The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides for a minimum sentence of fifteen years for anyone who has three prior serious drug offenses or violent felonies. It defines a serious drug offense as any drug offense for which the maximum punishment is ten years or more in prison, according to state law.

The question in McNeill v. United States, decided yesterday, was whether a drug conviction is an ACCA prior based based upon the penalty at the time of conviction in state court or based upon the penalty at the time of the Federal Court trial.

Clifton Terelle McNeill had two two violent felonies on his record at the time he was convicted of possession of a gun and possession of cocaine for sale in Federal Court. He also had six drug offenses. At the time of his conviction on the drug offenses the maximum penalty in North Carolina was ten years. But in 1994, the North Carolina law changed providing a maximum sentence of 38 months. The trial judge ruled that he had three or more serious felonies under the ACCA and sentenced him to 300 months.

The Supreme Court reviewed the language of the ACCA and agreed with the trial court that the determination of whether a crime is a prior under the ACCA is made at time of the original sentencing, not at the time of the conviction of a subsequent crime. As a result the Supreme Court found that the fifteen year minimum applied to McNeill.

Section 18 USC 924(e)(1) states in pertinent part:

In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years

Justice Thomas, for a unanimous Court, held that despite the present tense language of the section the statute should be interpreted as it was written at the time of the original state conviction, not at the time of the subsequent Federal conviction. Since the statute talks about a prior conviction it is necessary to look at the conviction at the time of the original sentencing. Otherwise it is possible that the statute applicable to the prior conviction may have been revoked. Furthermore under North Carolina law the maximum punishment for drug crimes committed prior to 1994 remains ten years.

While this is all good and well certain incongruities appear. If a crime happened the day before the revised North Carolina statute was passed the defendant is facing an ACCA prior while the defendant who was convicted one day later is not. Furthermore by basing the statute on state law a defendant who committed the same offense but lives across the border in South Carolina may not be facing an ACCA mandatory minimum.

In any case, I’m not sure why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. In sentencing McNeill the judge pointed to McNeill’s “long and unrelenting history of serious criminal conduct” in upwardly departing from the Sentencing Guidelines to sentence him to 300 months. Thus it is unlikely that even if the Supreme Court had decided that the mandatory minimum did not apply and remanded the case for resentencing that the trial court would have sentenced McNeill to less than 300 months.

Russell E. Booker and Michael Wyman plead guilty in separate domestic violence cases to assault in Maine. Both cases occurred some years ago. More recently Booker accidentally shot a hunting partner and Wyman shot a bullet into the air during a domestic dispute. Both were indicted and convicted in Federal court for possessing a weapon after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.

Booker and Wyman appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals alleging that since Maine’s assault law does not require a specific intent to commit a crime the convictions cannot serve as a basis for the Federal convictions. The state statute allows a conviction for recklessly assaulting someone. They also alleged violations of their Second Amendment right to possess a gun.

The Federal statute banning possession of guns (18 USC 922(g)(9) by those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence reads:

That it shall be unlawful for any person . . . (9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

The First Circuit rejected the defendants argument that the state statute had to be an intentional crime. Nowhere in the Federal statute does it require that the domestic violence statute have a particular mens rea or intent. Therefore the court ruled that Congress in passing Section 922(g)(9) did not mandate a mens rea and therefore the convictions are valid.

Pointing to Heller in which the Supreme Court recognized the Second Amendment right to possess a gun the court pointed out that the Supreme Court recognized that certain categories of people could be banned from possessing guns. The First Circuit held that due to the significant number of people killed with guns in domestic violence disputes that Congress can prohibit misdemeanants convicted of domestic violence from possessing guns.

The irony here is that while looking at the intent of Congress in ruling that a particular mens rea is not necessary for a conviction under Section 922(g)(9), the Court did not look at the intention of the First Congress which passed the Bill of Rights. Certainly the first Congress did not intend to limit the ability of misdemeanants from possessing weapons. It is unlikely that domestic violence was even a crime in 1789.

Joemon D. Higden was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In order to convict him the government had to prove three elements:

(1) the defendant has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; and
(3) the firearm had travelled in interstate commerce.

The prosecution and the defense stipulated to the first and the third elements. Instead of instructing the jury on all three elements and telling them that the parties stipulated to the existence of two of the elements, the judge told the jury that their sole job was to determine whether the prosecution had proved the second element by beyond a reasonable doubt.

