Friday, we looked at Florida v. Powell in which the Supreme Court looked at a version of the Miranda warnings that did not clearly state that an arrestee had the right to have an attorney in the room with him/her while being interrogated while in custody.

Today we look at whether the Supreme Court should have considered Powell in the first place. Powell is an appeal from the Florida Supreme Court which ruled the version of the Miranda warnings used by the Tampa police is unconstitutional. The version used by Tampa police states:

You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview

The Florida Supreme Court held: “[b]oth Miranda and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution require that a suspect be clearly informed of the right to have a lawyer present during questioning,” and that the warnings given to Kevin Dewayne Powell did not satisfy either the State or the Federal Constitution.

The question is whether the Florida Supreme Court found “independent state grounds” to reverse Powell’s conviction. The Bill of Rights guarantees certain rights. For the most part these rights, under the Fourteenth Amendment, are binding upon the states. But nothing in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights limits the states from granting its citizens greater rights than are guaranteed in the Constitution. For example while the Supreme Court may have found the Tampa version of the Miranda warnings sufficient to protect Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination, the Florida Supreme Court has every right to hold the Tampa version of the Miranda Rights insufficient to protect rights granted in the Florida Constitution.

On remand the Florida Supreme Court has every right to say that confessions made after being read the Tampa version of the Miranda inadmissible as a violation of the Florida Constitution. Therefore the Supreme Court as a rule refuses to consider cases where the state court has ruled on the issue and found that it violates the state Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court like any other state court may find that a particular act violates both the state constitution and the Federal Constitution as the Florida Supreme Court did in this case, according to Justice Stevens in his dissent. But since the Supreme Court decision will not have any effect upon Powell if the Florida Supreme Court finds that Powell is protected under the Florida state constitution, the Supreme Court does not take cases where

[t]he state court ‘make[s] clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.’ . . . [T]he real question is whether ‘the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is … clear from the face of the opinion.”

The U. S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, and joined by every justice except Stevens, states that

the Florida Supreme Court treated state and federal law as interchangeable and interwoven; the court at no point expressly asserted that state-law sources gave Powell rights distinct from, or broader than, those delineated in Miranda

But as Justice Stevens points out that the Florida Supreme Court said that the Tampa version of the Miranda rights under neither the United States Constitution or the Florida Constitution provided the arrestee with sufficient notice that he/she could have an attorney present during any interrogation it implicitly stated that there are independent state grounds for excluding the confession under the State Constitution. Therefore the Supreme Court’s decision is no more than an advisory opinion and the Court should not have accepted the case.

This is the type of activism that members of the majority would reject under other circumstances. The Supreme Court, they would argue, should only accept cases where their opinion would mean something and where they were not interfering with the State Courts rulings on state law.

As part of a robbery investigation Tampa police searched Kevin Dewayne Powell’s girlfriend’s residence. The found Powell and a gun. They read a warning to Powell prior to taking a statement. The warning said:

You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.

This deviates from the normal Miranda warning in its lack of clarity about the defendant’s ability to have a lawyer present during the interrogation. While the warning read to defendants varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most jurisdictions including all Federal peace officers use the wording found in Miranda v. Arizona:

[H]e has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

The majority opinion holds that the Tampa warning does not deny the arrestee the right to know that he/she may have counsel present at the time of the interrogation. It states that the combination of the section tells the arrestee that he/she may consult an attorney prior to questioning and the section that says that the rights are available to the arrestee at any time should be sufficient to tell the arrestee that he/she may have counsel available during the interrogation.

But some future court may cite Powell for the proposition that an arrestee does not have the right to have an attorney in the room with him/her. They may claim that an arrestee, like a grand jury witness can only consult an attorney upon request who is waiting outside the room. This denies the arrestee of the right to receive suggestions from his/her attorney on what questions to answer and what questions not to answer.

But as Justice Stevens says in dissent

[T]he catchall clause does not meaningfully clarify Powell’s rights. It communicated that Powell could exercise the previously listed rights at any time. Yet the only previously listed right was the “right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the officers’] questions.

