James L. Green was convicted in Georgia State Courts of rape and related offenses involving two sexual assault on different victims. He appealed and eventually filed an in pro per petition for habeas corpus in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

One of the issues was the incompetence of counsel. Green argued that his counsel was incompetent for failing to move to suppress DNA evidence. The Court ruled that even though counsel should have moved to suppress the evidence due to misstatements in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, Green was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure since there was more than enough evidence to convict him even if the DNA evidence had been excluded. The victim testified that she knew Green prior to the attack and she recognized him when he raped her. Therefore counsel’s incompetence did not prejudice Green and the conviction was upheld with the exception of the aggravated sodomy conviction.

Under Georgia law aggravated sodomy is “any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another that is committed with
force and against the will of the other person.” The only evidence to support the charge was one of the victim’s testimony that

while threatening her with a knife, Green forced her to perform oral sex on him and to lick his anus. She further testified: “He pushed me down on the bed and
raped me.

The court found this to be insufficient, as a matter of law, to convict Green on the charge. The jury could not assume based upon this testimony that Green’s penis touched the victim’s anus. Therefore the conviction on this count was reversed.

A couple of days ago we reported on People v. McKee in which the California Supreme Court opened up the opportunity to challenge Proposition 83, also known as Jessica’s Law on equal protection grounds. Monday the court in In re E. J. again considered Jessica’s Law. This time it rejected claims that it was being used retroactively against parolees and remanded to the lower courts to consider on an individual basis whether it violates the constitutional rights of those required to register as sex offenders by preventing them from living within 2000 feet of “any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”

The law was challenged by four parolees who were released on a new grant of parole after the effective date of the proposition for non-registerable offenses but who due to previous convictions have a lifetime registration requirement. Compliance with the Proposition 83 requirements was made a condition of the new parole grant.

The parolees argued that the law was illegally being enforced retroactively. The majority opinion finds that it is not a violation of either Penal Code Section 3 which prohibits the retroactive enforcement of criminal law unless the law specifically allows retroactive enforcement or the ex post facto sections of the state and Federal constitutions. The court found, as to the four petitioners, it was only being alleged as a condition of parole granted after the effective date of the proposition and it was only governing activity that happens after the effective date. Generally ex post facto laws are prohibited because they punish activity without prior notice of the illegality of the activity. Here the petitioners were given notice when they were placed on parole that they could not live in certain areas. They were not being punished for the original offense which led to the registration requirement. Rather they could be punished for moving into certain areas when they were paroled after the proposition’s effective date.

As to the constitutionality of the stay away requirement, the Supreme Court requested superior courts in the county of parole to hold hearings to determine whether the residential restrictions violate the petitioners constitutional rights. The court indicated that there might be a constitutional violation if there was only a limited area in the county of parole where the petitioner could live. Many sex registrants have become homeless or at least have registered as being homeless because the parole boards have treated the homeless as not being in violation of the residential restrictions as long as they do not stay in an area within 2000 feet of a park or school for an extended period of time.

The California Supreme court ruled in People vs McKee that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP) is subject to an equal protection challenge.

Proposition 83, also known as Jessica’s Law,passed by California voters, changed the SVP from a civil commitment that had to be renewed every two years, only if the government proved by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard that a person met the SVP requirements, to an indefinite commitment where the committed person must prove that he/she does not meet the standards by a preponderance of the evidence standard.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with an order to hold a hearing, using a strict scrutiny standard, to determine if the SVP violates equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires equal treatment for people equally situated. This does not mean all people must be treated equally. But it does mean that people who are similar circumstances, as to relevant criteria must be treated equally. In this case the California Supreme Court determined that those alleged to be sexually violent predators are similarly situated with those alleged to be mentally disordered offenders (MDO) and those found to be not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). All three groups involve people who committed violent felonies as a result of mental illness. While the predicate felonies for each of the categories is somewhat different, they all involve violent offenses and they are all determined to be a danger to society.

But unlike the MDO and NGI, the SVP ia given an indeterminate sentence and is not given a jury trial, after the initial determination, where the jury must find that the people have proven their case by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The MDO is give a one year commitment. After the initial commitment the SVG has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard. The NGI’s term is limited to the maximum for the alleged crime.

