The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Manuel Roach despite the lack of probable cause to support the search warrant for his girlfriend’s house and despite the judge’s failure to determine whether or not the expert had sufficient knowledge to testify about gang culture.

On appeal the defendant objected to the search of this girlfriend’s house on the two grounds. First he said that there was not probable cause to support the search warrant. Second he said that there was an insufficient nexus between the residence and any evidence of criminal activity. The court agreed with Roach on both grounds.

The search warrant was based on Roach’s former membership in the Northside Crips in Wichita. But his last documented membership in the gang was years before the warrant was served and while he admitted a gang lifestyle that too was a year and a half before the warrant. The last evidence of his being involved in drugs was in 2002, five years before the warrant. Based upon this information the court found the evidence stale and therefore the warrant was not supported by probable cause. The only evidence in the affidavit attempting to show a nexus between the residence and criminal behavior evidence was a statement about the residences of fifteen alleged members of the gang. The affiant said:

“[O]fficers have verified that the individuals listed below live at the following addresses, through investigations, which included
checking for utilities information, driver’s license records, real estate records, Wichita Police Department records, tax records, social security records, US Postal Service records, interviews and/or surveillance.”

The court found this statement to be conclusory and it failed to state what methods had been used on the girlfriend’s residence. Thus it did not show a nexus between the residence and criminal evidence.

However under Leon if a search warrant is not supported by probable cause evidence received as a result thereof is admissible if the officer carrying out the warrant does so in good faith. The court found that the officer could have believed that their was probable caused based upon Roach’s long history of participation in the gang and in drugs. Furthermore since there was some evidence that the officers confirmed that Roach lived at the residence the officer search the residence could have believed that a nexus existed. As a result the officer acted in good faith and the evidence was admissible.

In Daubert the Supreme Court ruled that in Federal cases expert testimony is admissible if the judge makes a finding that it is both reliable and relevant. The trial judge did not make the necessary finding but the court found the government’s gang expert’s testimony admissible anyway because the jury could have believed the gang evidence true based upon other evidence. In other words it was harmless error to admit the expert evidence.

Sometimes the law is funny. Here the trial court violated the United States Constitution and the Rules of Evidence. Yet the appellate court found the evidence admissible and upheld the conviction.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Edward Lee Smith due to trial counsel failure to make a Franks motion.

A confidential informant told a Hennepin County (Minneapolis) detective that Smith was a leader of the Vice Lords gang and that he was selling drugs and guns from his residence. Detective Joe Poidinger did a computer search and confirmed the gang ties. He arranged but did not participate in a search of Smith’s garbage. In the garbage officers found evidence of drug sales. Based on this information Poidinger obtained a search warrant for Smith’s duplex.

Smith was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison based on the quantity of drugs and his prior conviction.

On appeal he argued that probable cause did not exist for the search warrant and that double jeopardy existed since his sentence was aggravated due to a prior conviction.

The appellate court upheld the conviction. It ruled that probable cause existed for the search based upon his prior conviction and the garbage container search.

Smith argued that there was no evidence that the officers searched the correct trash can. He lived in a duplex and the units had adjoining garbage containers.

The appellate court ruled that Smith did not make a Franks motion in the trial court. Therefore the appellate court limited its review of suppression issues to whether or not probable cause existed on the face of the search warrant affidavit. Under Delaware v. Franks evidence seized as a result of “deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth” in an affidavit supporting a search warrant must be suppressed. But in order to get a Franks hearing a defendant must show that

[t]here [are] . . . allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.

I have some problem with using the prior conviction. A prior conviction is not really relevant to whether drugs can be found in the defendant’s residence on a particular day. But when we ignore the Franks issues drug related trash in a garbage can is probably sufficient to a showing of probable cause for a search warrant.

The other issue raised by Smith is the mandatory minimum sentence based on his prior conviction. The court held that issue was not timely raised since it was not raised in the trial court. Secondly, the appellate court, relying on precedent, found that the ten year mandatory minimum was “a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, not an increased punishment for the earlier crime.” As a result the court that constitutional provisions against double jeopardy were not violated.

The Sixth Circuit found that probable cause supported the search warrant in United States v. Dyer and affirmed the conviction.

A Tennessee police officer swore out an affidavit for a search warrant for a cabin rented by Stacy Lee Glance and used by Glance and Kenneth J. Dyer. The bulk of the information in the affidavit came from an unnamed confidential informant who was facing drug charges and hoping to get the charges dismissed in exchange for his/her assistance in convicting Glance and Dyer. Glance went to trial and was found not guilty. Dyer entered a conditional plea allowing him to challenge the search warrant on appeal.