In our next post we shall consider whether or not the Supreme Court should have considered Powell in the first place.

In Arizona v. Edwards the Supreme Court ruled that once an individual asserted his/her Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation the interrogation could not resume until an attorney was appointed unless the suspect initiated the renewed interrogation. Yesterday in Shatzer v. Maryland, the court ruled that the interrogation could resume, even though the suspect did not initiate the renewed interrogation if a break in custody of at least two weeks occurred between the initial interrogation and the resumption.

In 2003 Hagertown, Maryland police officer Shane Blankenship interrogated Michael Blaine Shatzner regarding an allegation that he sexually abused his young child. At the time Shatzner was in prison on separate charges. Shatzner claimed his rights under Miranda to have an attorney present. The interrogation was terminated. Two and a half years later a different Hagertown officer renewed the interrogation. Shatzner told the officer that he thought the investigation had ended but he agreed to talk and in writing he waived his Miranda rights and gave an incriminating statement. His statement was admitted at trial and he was convicted.

On appeal he challenged the admission of the statement. The Supreme Court ruled that since the second interrogation was more than two weeks after the first, “there is little reason to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has been coerced.” But by setting a two week “rule” the Court allows overly zealous police officers to arrest someone every two weeks, interrogate him or her and then release the suspect if a Miranda claim is made, only to repeat the scenario every two weeks until the suspect gives in. This is the very type of badgering Miranda was written to prevent.

Myron Sawyer was convicted for a Little Rock bank robbery. He appealed his conviction on various grounds including denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his car and denial of his Miranda motion.

A masked robber wearing a green jumpsuit entered the bank and waved a gun demanding that everyone lie down. Then he produced a bag and ordered the teller to fill it up. He jumped up on the counter to make sure the bag was full. While filling the bag the teller put an electronic tracking device in the bag. As he left a man saw him running across the street and followed him in his car. The man saw two men driving a gold Saturn and followed the vehicle. He saw a third man sit up in the back seat. Eventually the onlooker returned to the site of the crime and provided the information to the police. The police following the electronic tracking device found Sawyer shortly after he parked at a convenience store. A green jump suit and a gun were found in plain view in the vehicle.

Sawyer was arrested and taken to the police station. He was read his Miranda rights and he asserted the right to remain silent. He was left in the interviewing room. An officer went to the bank and found a shoe print on the counter. The officer returned to the station and asked Sawyer to show him his shoe. Sawyer complied with the request. The shoe matched the imprint. The officer made some comments about the evidence that had been found. Sawyer began to ask questions. The officer read Sawyer his Miranda rights. This time Sawyer waived his Miranda rights and gave a full confession.

Initially, to detain Sawyer at the convenience store the police must have had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime was committed and that Sawyer was involved in the crime. Sawyer argued that the initial detention was illegal and that the evidence found in the Saturn was a fruit of the illegal detention and should be suppressed. The Eighth Circuit found that the police needed a minimal level of objective justification for the search. The court found that this was met by the witness seeing the car leaving the site of the crime, the reckless driving of the vehicle and the electronic tracking device leading to the area where the car was found.

The court found that the police rigorously complied with the initial assertion of Sawyer’s Miranda rights and that a sufficient period of time lapsed between the two times the Miranda rights were given to prevent harassment and therefore the waiver of the second reading of the Miranda rights was valid allowing for the admission of the confession. Furthermore prior to the reading of the Miranda rights the second time Sawyer initiated the conversation.

Of course, I have a bridge to sell to any anyone who believes that the police officer who told Sawyer about the shoe imprint and the other evidence did not hope that Sawyer would start talking about the incident and confess. This happens all of the time. The most famous incident is known as the Christian Burial Speech. In Brewer v. Williams, the defendant was arrested in Davenport, Iowa for the murder of a ten year old girl in Des Moines. His lawyer told him and the officers not to discuss the case on the trip to Des Mones.While being driven to Des Moines by offices one of the officers began talking about how the body had not been found, that it was about to snow and if the body was not found the girl would not get a Christian burial. He then directed the officers to the body. In that case the Supreme Court set aside the conviction. But the basis was the Sixth Amendment right to counsel since the officer by intentionally eliciting Williams’ statement violated their promise to his lawyer not to ask him about the incident.

