as a fruit of the unMirandized admission to the forgery.

The Sixth Circuit granted the habeas but the Supreme Court reversed. In a per curiam decision

Since Dixon did not admit to the murder in the unMirandized statement he could not have felt coerced into admitting the murder in the later Mirandized statement. Moreover, according to the court the two statements were clearly independent. After the first statement he was transferred from the police station and back again. In that period he learned that Hoffner had directed the police to the body and they found it. This change in circumstances was presumably more important in Dixon’s change in attitude than the fact that he had given an earlier unMirandized statement. As a result the Mirandized admission was not coerced and it was admissible. The Supreme Court found that the
Sixth Circuit erred in granting the habeas which did not meet AEDPA test that requires Federal courts “show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” when granting a writ of habeas corpus in a state case.

Brian Rogers, a non-commissioned Naval officer at the Brunswick Naval Air Station, sold a computer he no longer needed. But he failed to remove the child porn from it. The buyer reported the pornography to the local police who initiated an investigation. To assist they brought in the state computer crimes unit and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

A search warrant was obtained for Roger’s house and plans were made to serve it while he was on the base. His commanding officer agreed to order him to go home at the scheduled time for the search.

Once he got home, he was interviewed by the local police and the state computer crimes unit. They told him that he was not going to be arrested that day and they did not read him his Miranda rights. After some time he agreed to go the police station with them where they continued the interrogation. Eventually an officer from NCIS joined the interrogation, first giving him the military version of the Miranda rights.

Under Miranda a statement generally cannot be used against a defendant unless it is the result of interrogation occurring while the defendant is in custody. Here there were basically three statements. The first occurring at the house. The second at the station by the police officers and the third by the NCIS officer after giving Rogers his Miranda rights.

The primary question here was which, if any of the three statements were made while Rogers was in custody.The First Circuit in an oppinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter ruled that the first statement was made while he was in custody since he had been ordered by his commanding officer to go home and presumably to cooperate with the police when he got there. The second statement was basically a continuation of the first and was also done without the benefit of Miranda warnings. While the NCIS officer gave the equivalent of Miranda warnings it was not sufficiently distinguished from the first two statements. Rogers had already given two statements and it is doubtful that anything said in the third had not already been said. Furthermore the NCIS officer told him that she was not in the command structure and therefore she could not countermand his officer’s order,

The Circuit Court remanded the case to the District Court to determine if sufficient curative action occurred to distinguish the statements. If not the conviction must be reversed.

A thirteen year old North Carolina boy was removed from his classroom by a uniformed officer. He was taken to a room where he was interrogated by a police officer, a school security guard, and an assistant principal. He was not Mirandized. During the interrogation he made statements that incriminated himself in two burglaries.

An unmirandized statement cannot be used against a defendant if the statement was made while the defendant was being interrogated while the defendant is in custody. The question in juvenile court proceedings and on appeal was whether the teenager was in custody at the time of the interrogation . The defendant does not actually have to be in custody. It is sufficient if the defendant is in a custody-like situation. The juvenile court ruled that he was not in custody. On appeal his attorneys argued that in determining whether the teenager was in custody the juvenile court should have taken into consideration that the teenager was a juvenile. The state argued that the same definition of custody should be used for all regardless of the age of the defendant.

The Supreme Court held last week that the juvenile court should have taken into consideration the defendant’s age. The Supreme Court ruled that a minor’s age must be taken into consideration due to the increased pressure juveniles feel to answer questions posed by law enforcement officials.

Justice Alito dissented saying that the purpose of Miranda was to create a uniform rule. Necessarily when you create a uniform rule it is both over inclusive and under inclusive. Miranda covers some people who do not need the warnings and other people who need stronger warnings. By giving children more protection you are destroying the uniformity of Miranda and opening up the door to more exceptions. However, the Court ruled that it was more important to prevent police from circumventing Miranda than providing one rule for both adults and juveniles.

Casey Anthony has sure done a good job of convicting herself.

Ellis Wood was arrested on allegations that he hired Rasheen Harry (“Harry”) to kill Carlisle Hall (“Hall”). Wood believed that Hall raped Wood’s girlfriend, Nisha Bernard (“Bernard”). He was interrogated a number of times and kept in the police station over night.

After a final interrogation he was asked if they could videotape his statement. He responded: “I think I should get a lawyer.” New York Detective Charles Arnao (“Arnao”) gave him a phone and left the room. When the detective came back Wood appeared to be finishing a friendly conversation. Arnao had another officer bring video equipment and read Wood his Miranda rights before videotaping an interrogation.

At trial, on appeal, and in his writ of habeas corpus before the Second Circuit, Wood raised Miranda questions. Both the appellate courts and the United States District Court found the admission of the video to be a violation of Wood’s right to counsel, they found the admission to be harmless error. However, the Second Circuit found the video had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for either retrial or dismissal.

