Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

But, under California law, a finding that a crime was committed in juvenile court is an adjudication, not a conviction and as Justice Kennard points out in dissent one reason for this is that a juvenile is not permitted to have a jury trial.

Nguyen, as part of a plea bargain, plead to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and submitted the question of whether a prior juvenile adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon was a strike under the Three Strikes Law to a Court trial. The court found that it was a strike and therefore doubled his sentence from 16 months to 32 months. If he had two strikes he would have been sentenced to a minimum of 25 years to life.

The majority gives two reasons for finding that an adjudication in a juvenile matter can be used a prior conviction in a three strikes case despite not being found to be true by a jury.

First in the adult matter all findings of fact are made by a jury. The jury is allowed to determine whether or not there is a prior conviction and whether the conviction is for a matter that comes within the purview of the Three Strikes Law. Since the failure to submit the juvenile case to a jury is not in the case for which the person is going to be sentenced the matter is not strictly one that comes under Apprendi.

Second, under Apprendi the issue which triggers the additional punishment is not the felonious conduct which lead to the juvenile adjudication, but rather the fact of the prior adjudication. As the Supreme Court stated in Apprendi it is the fact of the conviction, not the felonious conduct which increases the sentence.

If the issue is not the felonious conduct, but rather the fact of a prior conviction and if we assume that for purposes of the three strikes law a conviction and an adjudication are the same thing as the Court does then the defendant gets a trial on all matters which increase the sentence since he/she is entitled to a trial on whether or not there was a prior conviction.

But as Kennard points out the purpose for doubling the sentence for a prior strike is not the fact of the conviction but rather the fact that the individual continues to perform felonious conduct. Furthermore Appprendi justifies the prior conviction exception to the requirement that any fact used to increase a sentence must be approved by a jury by arguing that

unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.

Thus if a prior conviction is only exempt from the need for being found by a jury if it is based on fair notice, reasonable doubt and a jury trial the facts of a juvenile conviction, found without a jury trial cannot be used to increase a sentence.