In the classic case of Brady v. Maryland the Supreme Court found that prosecutors must provide material evidence in their possession or the possession of the law enforcement agency to the defense where that evidence might be helpful. Today we will look at a Seventh Circuit case in which the appellate court refused to order a new trial since the evidence held by the prosecutor and law enforcement agencies was not material.

To establish a Brady violation the defendant must prove:

(1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that
the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.

James Daniel started an on-line conversation with Amanda_13 about sex. Eventually they agreed to meet in Will Park in Valparaiso, Indiana. Daniel promised to bring a condom. But Amanda_13 was not named Amanda and “she” was not 13. “She” was Sergeant Richard Howard of the Porter County Sheriff’s Department. Instead of having sex in the park Daniel was arrested there. Daniel’s second mistake was to give consent to search his computer. The government’s expert found two more sets of communications involving daisy13_Indiana and blonddt. Both sets of conversations were introduced at trial. But unbeknownst to the prosecutor at trial both daisy13_Indiana and blondtt were law enforcement officers working the same scam as Sergeant Howard. At some point between the end of trial and sentencing the prosecutor found out that daisy13_Indiana was a law enforcement agent and it wasn’t until oral argument that the prosecutor found out that blonddt was also a government agent.

After the prosecutor informed the defense counsel that daisy13_Indiana was a police officer, counsel did not request a new trial or inform the court. (Habeas on incompetence of counsel coming up next?) Without objection from in defendant in the trial court, at least as far as Daisy13_Indiana the appellate court uses a plain error test judge the Brady error.

Under the plain error standard, the alleged Brady violation must be an obvious error that affected Daniel’s substantial rights and created a substantial risk of convicting an innocent person.

The appellate court found that the evidence was not material. First, impeaching the expert would do no good since he was not involved in the investigation. Second, since the conversations with daisy13_Indiana and blonddt occurred after the conversation with amanda_13 they could not be used to show entrapment and finally the evidence was admitted to show Daniel’s state of mind and whether they were peace offices or not was not relevant as long as Daniel thought that they were young girls.

The Supreme Court ruled last week held that there is no due process right to DNA discovery post conviction.

William G. Osborne was convicted of rape and assault for a 1993 incident in Anchorage, Alaska.At the time of the trial modern DNA tests were not available. The results obtained from the DNA test did not exclude eighteen percent of African American men.

Osborne filed a 1983 civil rights action in Federal Court to get the DNA sample which he plans to have tested at his own expense. The District Court denied his request. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld his right to the discovery and the Supreme Court last week reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.

While, under Brady, there is a pretrial right to discovery, the Ninth Circuit erred, according to Chief Justice Roberts in his majority opinion, in extending the right to post trial discovery, despite the fact that Osborne has a liberty interest in pursuing post conviction relief.

The Supreme Court held that one can only obtain post trial due process relief if the available process “offends some fundamental principle of justice” or “transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness.” While Alaska does not have a statute specifically granting the right to post trial DNA, a review of the statutes and judicial decisions in Alaska indicates that post trial right to a DNA examination is available under various circumstances and the process by which it can be obtained does not offend the fundamentals of justice or transgress recognized principle of the fundamental fairness.

Furthermore the Court refused to extend the right to substantive due process to the right to post trial discovery of DNA samples. First there is no long standing right to DNA and secondly the court did not want to interupt the legislative and judicial process which is happening in each of the states and Congress. There are 46 states in which legislation has been enacted which in one way or another guarantees the right post trial discovery of DNA samples.

Justice Stevens in dissent, wrote that while Alaskan law permits post trial discovery of DNA samples it is not clear that the discovery is granted in practice, In particular he noted that it was not granted to Osborne even though it appears that it could exonerate him. Second, Stevens states that there is a fundamental right in not being incarcerated if one is innocent and that denial of the DNA discovery violates his due process liberty right.