On remand the people must attempt to show that there is a reasonable distinction between those who come under the SVP and those who are either MDO or NGI and that as a result of that distinction indefinite commitments and putting the burden of proof on the person committed is reasonable. If they cannot do that, pending any changes the legislature wants to make in the law those alleged to be sexually violent predators will be dealt with in the same manner as mentally disordered offenders.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed Jackson v. Virginia. In Jackson v. Virginia the Supreme Court held:

that a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if a federal judge finds that “upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

This week in E. K. McDaniel v.Troy Brown the Court stated that Federal Courts can only grant a writ of habeas corpus if no rational trier of the fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the record at trial without excluding unreliable evidence or evidence wrongly admitted.

Troy Brown was convicted of raping a nine year old girl and sentenced to life in prison. A significant portion of the evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of an expert regarding DNA samples. The expert made two major mistakes. First she committed the “prosecutor’s fallacy.” The “prosecutor’s fallacy” “is the assumption that the random match probability is the same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of the DNA sample.” This erroneously allows the prosecutor or the expert to say that the odds that another person randomly chosen has the same DNA is the same as the odds of the accused being innocent.

Troy Brown has three brother. Two of them, like Troy live near him and the victim in Nevada. The second error made by the expert was to overestimate the chances of one of his brothers having the same DNA as found in the victim. She estimated that the odds of two brothers sharing the same DNA is 1 in 6500. The actual odds of two brothers having the same DNA is 1 in 263 and the odds of two out of four brothers having the same DNA is 1 in 66.

The Supreme Court said that the habeas could only be granted based upon the testimony at trial even if the evidence was unreliable or erroneous. But in any case even if the correct evidence had been submitted a reasonable jury could have convicted Brown. There was sufficient corroborating evidence when looked at it using only the evidence most favorable to the prosecutor which is the standard in post trial appeals where a jury has convicted the defendant.

The defendant also raised a due process claim challenging the reliability of the trial DNA evidence. But since that issue was ont raised at trial or on direct appeal the Supreme Court refused to hear it.

Section 4248 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 Congress authorized the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or their designees to order the continued incarceration of individuals who they believe to be sexually dangerous beyond the completion of their prison terms and to petition the court to order indefinite incarceration.

The Supreme Court granted cert in United States v. Comstock to determine the constitutionality of the Federal Government holding prisoners after their prison term terminates. In Comstock the Fourth Circuit found the section to be beyond the limited powers granted to Congress by the Constitution. The Court determined that mental heath hospitalization has traditionally been a responsibility of the states.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand found the statute to be legal in United States v. Volungus Volungus was convicted of possession of child porn. He was sentenced to 53 months and released on supervised release. The court revoked his release and sentenced him to 23 months. Two weeks before his 23 months were to end the attorney general petitioned to have him civilly committed. The First Circuit reasoned that since possession of porn is illegal due to its transportation in interstate commerce civil commitments are constitutional under the necessary and proper clause. When the Fourth Circuit considered the necessary and proper clause it found that the issue was not the underlining charges but rather the prevention of of sex crimes and the prevention and prosecution of most sex crimes are not crimes resulting from interstate conference.

Section 4248 has several problems. First it allows one person, who is not a doctor, who is either a prosecutor or a warden to order the continued incarceration of an individual beyond the termination of his legal sentence. Second, it allows a judge, without a jury, but with certain procedural safeguards to order the indefinite commitment of the former prisoner. Third, it allows the commitment of anyone who is “sexually dangerous,” whether or not that person has committed a sexually violent crime. Fourth, it is doing all of this without constitutional authorization. What dictatorship is this?

The California Third District Court of Appeal ruled that El Dorado County Superior Court Judge Douglas Phimister wrongly removed Gilbert Maines as counsel for Nancy Garrido in the kidnapping case of Jaycee Duggard.