While the officer did not admit to be eliciting Sawyer’s, confession there is no doubt in my mind that is why the officer discussed the evidence in front of him. But the court found the confession to be admissible.

An informant told Detective Josh Davis of the North County Metropolitan
Enforcement Group in Chesterfield, Missouri that David Wise and Brian Sievers were growing marijuana in Sievers’s basement.

Detectives Davis, Jeffrey Seerey, and John Cochran went to Sievers’ house for a “knock and talk.” They knocked on the door. Sievers answered it. The officers identified themselves and told Sievers the purpose of the visit. Sievers said, “Who ratted me out? That’s all I want to know.” [Brilliant, an admission.] The officers then read Sievers his Miranda rights. Sievers then gave a full confession including telling them that there were over a hundred plants in the basement (actually there were 312) and that his friend David Wise was in charge of caring for the plants. [Now who is ratting who out]

After the officers searched the house, with Sievers consent, [Brilliant] he took them to Wise’s St. Louis residence.

This time Seerey and Cochran did the “knock and talk” while Davis stayed in the car with Sievers. They knocked on the door, as Wise is leaving. They ask him if he would prefer to talk outside or inside. Wise says inside. [Just what the officers wanted--a chance to get inside.] Then Wise invites them into his bedroom away from his family. He looked nervous so the officers did a pat search and found a packet of marijuana in his pocket. Seerey tells Wise about the visit to Sievers’. residence. Wise says he doesn’t believe the officers. They bring Davis and Siever inside. Siever tells Wise, “They’re onto us, they got the whole grow.” [Another admission] Wise is read his Miranda rights and he gives a complete statement incriminating himself and Sievers.

Prior to trial Wise moves to suppress his confession, statements, marijuana packet and marijuana seeds found on his dresser. Motion denied.

On appeal the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Wise confirmed the conviction holding that there was sufficient evidence to convict Wise, that the statements were properly admitted and that the seizure of the marijuana packet and the seeds were legal.

Surprise, surprise, you voluntarily talk so much both before and after the Miranda warnings and then the evidence is used against you. On top of that you invite the officers into your bedroom where marijuana is in plain view and then they dare to seize it.

If Sievers and Wise had not opened up their big mouths they would not have been arrested. Apparently the informant had not provided enough information for a search of the residence. Otherwise the officers would have gotten a search warrant. But by talking the defendants gave the officers enough information to search their residences and to arrest them. They also gave them the information used to prove the case at trial. I do not know how many times I have told defendants that “Anything you say can and will be used against you.” Police don’t ask question unless they need the information to hurt you and they are smart enough to use whatever you say against you.

Myron Robinson, like many other people ignored his lawyer’s advice and spoke to the police, believing that he could talk himself out of trouble. But like most other people in his position he talked himself into a conviction and a stay in the Federal pen. Even after the police gave him the Miranda warnings he continued to talk and the more he talked the more trouble he was in. Now Myron thought he was smart. After all he was friends with an FBI agent and he was friends with the US Attorney. At least he thought they were his friends. He had been a cooperating witness on a case. He even invited agents over to his mother’s house. As a result he thought he could talk himself out of trouble and that he was immune from arrest. WRONG!!! They arrested him and used his statement against him to send him to the pen.

On appeal he asked the appellate court to find that his statement should have been excluded and that his conviction reversed. WRONG!!! The question was who initiated the interrogation. If the FBI initiated the interrogation after being told by Robinson’s lawyer that he asserted his right to remain silent the statement would be excluded, If Robinson initiated the conversation in which he gave the statement then the statement would be admissible.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the question of who initiated the conversation was a factual question and therefore it was reviewed for clear error. It came down to whether the court believed Robinson or whether the court believed the agents. “Where a factual finding rests on the district court’s credibility determination, it ‘is entitled to great deference and can virtually never be clear error’.”

