Jared Lee Loughner is charged with the attempted murder of Congress member Gabrielle Giffords. Six people were killed and 13 were injured during a political rally in Tucson, Arizona on January 8, 2011.

A district court judge found him incompetent to stand trial. This does not mean that he is insane or not guilty by reason of insanity. Rather it means that he cannot help his lawyer or that he does not understand the legal process sufficiently to make decisions regarding his defense.

After the district court’s decision the Bureau of Prisons housed him at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. The purpose of sending him to the Medical Center was to make him competent to stand trial. Doctors at the Medical Center ordered that he be given psychotropic drugs. He refused to take them and the Medical Center attempted to force them on him. His lawyers moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Medical Center from involuntarily medicating him. The District Court refused to grant the injunction. He appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction one must show that he/she is likely to succeed on the merits, that the failure to grant the preliminary examination could result in irreparable harm and that the balance of the equities support the granting of the preliminary injunction. Since Loughner has not been convicted he is presumed innocent and has greater civil rights than one who has been convicted. Forced medication may cause significant and irreversible side affects including death. While the government has strong reasons for wanting to return Loughner to competency the equities favor Loughner. The length of the injunction will be short and he has a strong interest in controlling what drugs are injected into his body. As a result the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and granted the temporary injunction. It set the case for an expedited hearing on August 29 to determine the issue of forced medication on the merits.

The California Supreme Court in People v. Taylor held that any person who is competent to stand trial and who is competent to waive his/her right to an attorney is able to represent him/herself. A waiver of counsel must be “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”

When a defendant makes a Faretta motion to represent him/herself the court must voir dire the defendant to determine if he/she understands the consequences of self representation. If the defendant understands the consequences the court must allow the defendant to waive the right to counsel and grant the motion.

Keith Desmond Taylor was convicted and sentenced to death for a murder that occured during a residential burglary. Prior to trial he had problems getting along with his court appointed attorney. He made several motions to represent himself and on his final motion it was granted. His appointed attorney was then appointed to act in an advisory capacity. (Later it was changed to standby counsel meaning that he would take over representation during the trial if Taylor’s right to represent himself was terminated.)

On appeal his appointed counsel argued, inter alia that he was not competent to represent himself, despite the court’s finding that he was competent to stand trial.

As in California law, Federal courts allow any defendant who makes a knowing intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel to represent themself as long as they are competent to stand trial. The United States Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran held that while the Federal standard for competencey to stand trial and competency to represent oneself is the sames states are free to insist upon a higher standard of competency in order to represent oneself that the competency level necessary to stand trial. But in Taylor the California Supreme Court reviewed the history of self representation in California and found that the state, like the Federal government uses the same competency standard for both standing trial and representing oneself.