Last month Judge Phimister removed Maines as counsel for Garrido who is charged along with her husband Phillip with kidnapping and sexually abusing Duggard 18 years ago in South Lake Tahoe. Judge Phimister claimed to have information that Maines shared confidential information about Gerrido while he was drunk at his country club and removed him from the case. But Maines provided affidavits to the Third District Court of Appeals from witnesses stating that he was not drunk and that he did not discuss any confidential information.

However, the appelate court did not reinstate Maines as Duggard’s counsel. Phimister claims to have additional evidence of misconduct by Maines so the Court returned the case to Judge Phimister and ordered him to decide wheter or not to remove Maines from the case by December 24.

The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Michael J. Brown on sexual assault charges over claims that the admission of of a DNA report processed by a subcontractor laboratory to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) through the testimony of a forensic biologist from OCME violated the right of confrontation as discussed in Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts.

At trial there was evidence that the defendant followed a nine year old girl into the apartment house of a friend in Queens and sexually assaulted her in 1993. She was unable to identify him. In 2002 OCME submitted the rape kit to a private licensed laboratory, Bode. It matched the DNA of Brown who had been arrested on unrelated charges in Maryland. An analyst from OCME then compared the two samples. At trial she introduced several reports and graphs developed by Bode in its comparison of the DNA.

The Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz ruled that affidavits prepared by a forensic chemist were testimonial under Crawford. Citing Crawford, Melendez-Diaz stated

“Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent–that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements … contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”

The Court in Melendez-Diaz had little trouble finding that the chemist’s affidavits were testimonial and that their admission violated the Confrontation Clause.

The New York Court of Appeals attempts to differentiate the DNA reports from the chemist’s reports in Melendez-Diaz by saying that the chemist in Melendez-Diaz drew the conclusion that the item tested was cocaine while the reports in Brown did not draw any conclusions. It was the analyst from OCME who testified who drew the conclusions that Brown’s DNA matched that taken from the victim. But the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz rejected the respondent’s claim that the chemist’s personal appearance was not necessary because it was the “result of neutral, scientific testing.” The New York Court is making the same claim and it should not hold up under the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz.

The affidavits in Melendez-Diaz are under oath whereas the reports in Brown are not under oath. Some might argue that this makes the Brown reports less testimonial. But it also makes them less reliable and more in need of cross examination. Furthermore they were made for the purpose of litigation and in expectation that they would be introduced into evidence. As such their testimonial nature should not be questioned.

The California Supreme Court ruled that having a deputy escort an in-custody defendant to the witness seat and sit next to him/her while he/she testifies is not a violation of the defendant’ due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.

Lorenzo Stevens was charged with attempting to molest his daughter and giving her crack. His daughter lived with her grandmother. According to her testimony at trial, he called her up and asked her to meet him at Taco Bell. They walked to a truck he used as a residence. He gave her a piece of rock cocaine and attempted to get her to copulate him. She escaped and reported the incident to her grandmother and her mother. The police were called. Stevens led the police on a wild escapade by jumping from roof to roof.

According to his testimony his daughter made up the story. He claimed that she made up the story after he asked her if she was sexually active and if she used drugs.

Prior to testifying he was escorted to the witness seat by a sheriff’s deputy who sat beside him during his testimony. No other witness was escorted by a deputy and deputies did not sit beside any other witness.

While certain courtroom security techniques such as shackling the defendant or requiring him/her to wear jail garb while before the jury are “inherently prejudicial” and require a “manifest need” before they can be imposed having a deputy sit next to the defendant while he/she testifies is not an “inherently prejudicial” act requiring a “manifest need” for such a technique. The Court points out that American citizens are accustomed to having security offices in official places and the jury may not pay any attention to it. But as the dissent, by Justice Moreno points out having a uniformed guard sitting next to the defendant when he testifies, like shackling the defendant or having him/her dressed in jail clothes indicates that the defendant must be separated from the community at large.As Justice Moreno pointed out the use of a uniformed deputy sitting next to the defendant as he testifies violates the presumption of innocence.

Saturday, outside the Richmond (California) High School gym where students were attending a homecoming dance a fifteen year old student was gang raped by as many as ten people, some of whom were students or former students while as many as ten other people watched the rape. The rape took place, reportedly, over a period of two and a half hours and no one reported it to the police. Five people are currently in custody–two adults and three juveniles. More arrests are expected.

Three questions are raised. First why did so did so many people observed the crime but not report it? Second, can the observers be prosecuted? Third, what is the responsibility of the school?

One thing is clear and that is that we still know very little about what happened at Richmond High School Saturday night and as more facts become known anything we say may have to be modified. Apparently the girl left the dance with plans of meeting her father and going home around 9:30. She met a friend who took her to a secluded area on campus where students were drinking. At some point a group of male students and their adult friends started raping the girl. Apparently members of the group went in and out of the dance, telling people inside the gym about the rape. Some of the people in the dance came out at times to observe the rape. But no one called the police or told the police officers and the chaperons who were inside the gym. Later, after a call to the police, she was found, unconscious, under a bench on the campus. She is hospitalized with non-fatal injuries.

Some experts have pointed to the “bystander effect” or the Genovese Syndrome. Under the bystander effect the larger the number of observers the less likely that the crime will be reported. People do not want to get involved and assume that someone else will or has reported it. Furthermore, people think that if its okay for the other observers not to report it then they do not have to report the rape. The bystander effect was first publicized after Kitty Genovese was stabbed on the street in front of her Queens, New York apartment building in 1964. After she made her way into the building the attacked came back and raped her. She died on the way to the hospital. A dozen people heard her screaming but did nothing. She may have lived if someone called the police.

The “bystander effect” is based upon research showing a “diffusion of responsibility.” The research shows that if three or fewer people observe a crime each is likely to report it but when the crime is viewed by ten or more people it is unlikely that anyone will report it.

I suspect that many of the observers knew the rapists who were fellow students at Richmond High School and that they did not want to report their friends or to be snitches. They may have been afraid of retribution if they called the police or brought the event to the attention of the chaperons and the police inside the gym.

Generally in the United States there is no law mandating that people report a crime. California does have a law mandating the reporting of crimes where the victim in fourteen or younger but in this case the victim is fifteen.

However non-participants in the rape could be arresting for aiding and abetting the rape. But convictions are hard to get for aiding and abetting. It is necessary to show that the individual accused of aiding and abetting did so with the intent to assist the rapists. For example the observers probably cannot be arresting for forming a circle around the victim while she was being raped. However if it can be proved that the observers intentionally made the circle in order to prevent the victim from escaping her attackers they could be found guilty of aiding and abetting the crime.

The school board may be civilly liable to the victim. Apparently the school has a history of violent acts and they took insufficient efforts to protect students arriving and leaving the dance. I suspect the victim will be able to prove that school officials violated their own rules by not surveilling the area around the gym.

This is going too far. James Nichols was arrested for going to church.

Nichols is a convicted sex offender. North Carolina has a law that convicted sex offenders cannot come within 300 feet of any place intended primarily for the use, care or supervision of minors. Nichols was arrested on a Sunday afternoon after attending services at the Moncure Baptist Church. The Moncure Baptist Church has a daycare program for children.

Nichols’ arrest has three problems. The first is a factual issue. Can a church be a place intended primarily for the use, care or supervision of minors? I doubt it. The primary purpose of a church is to propagate religion and serve as a place of prayer. Second, it is vague. What is a place intended primarily for the use, care or supervision of minors? Would that include a residence where a family with children live? Would that include a courthouse which has a daycare center for children while their parents are in court? Would it include a public beach? Due process demands that laws be written in a way that people can know when they violate the law. Here there is no way to know what places the sex offender must avoid. Third and most important is that the law criminalizes First Amendment activity. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .

The Fourteenth Amendment extended the First Amendment to the states and thus legislatures are prohibited from making any law which prohibits the the free exercise of religion. Nichols is challenging the arrest and the interpretation of the law. I hope he wins.

This is not to say that the church cannot forbid Nichols from joining the church or attending services. The minister or the congregation can ban him, although one of the goals of most churches is to bring sinners to religion. But the government cannot under the First Amendment prevent people from practicing their religion. Why don’t we leave the question to the minister and the congregation. They can determine whether they feel threatened by Nichols’ presence.