After an arrestee unequivocally requests an attorney, a police officer must immediately terminate the interrogation and it cannot be restarted until either the arrestee has an attorney present or the arrestee initiates the conversation.The Second Circuit, like the District Court and the new York state appellate courts, found, “I think I should get a lawyer.” to be an unequivocal request. The statement does not show any doubt about the need for a lawyer nor does he question his decision. Thus the violation of Miranda is clear.

Perhaps a little less clear is whether the violation is harmless error. To determine whether the admission of the evidence was harmless the court looks at the importance of the evidence and the strength of the prosecution’s case. The prosecution had only two witnesses, Harry and Bernard. Harry had been convicted of the murder and was looking for a shortened sentence. He had a long rap sheet and he is subject to strenuous cross examination. By the time of trial Bernard had ended her tumultuous relationship with Wood. Not only was she looking for revenge but she was subject to deportation. As a result the government’s case was not very credible. The only thing that made it believable was the videotape which corroborated Harry’s testimony. The Second Circuit found that without the videotape Wood may have been found innocent.

Thus the videotape was not only important to the government’s case but it buffered an otherwise weak case. Furthermore, the government found the videotape to be important. The U. S. Attorney repeatedly brought the videotape up during closing and told the jury that they should pay attention to the videotape to support the conviction.

In Florida v.Powell the Supreme Court decided, last year, that while there is a right to an attorney, under Miranda, both before and during an interrogation, merely telling a suspect that he had a right to an attorney before the commencement of an interrogation and not telling him/her that the right also covered the assistance of an attorney during the interrogation did not violate his/her rights under Miranda. The Court ruled that a logical person would feel that the attorney would not leave at the beginning of the interrogation and would still be present during the interrogation.

The question facing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Jermaine Antwon Warren,his week, was, after Powell’s determination that the right to an attorney existed both before and during the interrogation must the Miranda warning include a temporal section.

Jermaine Warren was arrested on narcotics charges. He was interrogated twice. The first time was at his residence by a parole officer who did not give him any Miranda warning. The trial court excluded this interrogation and the exclusion was confirmed by the Third Circuit. The second interrogation occurred at the police station by the police. He was given a Miranda warning but it was not read from a card. Instead the officer recited it from memory. It included no temporal statement that the right to an attorney would be available either before or during the interrogation.

The Third Circuit found that the post Miranda statement was admissible even if it did not state that the attorney would be available before and during the interrogation. The court found that nothing in the officer’s recitation of the Miranda warnings temporally limited the time the attorney would be able to held and further more that Supreme Court rulings only require that the substance of Miranda warnings be conveyed and that was accomplished. As a result the court upheld the conviction.

“SJ” a fifteen year old girl found nude pictures of herself on her guardian’s computer. She also found a hidden camera in the bathroom. She reported her findings to the police.

They performed a “knock and talk” at the residence of Jon R. Hughes. ¹

Prior to the “knock and talk” the police learned that Hughes’ mental state was very fragile and that he needed involuntary hospitalization. They did not plan to arrest him at the end of the “knock and search.” Instead they planned to get consent to search his computer and to hospitalize him.

Eventually he was arrested and raised search and Miranda issues before the Federal Court. The officers twice interview Hughes.The first time was during the “knock and search/” The court ruled that Miranda warnings were not necessary. Miranda warnings are only mandated when there is a interrogation and the person is effectively in custody. In this case the Court ruled that Hughes was not in custody. The interview occurred in his home. The police did not plan to arrest him and he was not arrested on that day. His mental state was poor. In fact he had an anxiety attack in the middle of the interview. But that standing alone does not show that the interview was involuntary.

Hughes claimed that his consent to search the computer was not voluntary due to his mental state. The court founhd that Hughes consent to search the computer or his lack thereof was immaterial. By the time the officers requested his consent he had already given them enough information to get a search warrant. Therefore under the theory of inevitable discovery his consent was immaterial.

The Department of Homeland Security learned that there was pornography on computers at Terry Boll’s residence. They got a search warrant. They discover that seven people live in the house and there are ten computers. Eventually they learn that there is child porn on three of the computers and that two of these computers belong to Boll. ¹ This should be the end of the case. There is no way the government is going to be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Boll possessed the pornography. Any criminal defense attorney worth his/her salt can convince a jury that there is a reasonable doubt that someone else put the pornography on the computers even if boll owned them. ² t is unlikely anyone will be charged.

But Boll apparently has not listened to enough police shows on TV. If he had he would have heard the police give the Miranda warning regularly. He seems to know that anything he says can be used against him. ³ Just the same, he answers the agent’s questions:

Agent Scherer: I asked him if he had an explanation about why there was child pornography on his computer.

Government: How did he respond?

Scherer: He replied I guess you caught me.

Government: How did you respond to that?

Scherer: I asked him further questions about how the child pornography got on there, and he stated, well, they are my computers, aren’t they.

Case lost. Not only did Boll lose the case but his attorney had the nerve to argue insufficiency of the evidence on appeal. His answers to the questions gave the government all it needed to convict.

Generally the police won’t ask any questions unless they need the information to charge a crime or get a conviction. Often if you refuse to answer police questions they walk away without even charging you. But by answering the questions you give them the information they need to charge you or to get a conviction.