Kerry L. Smith was indicted on marijuana related charges in April 2007. He retained John Rogers to represent him. Both sides dealt with voluminous amounts of discovery. Various motions were filed and superseding indictments were issued. Approximately a year into the case Rogers requested a competency evaluation for Smith. It was completed in June of 2008. No trial date was set. On August 25, 2008 Smith filed a motion asking to substitute in Beau Brindley as his attorney. On September 8 the Court set a trial date of November 4 and denied the motion to substitute counsel because Brindley was scheduled to be in another trial on November 4.

When the court rejected Brindley, Smith requested that Rogers continue to represent him. With the court’s prodding, Rogers refused. The Court appointed Ronald Jenkins to represent Smith.

Three weeks later Smith plead guilty with a written plea agreement that among other points surrendered the right to appeal unless the sentence exceeded the guidelines.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Section 11(b)(1)(N) requires that the district court “must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” Though the appellate waiver was in the agreement the Court made no effort to independently inform Smith of the parameters of the waiver. The court mentioned it only in passing and then only to ask Jenkins whether there was a waiver.

The right to counsel of one’s choice is so fundamental that one should not be able to waive an appeal of its denial. The denial of the right to counsel of one’s choice brings into question the value of the waiver. Different counsel will handle different issues in different ways. If Smith had been granted the substitution he may not have plead guilty and if he had plead guilty he may not have agreed to waive the right to appeal. As the appellate court stated, “[i]f a defendant is erroneously denied the counsel of his choice, it is a structural error in the trial that brings into question the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea itself. ”

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found a clear violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Since no trial date had been set at the time the motion to substitute counsel was made, the interference with the court’s calendar was minimal and the court’s refusal to set a trial date when Brindley was available was uncalled for and a violation of Smith’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and to those who can afford private counsel it guarantees the right to counsel of their choice. But it also guarantees a fair trial. In some instances those rights contradict each other. For example, part of a right to a fair trial is the right to have counsel who will zealously defend you. But when counsel has a conflict that prevents him/her from zealously representing a defendant the right to a fair trial is violated. The right is only preserved when counsel does not have conflicting responsibilities. This question comes up, for example, when counsel represents two defendants in the same trial. If the defendants have conflicting defenses such as to require counsel for one defendant to point the finger at the other defendant a defendant is denied a fair trial since his/her lawyer ends up pointing the finger at one of the clients jointly represented by the lawyer.

In United States v. Turner The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced the question of conflicting rights when one member of a multi-defendant drug case was arrested after all of the other defendants had either plead of been convicted. The same lawyer who represented one of the other defendants in sentencing was hired to represent Roosevelt Turner who had recently been arrested. The United States Attorney complained about a possible conflict and the United States District Judge removed Turner’s attorney. Turner went to trial with another attorney and appealed. The appellate court reversed the conviction because Turner had been denied the attorney of his choice.

The only evidence the United States Attorney raised to show a conflict was that either Roosevelt or Anthony Womack both of whom were represented by Irl Baris might want to testify against the other or that one of them might be subpoened to testify against the other. But the appellate court said that the fact that something might happen was not enough to deny a defendant his choice of attorneys. In fact neither turned against the other or was subpoenaed to testify against the other.

Since the denial of Turner the right to the attorney of his choice is a structural error Turner is entitled to a new trial. Afterall no one could tell if he would have been convicted with a different attorney.

The Supreme Court, last week, in Kansas v. Ventris ruled that statements given to jailhouse informants in violation of the Sixth Amendment can be used to impeach a defendant at trial.

In 1964 the Supreme Court ruled in Massiah v. United States that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to allow a police informant to elicit incriminating evidence from a defendant after the defendant has been indicted and in the absence of the defendant’s attorney.

But now the Supreme Court has ruled that while a prosecutor cannot use the illegally gained evidence in its case in chief it can use it to impeach the defendant. Donnie Ray Ventris and Rhonda Theel were charged with various crime including the murder of Ernest Hicks. Theel plead guilty to robbery and her murder charge was dismissed. The prosecutor placed an informant in Ventris’ cell who elicited comments from Ventris incriminating himself on the murder charge. After Ventris testified at trial that Theel committed the murder, the informant testified as to what he had been told by Ventris in the cell.

Justice Scalia, speaking for a seven member majority of the Supreme Court compared the Sixth Amendment violation to a Fourth Amendment violation. He said that since exclusion of the illegally seized evidence in both cases was not directly mandated by the Constitution, a defendant should not be allowed to take advantage of the fact that the government illegally obtained evidence to lie at trial and therefore the illegally obtained evidence should be usable for impeachment.

But the problem with Scalia’s analogy to the Fourth Amendment, is that evidence illegally seized under the Fourth Amendment it is excluded solely because of the government’s wrong doing. There is no question about its validity. In the Case of Massiah error not only is the evidence seized illegally but there is considerable question about its credibility. An informant who is being rewarded in one way or another by the government for providing incriminating evidence against someone such as Ventis has considerable reason to lie. The government is not going to dismiss his case or give him favors if he does not provide them with incriminating evidence.

Also, a defendant, such as Ventris has reason to lie when talking to a cellmate who he does not know to be working for the police. A person in jail has considerable reason to want to appear to be tough in jail. Jails are not nice places and your cell mates may not be nice people. By telling them that you killed someone, they are less likely to attack you. After all would you want to attack someone who killed a man in cold blood. Thus Ventris may have lied to the agent/cellmate just to protect himself.