The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a decisision by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that solicitation for the purpose of prostitution is a crime of moral turpitude prohibiting an order allowing a foreign citizen to voluntarily depart from the country.

The Court held that since a prior decision of the BIA found that prostitution was a crime of moral turpitude and since there is no material difference between prostitution and solicitation for prostitution that solicitation under California Penal Code Section 647(b) is a crime of moral turpitude.

A crime of moral turpitude is one that “encompasses crimes that “are base, vile, or depraved —if they offend society’s most fundamental values, or shock society’s conscience. . . [S]uch offenses are those that are intrinsically wrong (malum in se) or require evil intent.” Conviction on two misdemeanors involving moral turpitdude provide cause for deportation. The defendant, in the matter before the court, Avinesh Anand Rohit, had another conviction for attempting to dissuade a witness, a crime of moral turpitude.

Albuquerque’s chief criminal judge, Albert S. “Pat” Murdoch was arrested last week and charged with raping a prostitute as well as intimidating a witness.

According to the prostitute he met her through an online ad she placed. He invited her over to his house and they met approximately eight times and he paid her approximately $200 each time.

On one occasion, the prostitute said, he forced her to be the recipient of oral sex. She refused but he did it anyway. The next time she went to his house she secretly videotaped Judge Murdoch forcing himself on her.

The police got wind of the tape and an undercover officer bought the tape from the prostitute for $400.00.

When the prostitute asked him what he would do if his activities with prostitutes became public he said that he would use his contacts with the police and others to prevent his use of prostitutes from becoming public.

Without knowing the evidence, my bet as to the judge’s defense at trial: his attorneys will argue that the alleged rape was a consensual playing out of a fantasy. He may also argue, based upon her question about what he would do if his activities became public, that she was attempting to blackmail him and he refused to surrender.

Former Antioch, California police officers ¹ Norman Wielsch, most recently head of the Central Contra Costa Narcotics Enforcement Team (CNET), and Christopher Butler, who now has a private detective agency along with San Ramon police officer, Louis Lombardi, were charged with stealing drugs from the CNET safe and selling them to Butler’s clients and to confidential informants. Lombardi was a member of CNET at the time of the thefts. Then Butler, and former Danville Officer Stephen Tanabe, were charged with setting up spouses of Butler’s clients to be arrested on DUI’s to dirty them up for the divorce proceedings. Now Butler is accusing his former friend, Wielsch of running a brothel in Pleasant Hill in 2009-2010.

Boy, these cops must count for half of the crime in Contra Costa County.

Guam is a United States territory and it comes under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court, sitting in Hawaii, heard United States v. Cha. It held that a 26.5 hour seizure of a residence pending the obtaining of a search warrant unconstitutional and as a result it upheld the suppression of evidence found in the house.

On Saturday evening, January 12, 2008 police officers arrived at the Blue House Lounge in Tamuning, Guam to investigate a complaint made by Sonina Suwain, a resident of Chuuk that the owners had seized her passport and were holding two of her female cousins against their will. The officers found one cousin waiting tables and the other in a hospitality room with a male patron. After interviewing the cousins Song Jaw Cha (Ms Cha) was detained on prostitution related charges. The officers did a walk through of the lounge and Ms Cha’s attached home, finding her husband in bed. They interviewed customers and ordered that the place be closed. The Chas were taken to the precinct at 1:00 Sunday morning and Ms Cha was arrested at 6:00 am. At 8:00 am Mr. Cha returned to his house but he was not allowed to enter. At 12:45 pm his lawyer arrived The lawyer returned at 2:45 and asked that Mr. Cha be allowed to retrieve his diabetes medication. The police did not allow him to get the medication until 7:00 that night. The lawyer left at 1:00 Monday morning.

At 9:20 Sunday morning Officer Perez was asked to come into work at noon for a briefing. During the briefing he was asked to prepare a search warrant affidavit. He waited for reports and started working on the affidavit at 6:30 Sunday evening. He worked until 4:00 am. He went home and returned at 7:50 Monday morning. At the request of the chief prosecutor he ran the warrant by him and presented it to a magistrate at 10:25 Monday morning. The search was not begun until 2:00 Monday afternoon and it was not completed until 1:00 Tuesday morning, when Mr. Cha was allowed to enter his house.

The court found that the officers violated the law by taking too much time to process the warrant request. In Illinois v. McArthur the Supreme Court listed four factors that must be considered in determining the constitutionality of a detention of a home prior to a search. First, they must consider the existence of probable cause. This is not disputed. Second, whether the police had good cause to fear that evidence would be destroyed. There was no reason to believe that evidence would be destroyed. Third, whether the police made reasonable efforts to meet the privacy needs of the residents. Evidence to the contrary is the refusal for four hours to provide Mr. Cha with his medication. Finally whether the police acted reasonably and with diligence in obtaining the warrant. The court found numerous unnecessary delays including Perez’s late appearance on the scene, the time that passed between his appearance and his beginning to work on the affidavit, and the time he took off in the early morning.

