The United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction for violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA, passed by Congress in 2006 makes state sex offenders registration laws more uniform and effective. It makes it a Federal crime for 1) people who are required to register as a sex offender to (2) travel in interstate or foreign commerce, and (3) knowingly fail to register or update a registration.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a conviction could be upheld even though the required travel occurred prior to the passage of the act as long as the defendant had sufficient time after the passage of the act to register. The Supreme Court ruled that since the restriction on interstate travel only affects those who are required to register and since the Federal requirement to register did not occur before the passage of the act in 2006, the travel had to occur after the act’s passage. Furthermore the act uses the present tense to indicate the travel requirement and Congress thereby indicated that the travel that the travel could not occur before the act was imposed.

In May 2004 Thomas Carr plead guilty to first-degree sexual abuse in Alabama. Later that year or in the beginning of 2005 he moved to Indiana and failed to comply with Indiana’s registration requirements. Even though SORNA did not take effect until 2006 the United States Attorney charged him with violating the act when he failed to register after the act took effect. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction based on the pre-enactment travel and the Supreme Court reversed.

By holding that the law requires that the travel occur after the enactment of the act the Court avoided considering whether or not the law violated the Constitution’s ex post facto clause which bans punishing people for acts committed before a law is passed making the act illegal.

In either case the decision is for the best. Otherwise people could be punished for acts that occurred many years ago. State registration statutes have been in effect for many years and the states are capable of punishing people who failed to register prior to 2006.

Congress passed a bill authorizing the Federal government to petition the courts to institutionalize an offender beyond the time of his/her maximum sentence if that person either committed or attempted to commit an act of sexual violence or child molestation and the offender is a danger to society.

Four Florida inmates challenged their commitments under 18 U. S. C. §4248 in United States v, Comstock on the basis that the Constitution does not grant the Federal government authority to institutionalize them beyond their maximum prison commitment. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress specific limited powers. The Tenth Amendment states that all powers not granted to the Federal government are reserved for the states.

Despite the defendants arguing that Congress was without authority to commit individuals after their sentence was completed, the Court ruled that the legislation was authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, under which Congress can pass any law necessary and proper to the carrying out the duties enumerated in Article I. For example, one of the enumerated duties authorizes a postal service. The building of post offices is a necessary and proper tool to establishing a postal service.

The court evaluated five factors in determining that the post-prison commitment of sexually violent inmates is necessary and proper means to carry out its duty to provide mental health care for Federal prisoners. The factors are “(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.” The Court ruled that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass legislation that is convenient, useful or conducive to carrying out one of its assigned duties. The Court found that while it is not independently proof of constitutionality the government has a long history of legislating prison mental health issues. Congress reasonably enacted the legislation to protect people who lived near Federal prisons from sexual violence by released inmates. The statute allows the Federal government to institutionalize those who would otherwise be released only after the states in which they were arrested and in which they live refuse to take custody of a dangerous inmate. Finally the court found that the post-prison institutionalization of sexually dangerous inmates was not too attenuated from Article I duties of Congress.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented. He points to the pivotal 1819 case, McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:

“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”

Thus to be constitutional it must

satisfies a two-part test: First, the law must be directed toward a “legitimate” end, which McCulloch defines as one “within the scope of the [C]onstitution”–that is, the powers expressly delegated to the Federal Government by some provision in the Constitution. Second, there must be a necessary and proper fit between the “means” (the federal law) and the “end” (the enumerated power or powers) it is designed to serve.

The only crimes the constitution specifically authorizes the Federal government to prosecute are counterfeiting, treason, piracy, crimes committed on the high seas and those against the Law of Nations. No one today would limit the Federal government to prosecuting those crimes. Certainly any number of crimes can be prosecuted under the Necessary and Proper Clause. But it is time to reconsider some of the crimes prosecuted by the Federal government. For example, is it really necessary to have the federal government prosecute drug, sex, and internet crimes. The basic police duties of government should be left to the state governments.

In 2006 Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. The act requires among other things that youth as young as fourteen years register, often for life, following a conviction or a juvenile adjudication for certain sex offenses. it also mandates the publication on the internet of specific information about certain sex offenders including their addresses.

A study by the Associated Press found as to juveniles convicted of registrable offenses the law has not been fully implemented in most jurisdictions. Twenty-one states, according to the study, now require juveniles to register as sex offenders and another nineteen state require them to register if they are convicted as adults. The law is quite complicated and Ohio is the only state fully in compliance. Other states risk loosing Federal funds to support criminal justice programs.

Part of the problem is that states vary in their perception of the need to require juveniles to register as sex offenders. Sex offender registrants often have trouble getting jobs, finding housing, and blending into society. This is particularly true now that the names of registrants are available on the internet.

Long term registration may be appropriate for those who are uncurable. But many experts in the field feel that juveniles can be rehabilitated and registration only makes it more difficult. There is the case of the sixteen year old Iowa boy who was required to register after having sex with a thirteen year old girl. Such behavior is not necessarily proof of a long term sex offender requiring lifetime registration.