Thus Myron’s big mouth earned him ten years in the Federal pen on gun charges. MAYBE next time he will listen to his lawyer.

Wednesday we looked at Texas v. Nguyen where a Texas statute requires confessions to be taped. In Massachusetts the state Supreme Court, using its supervisory powers over the courts mandated, that upon the request of a defendant a court must give a cautionary instruction to warn the jury of the danger of using an unrecorded confession. However that does not apply in Federal Courts.

Today we will look at United States v. Meadows, a case which was decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, Wednesday. It involves a charge of possession of a gun by a convicted felon. Timothy J. Meadows was arrested in Brockton, Massachusetts for possession of a gun by a convicted felon and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Timothy Meadows and John DePina were passengers in a car driven by Timothy’s brother, Shawn. Brockton Police Officer, Richard Gaucher stopped the vehicle at the entrance to the Battles Farm housing complex for minor traffic violations. As soon as the car stopped, Timothy got out of the vehicle and began to run. Gaucher called for back-up officers. They questioned Shawn who told them that their sister, Tia, lived in the complex and that Meadows was the person who got out of the car and ran. Gaucher radioed in the information and he learned that a domestic incident had been reported earlier in the day at the residence. Gaucher noted that Meadows ran in a direction that would take him away from Tia’s residence. They searched Shawn and DePina. They found two bullets on DePina but they did not find a gun in the car. At this point the officers radioed that Meadow might have a gun. They went to Tia’s residence. She told them that Meadows was upstairs. They called upstairs and asked Timothy to come downstairs. They handcuffed him and took him outside to search him.

A mother and her daughter who lived in the complex told the officers that they saw Meadows get out of the car, run towards a particular area and fall. The officers went to the place where Meadows fell and found the gun.

At trial and on appeal Meadows challenged the admission of statements he made at the time of the arrest. He claimed that he was effectively under arrest at the time he was handcuffed. The handcuffing occurred prior to the finding of the gun and therefore at the time he was handcuffed probable cause did not exist to arrest him. If this is true, statements he made to the police, after his arrest but before he was read his Miranda rights should be excluded at trial as the fruit of an illegal arrest.

The court admitted that handcuffing is evidence, though not conclusive evidence that an individual is arrested. The government argued, and the court found, that an arrest did not occur. A limited Terry stop may be made for investigative purposes when the police have a reasonable suspicion that a crime occurred and that the detainee committed the crime. Such a stop is only valid as long as the police actions are within the scope of the reasons that led to the stop. However, it may be reasonable to restrain an individual during a Terry stop for officer safety reasons if the officers have specific reasons for believing that they may be endangered. In this case bullets were found and there had been a domestic incident at the house earlier in the day. The court found that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that a gun might be nearby and therefore handcuffing was reasonable. Furthermore the fact that Meadow ran when the car was pulled over was evidence that he might try to escape and therefore it was justified to restrain him.

Meadows also claimed that the statement should have been taped. But the court found that it is not bound by Massachusetts state law and that as an intermediary appellate court it does not have the authority to make such supervisory orders without directions from the Supreme Court or Congress.

Meadow objected to the jury being told that he is a convicted felon. Of course he was charged with possessing a gun by a convicted felon. He wanted the jury to be told that he was of a class of people that cannot possess a gun. However based upon precedent the court found that the District Court made the right decision in telling the jury that he was a convicted felon but not telling them the nature of the prior conviction.

The Bill of Rights, various other provisions of the Constitution, Congressional legislation and Court interpretations of these documents set certain rights that people in the United States enjoy. While a state cannot take away a right guaranteed by the Constitution or the Supreme Court it can grant people who live in the state greater rights than are guaranteed by the Federal government.