The Court found that the failure to suppress the evidence would allow law enforcement officers to spend an indefinite amount of time prior to the preparation of a search warrant without any repercussions and that suppression would accommodate the goal of suppressing illegally seized evidence in that it would deter future “deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent conduct.” The Court pointed out that it was a violation of the law and not a violation of fact and that the police should be aware of the law.

Two questions that often come up in criminal cases are can a defendant withdraw his/her guilty plea and, if the defendant has an appointed counsel, can he/she fire the attorney and get another appointed attorney. Both questions are discussed in the Second Circuit case, United States v. Carreto, et al.

Josue Flores Carreto, Gerardo Flores Carreto, and Daniel Perez Alonso smuggled Mexican women, some of whom were under eighteen years old, into the United States and forced them into prostitution. They were indicted on November 14, 2004. They turned down all plea offers. On December 20, 2004 Alonso requested that he receive a new appointed attorney, claiming that his attorney had no interest in the case. The court held a hearing in which Alonso’s lawyer testified that he had seen him seven times for approximately one hour each. The court found no basis for the complaint and denied the request.

The appellate court found that the trial judge did not commit any error in denying Alonso’s request for a new attorney. Under Second Circuit law, the court must consider “the timeliness of defendant’s request for new counsel; (2) the adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry into the matter; (3) whether the conflict resulted in a total lack of communication between the defendant and his attorney; and (4) whether the defendant’s own conduct contributed to the communication breakdown.” The Second Circuit found that the trial judge fully considered the matter and that there did not appear to be a complete breakdown in communications. As a result it upheld the trial court’s decision.

On April 4, 2005 a jury was selected. The next day the defendants said they wanted to plead guilty. The judge carefully told them that there was no plea agreement on the table and that if they plead guilty they could receive a greater sentence that if they went to trial and lost. They insisted that they wanted to plead guilty and the court took their pleas to all twenty-seven counts.

Sentencing was continued and they were not sentenced for approximately a year. On the day of sentencing, Alonso had a new retained attorney and he moved to withdraw Alonso, guilty plea. The basis for the motion was that: “(1) defendants were not adequately advised of their right to testify at trial, (2) the court did not verify that the
plea was voluntary, and (3) counsel were ineffective in failing to obtain relevant documents from Mexico.” The court denied the motion on the grounds that nothing in the motion indicated that the defendants were innocent. While the law changes somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction the rule in the Second Circuit requires that the defendants show a “fair and just reason” to withdraw their plea. Specifically the court must consider whether the defendant assert their innocence, the amount of time between the plea and the request to withdraw it and the prejudice to the government of a withdraw. The court found there was no evidence of a claim of innocence, that over a year passed between the plea and the motion to withdraw the plea. Furthermore the lengthy period between the plea and the motion to withdraw it would make it difficult for the government to find witnesses. The court also pointed to the extensive colloquy held at the time of the plea. Furthermore the transcript showed that they had been told about their right to testify. According to the court the Mexican transcript were not relevant to the question of guilt or innocence.

The Carretos were sentenced to 50 years each and Alonso was sentence to 25 years.

The city of Amsterdam has a problem. Most banks refuse to give credit to prostitutes even though prostitution is legal. The prostitutes are an important part of Amsterdam’s economy and the prostitution segment of the economy is hurting due to its inability to get credit.

The city has rejected the idea of a “sex bank.” But it recognizes prostitution as a bona fide industry and the need of its proprietors to obtain reasonable credit.

May I suggest two examples for Amsterdam. San Francisco has developed a Bank on San Francisco. While the Bank on San Francisco does not provide loans it allows individuals who do not qualify for most banking accounts, including presumably prostitutes (although prostitution is illegal), to open accounts and use those accounts to cash checks and maintain savings accounts. The Bank on San Francisco, uses 170 branches of volunteering banks which agree to relax some of their rules, such as ID requirements, prior credit requirements, minimum account balances and some fees. As a result low income people can keep their money in a bank and not risk having to carry the money in their pockets. Also by cashing checks in the bank they do not have to go to high price check cashing firms.

A second model is micro-banks. Micro-banks, generally found in third world countries allow small entrepreneurs to borrow small amounts of money to open or expands small businesses. Amsterdam officials might like to know that the micro-banks have a repayment rate of over 95 percent.

By opening the bank up to all who are in need of banking sevices, such as the Bank on San Francisco and by using existing banks it won’t be a sex bank. By making loans like the micro-banks it will serve the needs of the sex workers. Of course, while it need not make million dollar loans,the cost of services in Amsterdam is a lot greater than in the Third World, where many of the loans are for as little as $125.