The large headline claiming that a fifteen year old girl sold her seven year old sister for sex at a Trenton, New Jersey party last month certainly attracted attention. But the actual facts are much muddier and we may never know what happened. Besides the sister two men and three juveniles were arrested. Apparently much of the information that we have heard comes from the police interrogation of the two youngest juveniles who are 13 and 14 years old. Both of them have learning disabilities. One is illiterate. Those who have listened to the tapes of the interviews say the police used leading questions and promised the boys that they would be released if they cooperated. At times the polices put words in the boys’ mouths and pushed the kids into implicating particular people.

The thirteen year old cried throughout the interrogation and continually asked for his mother. At one point in the interview he said: “I should just make up a story to get it over with.”

The interview with the seven year old is not much more helpful. She apparently walked into a room and watched her sister having consensual sex for money. Then her statement parroted her sister’s statement.

We may never know the whole truth although the results of DNA tests should clarify the situation to some degree.

Catherine Miller plead guilty in Federal Court to crossing state lines to have sex with a minor. The presentence report recommended a within guidelines sentence of between 70 and 87 months. However the court sentenced her to 120 months.

The Sentencing Guidelines as originally passed were considered mandatory and judges had only a limited ability to deviate from them. But in United States v. Booker the Supreme Court found the guidelines to be advisory. While the courts have the ability to deviate from the Guideline deviations are limited and must be reasonable.

At sentencing and on appeal Miller objected to the courts adoption of the Probation Department’s recommendation that that the sentencing guidelines be enhanced by an undue influence enhancement. However such enhancement, while subject to rebuttal are required in cases where there is an age difference of over ten years. Neither the trial court not the Seventh Circuit found that the enhancement had been rebutted despite some evidence that the juvenile had prior sexual experiences and seemed open to a romantic relationship with Miller.

The second issue on appeal was the government’s use of surprize evidence at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, the government introduced photo albums showing Miller with other minors. When Miller’s attorney objected, the court gave him a five minute recess to talk to his client. He said thank you and did not further object. Therefore the appellate court found that Miller waived any objection on appeal.

The final issue was the fifty percent upward deviation from the guidelines. The trial court based its decision on the high rate of recidivism among sex offenders. The appellate court rejected the finding and returned the case to the trial court for resentencing. First it found that if there is a high rate of recidivism it applies to all people charged with the crime and the Sentencing Commission would have taken this into consideration in writing the guidelines. Second it found there was no evidence at the sentencing hearing that supported a belief in a high rate of recidivism and there is evidence to the contrary. Therefore it reversed the sentence.

James L. Green was convicted in Georgia State Courts of rape and related offenses involving two sexual assault on different victims. He appealed and eventually filed an in pro per petition for habeas corpus in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

One of the issues was the incompetence of counsel. Green argued that his counsel was incompetent for failing to move to suppress DNA evidence. The Court ruled that even though counsel should have moved to suppress the evidence due to misstatements in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, Green was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure since there was more than enough evidence to convict him even if the DNA evidence had been excluded. The victim testified that she knew Green prior to the attack and she recognized him when he raped her. Therefore counsel’s incompetence did not prejudice Green and the conviction was upheld with the exception of the aggravated sodomy conviction.

Under Georgia law aggravated sodomy is “any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another that is committed with
force and against the will of the other person.” The only evidence to support the charge was one of the victim’s testimony that

while threatening her with a knife, Green forced her to perform oral sex on him and to lick his anus. She further testified: “He pushed me down on the bed and
raped me.

The court found this to be insufficient, as a matter of law, to convict Green on the charge. The jury could not assume based upon this testimony that Green’s penis touched the victim’s anus. Therefore the conviction on this count was reversed.

A couple of days ago we reported on People v. McKee in which the California Supreme Court opened up the opportunity to challenge Proposition 83, also known as Jessica’s Law on equal protection grounds. Monday the court in In re E. J. again considered Jessica’s Law. This time it rejected claims that it was being used retroactively against parolees and remanded to the lower courts to consider on an individual basis whether it violates the constitutional rights of those required to register as sex offenders by preventing them from living within 2000 feet of “any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”

The law was challenged by four parolees who were released on a new grant of parole after the effective date of the proposition for non-registerable offenses but who due to previous convictions have a lifetime registration requirement. Compliance with the Proposition 83 requirements was made a condition of the new parole grant.

The parolees argued that the law was illegally being enforced retroactively. The majority opinion finds that it is not a violation of either Penal Code Section 3 which prohibits the retroactive enforcement of criminal law unless the law specifically allows retroactive enforcement or the ex post facto sections of the state and Federal constitutions. The court found, as to the four petitioners, it was only being alleged as a condition of parole granted after the effective date of the proposition and it was only governing activity that happens after the effective date. Generally ex post facto laws are prohibited because they punish activity without prior notice of the illegality of the activity. Here the petitioners were given notice when they were placed on parole that they could not live in certain areas. They were not being punished for the original offense which led to the registration requirement. Rather they could be punished for moving into certain areas when they were paroled after the proposition’s effective date.