For example, in Miranda the Supreme Court ruled that Courts can only use statements made in response to interrogation by a person who was in custody at the time the statement was given if the person was warned that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them, that they have a right to an attorney and that if they cannot afford an attorney an attorney would be appointed for them. There are exceptions to the rule but the generally the rule remains in effect. But states can give greater rights.

For example, under Article 38.22, Section 2(a) of the law of the State of Texas the accused must be warned that:

(1) he has the right to remain silent and not to make any statement at all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;

(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court;

(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during any questioning;

(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and

(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time.

Furthermore, and maybe more importantly, Section 3(a) of the law requires:

First, “an electronic recording” of the statement must be made. (12) Second, “prior to the statement but during the recording the accused [was] given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 . . . and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[d] any rights set out in the warning.”

The requirement that the statement be taped is crucial for all. It prevents unnecessary trials when a defendant realizes what the jury is going to hear and encourages guilty verdicts. At the same time it keeps the police honest.

In Nguyen v. Texas The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled on an appeal from the State of Texas in a matter interpreting Article 38.22.

At 4:00 am Dallas Police Officer Vance Johnson stopped a car driven by Nguyen for traffic violations. Michael Sanchez, the owner of the car, was a passenger in the vehicle. Johnson asked for permission to search the vehicle and Sanchez gave him permission. After finding methamphetamine in the car Johnson arrested Sanchez.

Sanchez waived his Miranda rights and told the officer that the methamphetamine belonged to Nguyen. Johnson arrested Nguyen for the traffic violations. Johnson gave Nguyen partial Miranda rights which did not comply with Article 3822 Johnson attempted to interrogate Nguyen but he asserted his right to an attorney. Not surprisingly, Johnson decided not to interrogate Nguyen.

The officers put both men in the back seat of Johnson’s vehicle. Without telling Sanchez and Nguyen their conversation was taped. Sanchez begged Nguyen to take responsibility for the drugs and Nguyen eventually agreed. He called Johnson, but Johnson was too busy searching Sanchez’s vehicle to pay attention.

Johnson returned to the police car. Sanchez told him that the drugs belonged to Nguyen. But Johnson, rightly remembered that Nguyen invoked his Miranda rights and refused to question him. Sanchez said he would not go down for “Nguyen’s shit.” Nguyen stated that he was charged with the same thing as Sanchez. Johnson corrected him and said he was only charged with traffic violations. Nguyen said that the drugs did not belong to either of them. Sanchez started yelling at Nguyen urging him to take responsibility. Johnson went back to searching Sanchez’s vehicle.

Sanchez continued to beg. Nguyen gave in again. Sanchez called Johnson and Nguyen reluctantly told the officer the methamphetamine was his. Sanchez was allowed to get out of the police vehicle. Nguyen was crying. Johnson found an ecstacy tablet in Sanchez’s vehicle. Sanchez was arrest for the ecstacy.

Nguyen was convicted of hindering apprehension. The Fifth Court of Appeals reversed and the state appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The state argued that since the officer’s violation of section three came prior to Nguyen alleged illegal acts (hindering) the statements should not be excluded. The Court disagreed. Section 3822 is a procedural evidentiary and rule and there is no exception in it for crimes committed after the officer’s violation.

Second the state argued that the statement should be admissible because at the time the statement was given Nguyen was in custody for vehicle violations, not for hindering. The Court found that a person is in custody when either they are arrested or their movement is restricted. Thus even if Nguyen had not been arrested for hindering his movement was restrained and therefore he was in custody.

Finally the state argued that Nguyen’s statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but the plain language of the statute is to the contrary. It says:

“No oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless” the five statutory conditions are met.

The Court of Criminal Appeals confirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing the conviction.

Last week the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied the appeal of Kenneth Kirkland who was convicted of possessing over fifty grams of cocaine and sentenced to twenty years in prison and an additional ten years of supervised release.