The informant claimed to have seen a drug deal involving methamphetamine in the cabin. The authorities corroborated some minor details of the informant’s statement. The informant took the officer to the cabin. Cars owned by Glance and Dyer were outside the cabin. Furthermore Dyer and Glance were seen at the cabin. Dyer and Glance have criminal records for methamphetamine related crimes and Dyer had an outstanding warrant for methamphetamine from North Carolina.

On this information the Sixth Circuit found that probable cause supported the warrant. The issue here is the reliability of the information received from the informant. The problem with this is that all of the corroborating evidence involves innocent behavior. All we really know is that the informant knows Glance and Dyer. We also know that the informant has reason to provide false information since any information that he/she provides will be used to dismiss the charges against him/her or to ameliorate the sentence for his/her criminal behavior.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction in a case where the District court wrongly denied the defendant motion to dismiss on illegal search and seizure grounds.

Two United States marshals went to the Missouri residence of Gary McMullin, looking for Daryl Crowder who was wanted on an Illinois warrant. While Marshall Newlin knocked at the front door, Marshall Davis covered the back door. McMullin consented to Newlin coming in and he told the marshal that he was having coffee with his uncle.

Simultaneously Crowder ran out into the back yard and he was arrested by Davis. Newlin went into the back yard to assist in the arrest and McMullin also went out.

Newlin handcuffed McMullin and physically brought him back into the kitchen. Back in the house, Newlin noticed some ammunition in an ashtray. He then asked whether there were any guns in the residence. McMullin pointed out several weapons and McMullin was arrested for possession of weapons by a convicted felon.

There is no question that Marshal Newlin had consent to enter the residence. But the issue on appeal is whether he had consent for the second entry into the residence.

The core value behind the Fourth Amendment is to protect an individual’s privacy in his/her home. As the court stated

In particular, Fourth Amendment law recognizes the inherent sanctity of a person’s house. The caselaw has consistently recognized that considerably more protection is to be afforded a home than other premises. The leading decisions . . . are each heavily predicated upon the ancient precept that ‘a man’s home is his castle. . . . Therefore, “to search a private place, person, or effect, law enforcement must obtain from a judicial officer a search warrant supported by probable cause.

The court considered two exceptions to the warrant requirement — exigent circumstances and consent. The court found no exigent circumstances requiring the reentry into the residence which would require that “lives are threatened, a suspect’s escape is imminent, or evidence is about to be destroyed.”

The issue of consent is a little more difficult. Does the consent for the initial entry cover the second entry. The court found it did not. While there are cases where courts have found the contrary. Generally in those cases the re-entry occurred shortly after a brief exit to get help or some similar purpose.

The court gives only short consideration to what I consider to be a major issue. At the time of the re-entry McMullin is in handcuffs and he was physically moved into the house. He was under the control of the marshal he may have well felt that he did not have the power to refuse consent. So I doubt any withdrawal of consent or giving of consent would have been in voluntary.

In any case the court came to the right decision and reversed the conviction.

Last week a Federal/State task force raided two Los Angeles area marijuana dispensaries. At first blush it would appear that the Feds were violating the promises made by President Obama during the campaign and later by Attorney General Holder not to interfere with state medical marijuana laws.

While the DEA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Torrance Police Department and Culver City Police Department all took part in the raids, the raids appear to have been directed by State authorities with the feds only helping out. The Los Angeles Police Department applied for the Search Warrant which was granted by a Superior Court judge. This would indicate that the affidavit supporting the search warrant alleges a violation of state law. But no one involved–neither the police department or the DEA are publicly admitting what violation occurred.

The task force raided Organica Collective in Culver City, and the Overland Gardens Collective in West Los Angeles . The clubs are owned by Jeffrey Joseph. His house was also raided and he was arrested. He is now out on bail. They seized 100 pounds of marijuana, 200 live plants, and $100,000 in cash. None of this necessarily indicates anything other than a dispensary which sells marijuana to patients who have the approval of their doctors to legally possess marijuana.

The Organica Collective posted a statement on opposingview,com denying any violation of state law.

The law requires that the police file the search warrant affidavit within ten days of the search and it then becomes public. Therefore it should be filed within the next week and we will know the allegations.

When prosecutors have no other way to justify a warrantless search they claim that exigent circumstances require immediate action and that peace officers did not have time to obtain a search warrant. In United States v. Washington they not only claimed exigent circumstances but they claimed that Mr. Washington did not have standing to object to the search.

George Young rented an apartment in Cincinnati, Ohio. While he was serving a term in the local jail, his nephew, Tracy Washington was house sitting. At the time of Young’s arrest he told Washington to secure the apartment and to keep people out of the apartment. Nevertheless the apartment manager told the officers that no one, including Washington, was to be in the apartment while Young was in jail.

Early on Christmas morning the local police came to the residence without a search warrant and accused Washington of trespassing. Over Washington’s objection they patted him down and searched the apartment. Drugs, paraphernalia and a gun was found.