As to the constitutionality of the stay away requirement, the Supreme Court requested superior courts in the county of parole to hold hearings to determine whether the residential restrictions violate the petitioners constitutional rights. The court indicated that there might be a constitutional violation if there was only a limited area in the county of parole where the petitioner could live. Many sex registrants have become homeless or at least have registered as being homeless because the parole boards have treated the homeless as not being in violation of the residential restrictions as long as they do not stay in an area within 2000 feet of a park or school for an extended period of time.

The California Supreme court ruled in People vs McKee that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP) is subject to an equal protection challenge.

Proposition 83, also known as Jessica’s Law,passed by California voters, changed the SVP from a civil commitment that had to be renewed every two years, only if the government proved by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard that a person met the SVP requirements, to an indefinite commitment where the committed person must prove that he/she does not meet the standards by a preponderance of the evidence standard.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with an order to hold a hearing, using a strict scrutiny standard, to determine if the SVP violates equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires equal treatment for people equally situated. This does not mean all people must be treated equally. But it does mean that people who are similar circumstances, as to relevant criteria must be treated equally. In this case the California Supreme Court determined that those alleged to be sexually violent predators are similarly situated with those alleged to be mentally disordered offenders (MDO) and those found to be not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). All three groups involve people who committed violent felonies as a result of mental illness. While the predicate felonies for each of the categories is somewhat different, they all involve violent offenses and they are all determined to be a danger to society.

But unlike the MDO and NGI, the SVP ia given an indeterminate sentence and is not given a jury trial, after the initial determination, where the jury must find that the people have proven their case by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The MDO is give a one year commitment. After the initial commitment the SVG has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard. The NGI’s term is limited to the maximum for the alleged crime.

On remand the people must attempt to show that there is a reasonable distinction between those who come under the SVP and those who are either MDO or NGI and that as a result of that distinction indefinite commitments and putting the burden of proof on the person committed is reasonable. If they cannot do that, pending any changes the legislature wants to make in the law those alleged to be sexually violent predators will be dealt with in the same manner as mentally disordered offenders.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed Jackson v. Virginia. In Jackson v. Virginia the Supreme Court held:

that a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if a federal judge finds that “upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

This week in E. K. McDaniel v.Troy Brown the Court stated that Federal Courts can only grant a writ of habeas corpus if no rational trier of the fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the record at trial without excluding unreliable evidence or evidence wrongly admitted.

Troy Brown was convicted of raping a nine year old girl and sentenced to life in prison. A significant portion of the evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of an expert regarding DNA samples. The expert made two major mistakes. First she committed the “prosecutor’s fallacy.” The “prosecutor’s fallacy” “is the assumption that the random match probability is the same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of the DNA sample.” This erroneously allows the prosecutor or the expert to say that the odds that another person randomly chosen has the same DNA is the same as the odds of the accused being innocent.

Troy Brown has three brother. Two of them, like Troy live near him and the victim in Nevada. The second error made by the expert was to overestimate the chances of one of his brothers having the same DNA as found in the victim. She estimated that the odds of two brothers sharing the same DNA is 1 in 6500. The actual odds of two brothers having the same DNA is 1 in 263 and the odds of two out of four brothers having the same DNA is 1 in 66.

The Supreme Court said that the habeas could only be granted based upon the testimony at trial even if the evidence was unreliable or erroneous. But in any case even if the correct evidence had been submitted a reasonable jury could have convicted Brown. There was sufficient corroborating evidence when looked at it using only the evidence most favorable to the prosecutor which is the standard in post trial appeals where a jury has convicted the defendant.

The defendant also raised a due process claim challenging the reliability of the trial DNA evidence. But since that issue was ont raised at trial or on direct appeal the Supreme Court refused to hear it.

Section 4248 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 Congress authorized the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or their designees to order the continued incarceration of individuals who they believe to be sexually dangerous beyond the completion of their prison terms and to petition the court to order indefinite incarceration.

The Supreme Court granted cert in United States v. Comstock to determine the constitutionality of the Federal Government holding prisoners after their prison term terminates. In Comstock the Fourth Circuit found the section to be beyond the limited powers granted to Congress by the Constitution. The Court determined that mental heath hospitalization has traditionally been a responsibility of the states.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand found the statute to be legal in United States v. Volungus Volungus was convicted of possession of child porn. He was sentenced to 53 months and released on supervised release. The court revoked his release and sentenced him to 23 months. Two weeks before his 23 months were to end the attorney general petitioned to have him civilly committed. The First Circuit reasoned that since possession of porn is illegal due to its transportation in interstate commerce civil commitments are constitutional under the necessary and proper clause. When the Fourth Circuit considered the necessary and proper clause it found that the issue was not the underlining charges but rather the prevention of of sex crimes and the prevention and prosecution of most sex crimes are not crimes resulting from interstate conference.

Section 4248 has several problems. First it allows one person, who is not a doctor, who is either a prosecutor or a warden to order the continued incarceration of an individual beyond the termination of his legal sentence. Second, it allows a judge, without a jury, but with certain procedural safeguards to order the indefinite commitment of the former prisoner. Third, it allows the commitment of anyone who is “sexually dangerous,” whether or not that person has committed a sexually violent crime. Fourth, it is doing all of this without constitutional authorization. What dictatorship is this?