The jury hung and a second trial was scheduled. when the judge indicated he planned to follow the same regime in the second trial the U. S. attorney objected and appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit ruled that the procedure was wrong since the jury must find the existence of all of the elements. The Court, citing the Sixth Amendment. The Court said that every defendant is entitled to a jury determination of each element. But here the defendant stipulated to two elements and agreed that the jury would only be asked to find that he knowingly possessed the gun. The advantage to the defendant is that the jury would not find out that he is a convicted felon. Protecting Higden’s right to have a jury determine every element of the offense actually hurts him. The trial judge realized that but sadly the appellate court did not.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed two District Court decisions excluding cooperating witnesses from testifying based on the alleged failure of the government to provide Brady discovery. The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that the government had a duty to provide the defense with all exonerating evidence. By exonerating evidence the Supreme Court meant evidence that is “favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Specifically it requires the provision of evidence that is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature.

Joseph Prochilo is charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and Elvis Guerrero is charged with attempting to buy cocaine for purpose of sale in separate cases. The cases against both men rely primarily upon cooperating witnesses. In each case the government provided initial Brady discovery relating to the cooperating witnesses. Defense counsel in both cases moved for further discovery.

Prochilo requested:

(1) details regarding the witness’s work with the United States Secret Service, the Essex County Sheriff’s Department, the DEA, and the FBI; (2) information regarding the other ATF cases on which the cooperator worked; (3) the witness’s cooperation agreements with government agencies other than the ATF; (4) a description of other firearms seized by the government as a result of the witness’s cooperation; (5) information about the cooperator’s contacts with other government agencies as they related to other matters or other investigations; and (6) a list of all benefits the witness received as a result of these contacts.

Guerrero requested:

to produce all information in its possession, custody, or control, regarding the witness, and identifying several categories of information.

Prochilo said that the requested information might reveal that the cooperating witness is “flawed”, that the discovery could help substantiate an entrapment defense, that many of the cases that the cooperating witness handled were thrown out requiring an explanation, and because only his counsel, not the government or the district court, will be able to judge what evidence is both favorable to him and material.

Guerrero claims that the discovery is needed for impeachment purposes.

The First Circuit reversed the District Court decisions in both cases. It held that for the defendants to obtain a court order for Brady material beyond what the government provides the defense must make specific requests for specific items and give specific reasons why the discovery is necessary. “[T]he defendant should be able to articulate with some specificity what evidence he hopes to find in the requested materials, why he thinks the materials contain this evidence, and finally, why this evidence would be both favorable to him and material.”

The problem with this is that you are asking defense counsel to request specific items from the prosecution’s file. If the defense knew what was in the file the defense would not need to ask for discovery. It is the basic requirement of due process and fairness that originally led the Supreme Court to require discovery of exculpatory evidence that is violated when you require the defendant to list specific items out of the government’s file so that he/she can use the items to impeach the cooperating witness.

Otis Jones plead guilty to various drug offenses and he was sentenced to 151 months in prison. He appealed the sentence to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

First, he argued that the District Court improperly aggravated his sentencing guidelines by adding two levels to his Guidelines for having a gun in connection with a drug offense. Two people testified at his sentencing hearing regarding his use of a gun in connection with his drug deals. While one of the witnesses was unsure about the type of gun Jones possessed both witnesses were sure that he used a gun. Furthermore the witnesses were expecting to receive consideration at their sentencing hearings in exchange for their testimony. The trial judge found the witnesses to be credible and therefore the appellate court ruled that the trial judge properly aggravated the sentence for possession of a gun in connection with a drug offense.

Jones’ second argument was that the court should have given him credit for time he spent in a local jail prior to his sentencing but after his arrest and indictment. The indictment followed the Jones’ arrest on a state probation violation for which he was sentenced to between three and six years in prison.

The District Court judge sentenced Jones pursuant to Section 5G1.3(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Section 5G1.3(c) allows a judge to impose a sentence that runs “concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment.” Guidelines section 5G1.3(b), allows a judge to credit a defendant for a period of imprisonment served on an undischarged term of imprisonment if the undischarged sentence “resulted from another offense that [1] is relevant conduct to the instant offense of [federal] conviction . . . and that [2] was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant offense.” While the state prison term was for possession of a weapon by a convicted felon it was not relevant conduct for the Federal conviction and therefore the appellate court ruled that the District Court, correctly, did not sentence him under Section 5G1.3(c) and therefore he was not eligible to receive concurrent credits for the period that he was in state custody prior to being sentenced in the Federal case.

When a defendant has both Federal and State cases time the sentencing of each is a tricky and difficult task for the lawyer. It is not something that can always be controlled but it is important to try to time the sentencing so that the defendant gets sentenced to concurrent time and so that he/she gets placed in the best facility.

Last year the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Gant that law enforcement officials cannot search a vehicle, pursuant to a legal arrest when the suspect is out of the vehicle and is not within hand’s reach of the passenger compartment of the automobile.