Washington was charged with gun and drug charges. He moved to suppress the evidence. The court granted his motion and the government appealed.

A defendant has standing to move to suppress evidence if objectively and subjectively he has a right to privacy in the area searched. If you are living in the area searched, as Washington was, you have a privacy right in the apartment. The government attempted to claim that because Young was behind in paying the rent, Washington was subject to to eviction and therefore could not have a privacy right in the apartment. But under Ohio law while he was subject to eviction no action had been taken and he continued to have a right to privacy in the apartment.

The government also argued that since he was committing criminal acts in the apartment he lost his right to privacy in the apartment. The court pointed out that this was absurd in that if this was true the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless.

Therefore the court found that Washington had standing to bring the motion to suppress the evidence.

The next issue is whether the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. The prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the search. The Supreme Court has found four instances in which exigent circumstances are applicable:

(1) to engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (2) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; (3) to prevent a suspect from escaping; and (4) to prevent imminent harm to police or third parties.

The government did not claim that any of these factors were relevant. While the Sixth Circuit has found a couple more instances where exigent circumstances exist it should only be used

As [the court has] repeatedly and consistently observed, the critical issue is whether there is a “true immediacy” that absolves an officer from the need to apply for a warrant and receive approval from an impartial magistrate

In this case the court found no great immediacy. It is true that several days before Christmas people were seen going into the apartment with a gun. But there was no evidence that the gun was being used. Drug use is a serious problem but if drug use was necessarily an exigent circumstance the warrant requirement would be meaningless.

The court particularly did not want to get around the warrant requirement since the alleged harm, trespassing is relatively trivial. As a result the Court found that the search was unreasonable and it upheld the suppression of the evidence.

The Obama administration continues to make plans for indefinite detention for many of the detainees at Guantanamo.

Indefinite detention violates many of the basic beliefs of our founders expressed in the Constitution. Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution states, “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” The Fifth Amendment guarantees “due process of law.” It starts out saying, “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;” The Sixth Amendment guarantees “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. It also requires that the accused have the right of confrontation and the use the state for compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses. The Eighth Amendment forbids excessive bail.

Furthermore the United States has signed international treaties guaranteeing alleged terrorist the right to a speedy trial. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees to all the right to a speedy and public trial.

Several days ago we discussed Unus v. Kane a case in which a Muslim family sued for an alleged violation of its Fourth Amendment rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Today we take a look at another case in which the plaintiff claimed an illegal search of her residence. Luckily for the plaintiff in this case, Maira Guzman the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court grant of summary judgment to the defendant, the City of Chicago. Guzman sued the City of Chicago pursuant to 42 USC Section 1983 for a violation of her civil rights.

Sergeant Marvin Bonnstetter of the Chicago Police Department was investigating gangs in Chicago. While he was at the jail he was approached by a man who claimed to have information. Together with an FBI officer he met with this man (known as John Doe). The officers asked the man a number of questions. He seemed knowledgeable about Chicago gangs and he was able to identify pictures of gang members.

John Doe told the officers that he had seen a convicted felon, Ruben Estrada coming out of his residence, located at 1536 West Walton in Chicago, with a gun. Doe told the officers that the West Walton address was a single family residence. The officers and Doe drove by the building and it appeared to be a single family residence. There was a real estate sign in the window and the officers thought it was a home run business.

Bonnstetter used the information to write an affidavit and submit it to the court to get a search warrant for the residence. A magistrate signed the search warrant.

Fourteen police officers and FBI agents, including Bonnstetter went to the residence to serve the search warrant. Shortly after arriving they discovered that it was not a single family residence. The real estate office was separate from the rest of the building and their were two residential apartments in the building. Furthermore no one by the name of Ruben Estrada lived in the building. They searched the upstairs apartment where Maira Guzmen, a pregnant woman, her husband, and their nine year old son lived.

The Seventh Circuit found that while Bonnstetter acted appropriately in obtaining the search warrant the police did not properly execute the warrant. The court citing Maryland v. Garrison stated that since the officers realized that it was not a single family residence prior to the search, they were required to withdraw.

New York joined Oregon and Washington in finding that their state constitutional bans on illegal search and seizure prevents the warrantless use of GPS, by law enforcement to track a vehicle.

State Police investigators placed a GPS device under the bumper of Scott Weaver’s van and left it there for 65 days, creeping under the van once to change the battery. Evidence taken from the GPS device was used to convict Weaver of the burglary of a K-Mart.

The New York Court of Appeals found that having a GPS device secretly placed under your vehicle for 65 days was so invasive as to violate the state constitution’s requirement that a search warrant is necessary for the search of the vehicle’s route. The court recognized that while the United States Supreme Court has never considered the validity of a GPS search it had found legal the use of a beeper in United States v. Knotts placed in a barrel of chloroform on the back of a truck as a means to aid agents keep track of the vehicle.