In the early morning hours of September 2, 2007, Fairview Heights, Illinois police officers began an investigation of Kirkland for possession of cocaine. The investigation took them to the local Ramada Inn. Using police dogs to sniff Kirkland’s vehicle which was parked at the hotel they believed that there was cocaine in the vehicle. After he came out of the hotel and started to drive the vehicle, the officers pulled him over on the pretext that they were stopping him for a cracked windshield.

While an officer was issuing Kirkland a warning, a sergeant and a DEA agent drove up. Without reading Kirkland his Miranda warnings they asked him some questions and for permission to search the vehicle. Kirkland agreed. Rifle cartridges and cocaine were found. He was arrested and 48 hours later transferred to DEA custody. Once in DEA custody he was read his Miranda rights and he took responsibility for the cocaine. At approximately 3:00 p.m. on September 4 he was taken before a magistrate.

On November 30 he (actually his attorney) filed a motion to suppress evidence. The motion did not mention the statements made to the police or the DEA. He claimed that his detention was without reasonable or probable cause and that the length of the detention was excessive. He filed a brief in support of the motion on February 1, 2008 but again did not discuss the statements. A hearing was held on February 28. At the hearing his counsel said

Regarding the statements that he ultimately makes
at the DEA office several days later, I believe those
warrant suppression as well, Your Honor, based
upon the fact that he had been in custody for over
48 hours at that point, apparently had not even had
a change of clothing. My understanding is that he
was brought to Court later that day, but not before
being interviewed at the DEA office.

The Court refused to suppress the cocaine because the search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause. The Court also refused to suppress the statements made while in Federal custody because he had been given Miranda warnings and it did not suppress the roadside statements because Kirkland (again actually his counsel) did not specify the nature of the statements.

The Fourth Amendment prevents lengthy detentions prior to an appearance before an magistrate during which peace officers can ruthlessly interrogate defendants. The Supreme Court has decided that a defendant must be taken before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest. Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that a defendant be brought immediately before a Federal magistrate and that any statement taken prior to the appearance before the magistrate but more than six hours after the arrest be excluded. Time held in local custody is excluded unless the Federal authorities colluded with the local police.

In refusing to grant the defendant’s appeal the appellate court found that Kirkland waived his right to have appellate consideration by failing to timely move to suppress the statements. Not only did Kirkland’s counsel wait until the hearing on the motion to suppress the cocaine to bring up the statements but his counsel failed to provide any legal reasoning in the motion to support the suppression of the statements. Furthermore counsel failed to meet deadlines set by the trial court for motions to suppress in that the original motion did not ask for the suppression of the statements.

The logical problem with the Seventh Circuit’s denial of the appeal is that Kirkland did not fail to meet any deadlines or to fulfill any duties. He is being punished for his counsel’s failure to meet deadlines and properly move for suppression of the statements. Presumably, although there is no indication in the appellate decision his appellate counsel (let’s hope that his trial counsel is not doing the appeal) is filing a writ of habeas corpus alleging incompetence of his trial counsel for failure to meet the deadline and for failure to move in a timely manner for suppression of the statements.

Scott Roeder is charged with the Kansas murder of Dr.George Tiller. Tiller was one of few doctors in this country who performed late term abortions.

At the time of his arrest he did the right thing. He refused to talk to the police without an attorney present. After all, we have all heard the Miranda rights on TV. In the usual pronouncement of the rights a defendant is told “anything you say can be used against you.” The better pronouncement is “Anything you say can and will be used against you. Because a smart prosecutor will find a way.

But after refusing to talk to the police, Roeder called the Associated Press. He told them, “I know there are many other similar events planned around the country as long as abortion remains legal,” Well guess what: his quote ends up in every newspaper in the country. And guess what else, he will hear it at trial. Just as his comments to the police are admissible any other comments he makes will be admissible at trial. Any prosecutor worth his or her salt will get this statement admitted as an admission of guilt. After all, the argument will go, if he was not involved in the murder how would he know that similar criminal acts are planned around the country.

And by the way, Mr Roeder, I’d be willing to bet that every conversation you make from the jail telephone (besides those to your lawyer) are taped and provided immediately to the District Attorney.