Prior to the decision in Gant,Indianapolis police detained Dewayne Cartwright for driving a vehicle without a light illuminating the automobile license. He stopped his car in a grocery store parking lot but not in a legal spot. Cartwright was unable to produce a driver’s license and the police were unable to confirm the name he provided. They arrested him for driving without a license and providing a false name. After the arrest and following, then current, Seventh Circuit procedure, prior to Gant, the officers searched the car pursuant to a legal arrest. ¹ A gun was found in the back seat and Cartwright was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He plead guilty, preserving his right to appeal the search of the vehicle, and he was sentenced to 84 months in prison.

Of course under Gant the search would be illegal. But the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the search on inevitable discovery grounds. The Fourth Amendment does not ban all searches occurring without a search warrant. It states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . ” Thus it only prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. As a result the courts have developed a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. One of those exceptions allows for inventory searches of vehicles prior to their seizure. In order to protect the police from claims of theft of the contents of a vehicle, a city may develop procedures to permit the search and inventory of a vehicle prior to storing a towed vehicle. Indianapolis had a well developed written policy providing for inventory searches. It allowed a vehicle to be searched if the driver was driving without a license and no passenger in the car had a license and is capable of driving the car. Cartwright’s passenger, Ciera Golliday, did not have a license even though she owned the car.

Another approved exception to the warrant requirement is the eventual discovery rule. It provides that evidence is admissible at trial even if it was seized illegally.if law enforcement officers, using their normal procedures, would eventually discover the evidence legally. The Seventh Circuit upheld the search since even though the search was illegal as a search pursuant to an arrest under Gant the gun would have eventually been discovered when the car was inventoried.

Andre Johnson was convicted of possession of a gun by a convicted felon, possession of cocaine and possession of a weapon in connection with a drug offense.

An undercover officer, Jason Bolte, parked his car in a high crime area on the west side of Cincinnati. A car with three people in it pulled up and parked behind him. A passenger wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt got out of the car and made a transaction, trading money for a couple of small piece of a white substance. Bolte called for uniformed officers to make the arrest. Johnson, no longer wearing the sweatshirt, attempted to flee when the officers tried to perform a pat shirt on him. An officer used a taser on him. He fell to the ground revealing a gun in his waistband. He was arrested. The car was searched. The sweatshirt was found. Crack and powder cocaine were found in its pockets.

After he was indicted he moved to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle. The Court ruled that the original detention was a valid Terry stop. In Terry v. Ohio the Supreme Court ruled that an officer could temporarily detain an individual if he/she had “a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Based upon Bolte’s observation of the crack purchase the officers easily had a reasonable suspicion. Finding the gun gave the officers probable cause to arrest him. ¹ An arrest would provide probable cause to search Johnson. To search the vehicle they would need probable cause to believe that they would find evidence in the car. Since Johnson was in custody and could not obtain a weapon from the car. But they had probable cause to believe that the gray sweatshirt was in the car and the court felt that they had probable cause to look for ammunition.

During the trial Johnson complained to the judge that his lawyer had not properly told him about the possible consequences of a conviction and that if he had known he would have accepted the proffered plea bargain. The judge said “Mr. Johnson, you’re the person in this room with felony convictions and that makes your credibility suspect. I know [your attorney] to be a capable, talented, honest attorney whose intentions are always to represent his client to the best of his ability.” The Sixth Circuit while admitting that the statement might not be appropriate did not find it to violate the Constitution or to mandate a reversal of the conviction. The Court refused to hold a hearing on whether the lawyer was providing incompetent counsel. To provide incompetent counsel the lawyer must not only act in a way that competent counsel would not act but the lawyer’s actions must result in injury to the defendant. Since at the time of the request, the trial was in progress the judge refused to hold a hearing since she did not know the effect of counsel’s actions on the conclusion of the trial. Therefore the appellate court found no error on the part of the trial judge and it pointed out that Johnson could file a writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawyer’s representation.

A defendant has an absolute right to testify or not to testify at his/her trial. When the judge found out that Johnson planned to testify she asked Johnson’s attorney if he had gone over the possible consequences of Johnson testifying with Johnson. (If the lawyer was so great–see above, the judge should have assumed that the lawyer as any decent lawyer would have done had gone over the possible consequences with Johnson.) She then told Johnson that if he testified the U. S. Attorney would be allowed to cross examine him about the details of his prior conviction. She then called a recess so Johnson could talk the matter over with his lawyer. On appeal Johnson claimed that the judge’s lecture scared him into giving up his right to testify. The appellate panel disagreed saying that the judge was merely explaining his rights to him so that he could make an intelligent choice and upheld his conviction.

Jamaal Williams plead guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A semiautomatic firearm was found and he was charged with possession of the weapon.

The prior conviction occurred in 2002. He was arrested in 2002 after the vehicle he was driving was reported stolen. After he was handcuffed the police car burst out in flames and in the commotion Williams attempted to escape. He was soon caught.

The Presentence Report (PSR) and the trial court set a base offense level of 22 on the basis that the prior conviction for attempted escape was a crime of violence. In determining whether a crime is a crime of violence a court must first look at the statute as a whole and determine whether it penalizes violent behavior. The Nebraska statute under which Williams was convicted penalizes both escape and the failure to return from a leave from a penal institution. The court is allowed to consider the statute and certain neutral court documentsion determining whether the specific incident lead to Williams’ arrest was a crime of violence. Specifically it cannot consider the police report or any document based upon the police report. In this case the trial court based its information on the PSR which was based upon the police report and therefore unuseable to determine the violent or nonviolent nature of the prior conviction. Under Supreme Court precedent, escape from a penal institution is a crime of violence and the failure to return after a leave of absence is not a crime of violence.

When a statute governs both violent and nonviolent behavior “a modified categorical approach” is used. Since the “the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, jury instructions, or comparable judicial records” do not specify what behavior the plea was based upon the court must find that it involved nonviolent behavior. As a result the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for resentencing.

Charles Bizilj took his two sons, Christopher, age 8, and Colin, age 11 to the 2008 Machine Gun Shoot and Firearms Expo in Westfield, Massachusetts. Those attending the Machine Gun Shoot and Firearms Expo were allowed to shoot machine guns at pumpkin targets. All ages were allowed to participate, although Massachusetts law prohibited those under 18 from using machine guns. Dr. Bizilj allowed Christopher to shoot a 9-millimeter Micro Uzi submachine gun, thinking that a small gun would be easier for the eight year old to shoot. The first two times Christoper attempted to shoot the gun it jammed. The fifteen year old who was supervising the shoot then checked the gun and reloaded it. Christopher put his finger on the trigger and then attempted to balance the gun on his shoulder. But as he was balancing the gun it went off, killing him.

Former Pelham Police Chief Edward B. Fleury who sponsored the event and two other men who provided the weapons are charged with involuntary manslaughter. Hampden District Attorney William M. Bennett did not charge Dr. Bizilj although at a minimum it seems that he may be guilty of child endangerment. ¹

During the shoot Dr. Bizilj videotaped the incident, dropping the camera when his son was shot. The trial was scheduled for last week but it was continued when Fleury got sick. In pretrial motions the defense requested that the prosecution be prevented from playing the video before the jury. The prosecution argued that the video was necessary “to show to the jury ‘how dangerous, how lethal’ the machine gun was in the hands of an 8-year-old boy.” But the defense attorney, Rosemary Curran Scapicchio, argued that there was no question that Christopher was shot or that he died and therefore it is not relevant. The question before the judge was whether the video’s probative value outweighed by it’s predjudicial effect upon the jury. The video is a strong tool and may take the emphasis off whether or not Fleury ² is quilty of manslaughter and place it on the horrendous nature of the death. To prove manslaughter District Attorney William M. Bennett will have to show “an unintentional killing occasioned by an act which constitutes such a disregard of the probable harmful consequences to another as to be wanton or reckless.” The Court ruled that in this case the probative value of the tape which will show the effects of allowing the child to shoot the gun and the lack of control over the child’s use of the gun makes it sufficiently probative that the evidence ought to come in. But at the same time the court withheld deciding whether the auditory part of the tape after the camera was dropped in which the father is heard telling his son that he loves him and praying will be used. The judge indicated that that portion of the tape may be excluded.

Conservation Officer Jeremy King cited Dale Thurman for illegally baiting deer on property that his father owns. The property had a two story house on it with the address 1025 Zeller Avenue and a mobile home with the address 1035 Zeller Avenue. Thurman told King that he lived in the mobile home. After being cited Thurman asked King if he could use pistols to hunt deer. King told him he could. Thurman said he had pistols and pointed towards the two story house. King later learned that Thurman was a convicted felon and could not legally possess the pistols. He got a warrant for “1035″ Zeller, which the affidavit wrongly claimed was the two story house. In the affidavit it said that Thurman possessed “1035″ Zeller without giving any basis for the statement.

At trial and on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Thurman argued that the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue a warrant for 1025 Zeller.

Of course the question is not whether Thurman lived at 1025 Zeller ¹ Rather the question is whether the affidavit exhibited probable cause to search 1025 Zeller. The Eighth Circuit said it did. Thurman’s pointing to 1025 Zeller when he told King that he had pistols apparently was sufficient cause to search the residence.

Thurman also argued that the affidavit did not particularly describe the place to be searched, a basic requirement under the Fourth Amendment. It described the residence as “the two story framed residential dwelling and outbuildings of 1035 Zeller Ave. located approximately one & two thirds mile north of Hwy. 96 on Zeller Avenue”. The Court found that even though the actual address was 1025 Zeller, the description provided sufficient guidance to the searching officers that they knew which residence to search and therefore it met the Constitutional requirements.

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