But the court found that the beeper in Knotts was a lot less sophisticated than GPS. The Supreme Court in Knotts found that the beeper was permissible since it was only an aid to human vision. Current devices are a lot more accurate than the beeper and human participation in tracking vehicles is no longer needed. The invasiveness of current devices is way beyond what the Supreme Court could have dreamed of twenty-six years ago in Knotts. As the court stated:

Disclosed in the data retrieved from the
transmitting unit, nearly instantaneously with the press of a
button on the highly portable receiving unit, will be trips the
indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to
conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the
abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and
on.

The court noted that there may be cases where exigent circumstances do not permit the luxury of getting a search warrant but in this case where the GPS device was on the vehicle for 65 days that is hardly the case.

The court also recognized that the expectation of privacy in a vehicle which is open to the public is a lot less than in a residence but it pointed out many circumstances, most recently in Gant, where the Supreme Court found an expectation of privacy in a vehicle.

Unlike the Oregon and Washington constitutions the New York search and seizure clause tracks the Fourth Amendment. Therefore there is some hope that someday when the United States Supreme Court decides a GPS case that it will follow the New York example.

Probably as long as there has been a Fourth Amendment there has been a debate over whether to exclude evidence illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled in 1914 in Weeks v. United States that illegally seized evidence should be excluded at trial. But to this day conservatives claim that the evidence should be admissible. After all it may have been seized illegally but its still credible evidence. The problem with this theory is, if you don’t exclude the evidence what is to stop government agents from consistently violating the Fourth Amendment to get evidence against individuals and organizations.

The right responds to this by suggesting that people can sue those who violate their rights in what is called a Bivens suit. But there are two problems with Bivens suits. First, if you are convicted of a crime and sent to prison as a result of illegally seized evidence no amount of money can pay you back for the time lost. Second, even if you are not charged and convicted a Bivens suit as shown in the recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Unus v. Kane et al is very difficult to win.

Unus v Kane et al involves a Muslim family living in the Eastern District of Virginia shortly after 9/11. Iqbal Unus, a U.S, citizen worked for the Islamic Institute of Islamic Thought and he had ties to several other Islamic organizations. David Kane, a special agent for ICE, working with Rita Katz, an expert on Islamic affairs wrote a 99 page affidavit as part of Operation Green Quest, which was a Federal effort to investigate domestic support of international terrorism, and presented it to a U. S. magistrate to search a number of places, one of which was the Unus residence to find evidence regarding support for terrorist organizations. The affidavit was based on the moving around of funds which may have gone to terrorist organizations. According to Kane’s affidavit a number of charities headquartered at 555 Grove Street in Herndon, Virginia moved large sums of money around but the government was unable to prove that any of it went to terrorist organizations. The most they could prove is that some of it ended up on the Isle of Man but they could not trace it beyond there. On this evidence the magistrate found probable cause to search twenty places including the Unus residence.

When the agents arrived at his home with the search warrant, Dr. Unus was not home but his wife and daughter were present. When the agents banged on the door his wife was afraid, seeing ununiformed individuals outside her house, at least one of whom had a gun. Thinking it was a home invasion robbery she went to get their daughter who called 911. The agents, seeing the mother run to the back of the house, broke the door down. They entered the house with guns drawn and they handcuffed both the mother and the daughter. They remained handcuffed for nearly four hours during most of the search of the residence. The Unuses are Muslim and they were allowed to say their afternoon prayers. But they were not allowed to do it outside the presence of men nor were they allowed to wear a head cover for the prayers and the agents insisted on taking their picture without the head cover.

Using the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) they sued the agents and the government for assault and false imprisonment as well as on Bivens counts for violation of their First and Fourth amendment rights. Despite the plaintiffs filing several amended complaints the trial court dismissed or granted the agents and the government summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Despite the fact that on appeal of a grant of summary judgment the appellate court reviews the evidence as it is most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court actions. Under the FTCA the Federal Courts look to the state law to define the various torts. The Court found that the agent’s knocking down the door, the exhibition of the weapon, and the use of the handcuffs in response to the door not being opened by the Unuses. Aysha Unus running to the back of the house and Hanaa Unus being on the telephone was reasonable. Therefore the charges of assault and false imprisonment were without support. After all it was a “terrorism-related warrant.”

The court upheld the dismissal of the Bivens claims since under the FTCA one cannot claim a violation of the FTCA and another law simultaneously. In any case the Court found Agent Kane’s behavior appropriate in the drafting of the affidavit.

Perhaps one could justify the court’s failure to find any support for the claims on the grounds of the mass hysteria that followed 9/11 but here it is eight years later and an appellate court with plenty of time to contemplate the briefs and the argument still finds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment.