Eduardo Dávila-Nieves (Dávila) was convicted attempting “to induce a person he believed to be a minor to engage in sexual activity.”

He made telephone contact with a thirteen year old girl, Y. G. Eventually their telephone conversations turned to sex. He attempted to meet her but her parents found out about the conversation and reported the conversations to the authorities. After this happened Y.G. told Davila that her parents took away her cell phone and that in the future he would have to relay messages through her fourteen year old friend, “Vanessa.” “Vanessa,” of course, was an undercover agent.

The conversations with Y. G. and later with “Vanessa” lasted for a year with breaks of two months and seven months. Each of the breaks were ended when “Vanessa” initiated a phone call to Davila. During the conversations he admitted to having pedophilia and he was afraid that he would get arrested. At times he came on strong. At other times he appeared to back off. But after a year there was an agreement to meet “Vanessa” and Davila was arrested.

On appeal the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied his sufficiency of the evidence argument. The elements of the offense are:

(1) used a facility of interstate commerce (2) to attempt to, or to knowingly, persuade, induce or entice (3) someone younger than eighteen years old (4) to engage in criminal sexual activity.

Davila argued that since the government did not enter into evidence the Puerto Rican statute that he was accused of violating there was insufficient evidence of the fourth element of the offense. But since the judge read the offense to the jury, instructed them thereon, and took judicial notice of the statute this is a rather weak argument. Certainly it is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on the law as it relates to the case but there is no duty to enter a paper copy of the offense into evidence.

Davilla argued that since the judge took judicial notice of the statute the judge was required to instruct the jury that it need not find the statute to be true. It is true that when a judge takes judicial notice of a fact the jury does not have to accept it. But when the judge takes judicial notice of a statute it would be absurd to allow a jury to disbelieve the judge.

The final and perhaps strongest issue is the refusal of the court to give an entrapment instruction. There are two elements to entrapment. First, it requires that the idea for the crime originate with a government agent and second it requires that the defendant would not have committed the crime without strong encouragement from a government agent. Here, despite the government’s initiation of the contacts after two breaks in communication the court found that there was not entrapment. It found that regardless of the government’s re-initiation of the crime, Davila was disposed to commit the crime.

I guess what bothers me most about the crime is that Davila is going to be released from prison some day. He has pedophilia. At this point pedophilia is incurable. Those with pedophilia have very litttle control over their pedophiliac urges although they need not always act upon them. Do we really want to put people into prison for having an illness. But then on the other hand how do we protect our children? Not all pedophiliacs act upon their desires for sex with young children. But without treatment Davila will problably be just as daangerous when he gets out of prison as he is today. Prison will not change the situation. What he needs is treatment. Any treatment inside the prison is probably meaningless since he will not have a chance to practice abstaining from pedophile acts.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Brewer is rather meaningless and for the most part unworthy of comment. There is a decent search issue but it is based upon confusing testimony in the District Court and once the Court of Appeals settles the evidentiary question or thinks it has settled the question the decision to uphold the search is predictable. The other issues raised by the defendant such as the sufficiency of the evidence or the failure of the trial court to inform the jury of the possible sentence in the case are clearly inane and equally unworthy of comment.

But Judge Bright’s dissent on the 370 month sentence for sales of 150 grams (5 plus ounces) of rock cocaine are compelling and something that more people ought to understand. Judge Reade who was the sentencing judge sentenced the defendant to 370 months in compliance with the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. If the case happened on the other side of the freeway which runs through the Northern District of Iowa it would have been assigned to Judge Bennett. Judge Bennett generally, using the discretion assigned to Federal judges by the Supreme Court in Kimbrough and treats rock cocaine the same as powder cocaine. Judge Reade, to the contrary used the 33:1 ratio found in the Guidelines at the time Brewer was sentenced. At the time of the sentencing Brewer would have been sentenced to 240 months (including a 20 year mandatory sentence that has now been reduced to 10 years) when treating rock and powder cocaine the same. Under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) Federal judges are supposed to consider the sentences imposed by other judges in similar cases in order to prevent significant disparity in sentencing for defendants who commit similar crimes. Yet this apparently does not happen in the Northern District of Iowa or in a number of other jurisdictions.

As Bright points out that although Whites use drugs more often that African Americans it is African Americans who get prosecuted for crack cocaine and get the higher sentences.

The guidelines for crack cocaine are plainly unreasonable. They are the same as the guidelines for second degree murder. In fact the average Federal prison term for crack is greater than the average sentence for murder.

Furthermore at the current cost of imprisonment it will cost the Federal government $780,000 to keep Brewer in prison throughout his term. If he lives to complete the term the government will then have to pay for ten years of supervised release.

This makes no sense. Brewer will be imprisoned until he is approximately 60 years old and studies have shown that few people commit major crimes when they are 60 years old. The lengthly prison sentence is not necessary to protect society. Nor is it an appropriate for punishment. The message it gives is that a series of relatively small sales of rock cocaine to a government agent is more horrendous than murder. I doubt we want to give that message. The other message it gives is that we prefer to lock up significant numbers of African American men for relatively small sales of crack than deal with the race problems in this country.

The irrationality of our sentencing laws promotes lack of respect for out criminal justice system and actually increases the amount of crime. Knowing that regardless of what they do African American men are likely to end up in prison, for long periods of time, only encourages them to use and sell drugs. Yet they still use it less frequently and in smaller numbers than Whites who are not targeted by law enforcement and are less likely to be incarcerated.

The Ninth Circuit en banc upheld the decision to dismiss Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan.

In Jeppesen, Binyam Mohamed and four other plaintiffs sued Jeppesen, a CIA contractor for their seizure in foreign countries and transportation to other countries where they were tortured and interrogated as part of the government’s extraordinary rendition program. In this manner the government avoided the protections provided defendants and detainees accused of terrorist related crimes.

After the plaintiffs filed their complaint the government received permission to intervene in the matter and moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the charges involved matters of national security and state secrets.

The decision points out that there are two ways to dismiss a case where state secrets may be disclosed at trial. One involves where the subject matter of a suit is a state secret. This is called a Toten Bar after the 1876 case in which spies for the government sued to enforce a secret agreement to pay them for their work against the Confederacy in the Civil War. While all of the plaintiff’s claims in Mohamed involve government secrets Toten has never been invoked in cases not involving the government as a party. While some of the Circuit judges wanted to base the decision on Toten the majority instead based the decision on United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953)

Reynolds created a rule of evidentiary exclusion. It permits the exclusion of evidence involving national secrets. But in rare cases where there is insufficient admissible evidence without using state secrets for the plaintiff to make a prima facie case or to allow the defendants to put forth defenses it allows for the dismissal of a case. Basing its decision on Reynolds the Ninth Circuit ruled that without the use of sate secrets there is insufficient evidence for Jeppesen to defend itself.

The problem with this, as the dissent points out, is that since Jeppesen has not answered the complaint yet we do not know what evidence they will need to defend themselves. According to the five dissenting judges the government’s motion was untimely and it should only be considered when and if Jeppesen requests discovery of documents or the deposition of individuals which would reveal state secrets. But the majority say the motion can be brought at any time and it is clear that the case cannot be defended without exposing state secrets which would affect the nation’s security.

As all of the judges admit dismissing a case and denying the plaintiffs justice and compensation for what appears to be serious injuries is an extreme measure and should not be taken lightly. The majority expresses a number of alternatives most of which require Congress to award compensation to the plaintiffs for their injuries. The dissent points that this is an abrogation of judicial responsibilities. It is hard to see how Congressional action would be more protective of national secrets than judicial action.

I would suggest that in exchange for the courts hearing the matter that the plaintiffs be asked to waive a jury trial and a public hearing. The trial could be conducted by declarations filed under seal. In other cases attorneys have been required to get security clearances and the Courts have limited which legal personnel can review secret documents. For example this has been done with national security documents used in the Guantanamo habeas proceedings. At least 28 judges on the Ninth Circuit have already seen the secret documents and no harm has been accomplished. The trial court can fashion procedures maintaining the secrecy of state secrets. In this way the plaintiffs can be compensated for their injuries and the state secrets can be maintained.

Wesley Lanham and Shawn Freeman were corrections officers at the Grant County, Kentucky, Detention Center on February 14, 2003 when a deputy brought “J. S” into the jail on a traffic charge. “J. S.” was 18 years old, six foot tall and weighed 125 pounds. He has blond highlights in his hair and on that Valentines Day holiday he wore a bright colored shirt and underwear with red hearts.

Sergeant Shawn Sydnor the supervising officer on duty at the jail told “J. S.” that he was cute and that he would make a good girlfriend for an inmate. He told Lanham and Freeman that “J. S.” needed to be scared. While pretrial arrestees were generally kept in the detox cells Sydnor asked Lanham and Freeman to find a cell in general population with convicted criminal serving their terms for “J. S.” Lanham found him a place in Cell 101 in 26 Hall. Twenty-six Hall was notorious for being a very rough place and for numerous incidents of sexual predatory behavior. Prior to placing “J. S.” in cell 101 Lanham and Freemen went to the cell and spoke with Bobby Wright. Lanham told Wright that they wanted the inmates to f-ck with “J. S.” Lanham and Freeman took “J. S.” to the cell and left hem there all night without checking in on him. Victor Zipp an inmate in the cell with a reputation for walking around nude raped “J. S.” and with help from other inmates roughed him up.

The next day Syndor, Lanham and Freeman agreed to report that they had placed “J. S.” in the general population because they needed to decontaminate the detox cells.

“J. S.” was released the next day and two days later his father took him to a doctor who confirmed the rape.

Lanham, Freeman and Sydnor were indicted. Sydnor plead guilty and cooperated with the prosecution. Lanham and Freeman went to trial and were convicted of conspiring to violate “J. S.’” civil rights and making a false report.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. They found that while the judge should have excluded two jurors who could not promise to be impartial the defendants were not prejudiced since they used peremptory challenges to exclude the two. The Court did not find that the lack of two of the defense’s peremptory challenges affected the trial.

The defendants objected to limitations placed on their cross examination of Sydnor. But since they did not complain at trial they were limited to plain error analysis and since various appellate courts are divided on the issue any error is waived under the plain error analysis. “To obtain a conviction for conspiracy to violate civil rights under § 241, the government must prove that defendants knowingly agreed with another person to injure the victim in the exercise of a right guaranteed under the Constitution. . . The government also must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was specific intent to commit the deprivation.” The prosecution met the sufficiency of the evidence test. There was sufficient evidence that Syndor, Lapham and Freeman agreed to place “J. S.” in a cell knowing that he was likely to be abused and raped. To meet the sufficiency of the evidence test ir is only necessary that there be sufficient evidence that any rational trier of the fact could find the elements of the offense. Here there was sufficient evidence of both conspiracy and making a false report. As a result the conviction was upheld.