The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision upholding a search at the residence of Pamela Robbins.

Officer Bruce Rhoads of the Tama County Sheriff’s Department obtained a search warrant for Robbins residence and for the residence of Michael Watson. The search warrant was based upon Rhoads’ experience, Watson’s criminal history, Watson’s purchases of pseudoephedrine, Robbins’ purchases of pseudoephedrine, suspicious traffic near Watson’s house, and the presence of Robbins’ car parked at Watson’s house. Pseudoephedrine is a drug commonly found in cold medications and it can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

During the search of the houses drug related items were found. Robbins and Watson were charged with various drug charges.

The Fourth Amendment mandates that a search warrant must be supported by probable cause. In other words there must be a nexus between criminal activity and the place to be searched. The nexus must be great enough that “under the totality of the circumstances a person of reasonable prudence would believe that evidence of a crime might be located on the premises to be searched.”

Nowhere was it alleged that Robbins purchased pseudoephedrine in amounts that exceeded the legal maximum or that she purchased it more often than permitted by law. The appellate court ordered the suppression of all evidence found at Robbins’ home due to the lack of probable cause. Probable cause, according to the court cannot be based purely upon the legal purchase of a precursor drug.

Kathy Parker was flying from Philadelphia to North Carolina on business. She was flying out of Philadelphia International Airport. As she was going through the metal detectors a TSA agent selected her carry on baggage for an in depth inspection.

Her personal items were spilled out on the inspection table for everyone to see. (The agent asked if the diet pills work?) Checks, in her purse, made out to her and her husband were inspected. The agent claimed that they were in sequential order and they called over the Philadelphia police since the agent claimed that sequentially numbered checks were evidence of embezzlement. For some reason the agent thought that she had emptied her bank account prior to filing for divorce so the agent called her husband to find out if they were going through a divorce.

My bet is that the agent was trying to get a job as a police officer and she was trying “to crack a big case” to show that she was deserving. Of course she found nothing.

But the issue is not what was found but the change that has occurred in out society. The Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Of course generally the Fourth Amendment only applies to searches but in this case TSA is working as an agent of the government and is subject to the Fourth Amendment.

Here Parker’s personal belongings were seized and inspected without probable cause, without an affidavit, and without the permission of a judge.

The Fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution in reaction to the British writs of assistance. The writs of assistance were general search warrants issued to assist customs agents find smuggled goods. They were issued without probable cause that evidence of illegal behavior could be found in a specific location. James Otis a Boston lawyer, one of the earlier patriots, developed a reputation by fighting the writs, as did John Hancock a Boston merchant who was the president of the Continental Congress and signed the Declaration of Independence.

The question in the post 9/11 period is how much of the rights fought for in the Revolution are we willing to surrender in order to obtain security. Can we feel safe without searching the diet pills and the personal papers of a 43 year old business woman taking a domestic flight? I’m sure that Otis and Hancock as well as James Madison and who wrote the Bill of Rights based on George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights would have found the risk de minimus and worth taking in order to preserve our fundamental rights.

A woman called the Albuquerque Police Department complaining that she heard a female neighbor yelling at a young child and beating the child in the neighbor’s back yard. She did not see anything due to a high fence.

Officer Debra Romero responded to the residence. Joseph Lundstrom answered the door. Lundstrom requested identification. Romero pointed to her badge. Romero ordered Lundstrom and his girlfriend, Jane Hibner to leave the house. Lundstrom asked why she was present and told her there was no child in the house. She pulled her gun. ¹ Hibner, the only other person in the house got between Lundstrom and Romero. Romero continued to point her gun at Hibner for a short while. Hibner left the house and was handcuffed by the officers. Lundstrom called 911 to assure himself of Romero’s identity. The operator assured him that Romero was an officer and asked him to exit the house. He did so with his hands raised He was handcuffed injured, and put in the police car. The police searched his house. No child was found. They were released without charges and sued for violations of the Fourth Amendment.

The police filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted and appealed. The defendants claimed that they had qualified immunity. Peace officers have qualified immunity against a civil rights suits unless the plaintiff can show that their constitutional rights were violated and that such rights were clear at the time of the incident. The Tenth Circuit has ruled that for a right to be clear it must be supported either by Tenth Circuit or U. S. Supreme Court precedent. In order to win the plaintiffs had to show that their constitutional rights were violated and that the state of the law was clear at the time of the incident. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the initial detention and the use of the gun was legal. While it was a search it was reasonable in light of the officer’s fear. Checking on the welfare of the child is part of the officers functions “community caretaking functions.” The officer pulled the gun in order to check on the item in Lundstrom’s hand which was a phone not a gun. But the court found that the handcuffing of Hibner, the surrounding of the house, the order for Lundstrom to exit the house, the handcuffing of Lundstrom were clear violations of the law supported by United States Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedents and therefore the claim of qualified immunity fails and the lower court decision was reversed. The Tenth Circuit relied upon the lack of probable cause to arrest them and the lack of reasonable suspicion to detain them. The original call said that a woman (and therefore not Lundstrom) was abusing the child. Prior to handcuffing Hibner the police had a chance to verify any suspicions by questioning her and they did not. Also they found no evidence that a child was in the house. When the original caller was told that there was not a child in the house she admitted that she may have been wrong about the location but the police continued to detain Lundstrom and Hibner.

The Fort Wayne Police Department received a tip that drugs were being sold at the residence of Michael Chapman. Chapman was on electronic monitoring in lieu of a jail sentence. In order to get the electronic monitoring he waived his rights against unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore a police task force went to his house to search it. Two officers knocked at the front door and two more surveilled the back door. After the officers started knocking on the front door, Eddie Lamar Carlyle ran out the back door with a backpack.

The officers handcuffed him and seized the backpack. They found marijuana, crack. a scale, a spatula and packaging materials in the backpack. After he was arrested Carlyle moved to suppress the evidence as being seized without probable cause. The trial court denied his motion on the grounds that he did not have standing to object to the seizure. At the hearing on the motion he denied that he owned the backpack. He testified that the backpack belonged to Chapman asked him to put the backpack in the garage.

The Court denied his motion saying that he did not have standing. In determining whether a defendant has standing to suppress evidence the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals looks at five primary factors:

(1) whether the defendant had a possessory [or ownership] interest in the thing seized or the place searched, (2) whether he had the right to exclude others from that place, (3) whether he exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, (4) whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy, and (5) whether he was legitimately on the premises.

He denied having an ownership interest in the backpack, but claimed to have a legitimate possessory interest in the pack since Chapman handed it to him. He exhibited the right to exclude other, except for Chapman. But at the same time he testified that he did not know what was in the bag. At the trial court hearing on the motion to suppress, Carlyle did not claim to have a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack. Without such an expectation the appellate court ruled that he did not have standing to object to the seizure.

From the point of view of a trial attorney one needs to make strategic decision prior to filing a motion to suppress evidence. You need to make sure that your client has both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. You do not want to put your client on the stand to testify that he/she has possession of the contraband for the purpose standing if you plan to have your client take the stand at trial and deny a possessory interest in the contraband. Sometimes it is worthwhile to pass up a motion to suppress evidence in order to have a chance at trial. Once your client gets on the stand and admits to possession at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence you lose your ability to negotiate the case and you set your client up for DA’s cross examination at trial.

In United States v. Naim Nafis Shakir, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered a search pursuant to a lawful arrest in a non-automobile context in the post Gant era. In Arizona v. Gant the Supreme Court clarified New York v.Belton. In Belton the Supreme Court ruled that in a vehicle search pursuant to an arrest officers could search the entire vehicle. But in Gant the Court ruled that since the purpose of a search pursuant to an arrest was to protect the officers such a search could only occur if the arrestee had access to the area to be searched. In other words once the arrestee is in a secure position there is no longer a need for a search. A search cannot be based upon the location of the arrestee prior to the arrest if the arrestee is now handcuffed and in the police vehicle for example.

In Shakir Pennsylvania authorities issued an arrest warrant for Naim Shakir for an armed robbery. The FBI found him in a Jersey City hotel. As they were arresting him, he threw down a bag. After he was arrested and handcuffed the agents seized the bag which was near Shakir’s feet and found a significant amount of cash in the bag. At trial he moved to suppress the bag. The appellate court ruled that the rule in Gant applies not only to automobile searches but to any search done pursuant to an arrest. It distinguished the case of Shakir from another case where the bag was dropped three feet away from the defendant. In that case once the defendant was handcuffed he did not have access to the bag, but with the bag being at Shakir’s feet and with handcuffs not always preventing injury to officers the court held that despite Gant the search was legal.

A confidential informant told the Kansas City Drug Task Force that Ishmael Kedar Harris was selling drugs in the Kansas City area. They saw him with a duffel bag driving a truck. After following him for a short distance they requested the Grandview Police Department to find a reason to stop Harris. After following him for a couple of blocks a Grandview officer stopped him for having a tinted driver’s license cover. Tinted license cover are legal in Missouri as long as the tag is clearly visible.

They asked for permission to search the vehicle. Harris told the officer that it was his girl friend’s car. They called the girl friend who refused to consent.

A drug dog was brought to the scene and signaled the presence of contraband. This gave the officers probable cause to search the vehicle. They found a gun and three pounds of marijuana. Using this information they got a search warrant for Harris’ house where they found 29.7 pounds of marijuana.

The statute says that the license plate must be “clearly visible.” The officer testified at the hearing that he had to get right up on the tale of the vehicle before he could read the tag. The judge found the officer credible and denied the motion to suppress the evidence.

The appellate court found that it was a question of credibility. Since the trial judge’s decision is not “clearly erroneous” the appellate court denied the appeal.

One issue that is not discussed in the decision is the length of the stop. The length of a traffic stop is limited to the amount of time it takes to handle the situation for which there is probable cause. In this case it would be limited to the amount of time it would take to give Harris a ticket for the license plate cover and to check his ID and warrants. Nothing is said in the decision but I wonder if the time it took to call the girl friend and to bring the dog to the site where the car was stopped exceeded the time necessary to give the ticked, check for his ID and warrants.

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Antoine Jones’ conviction for distribution of cocaine and cocaine base due to Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking of Jones’ vehicle without a search warrant.

Jones’ conviction was based, in part, on the use of a GPS tracking device which was attached to his vehicle for four weeks. The Court found that the failure to have a valid search warrant ¹for the use of the GPS device, violated Jones’ legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore the Fourth Amendment.

In order to find that GPS devices require a search warrant the Court had to distinguish the use of GPS devices from the use of beepers in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Knotts. In Knotts the Supreme Court ruled that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” In Knotts a manufacturer of chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine alerted the police of suspicious sales. The manufacturer then at the urging of the police planted a beeper in a five-gallon container of chemicals purchased by Tristan Armstrong. The police monitored the progress of the car carrying the beeper, to Knott’s Wisconsin cabin. The Supreme Court found that since Armstrong’s vehicle could have been followed on the public streets by a police car the use of a beeper to assist the police did not violate the driver’s legitimate expectation of privacy.

The Circuit Court distinguished the use of GPS on Jones vehicle from the use of the beeper on Armstrong’s vehicle by the fact that the use of the GPS lasted around the clock for four weeks while the beeper was only monitored during a short ride from Minneapolis to the cabin in Wisconsin. But just as the police could have followed Armstrong’s vehicle on the public streets they could have followed Jone’s vehicle. The Circuit Court pointed out that it would be much more difficult to follow a vehicle for four weeks and that during a prolonged period one learns significant private details about a person’s life that one does not learn during a short trip. Also the Supreme Court in Knotts specifically did not decide what would happen in technological advances allow long term trailing of a vehicle.

However, I find it difficult to accept the supposition that a short term trailing of a vehicle is not a violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy and a longer term trailing is a violation. With the increased use of GPS the issue may well appear before the Supreme Court. The Circuits have split. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, relying on Knotts, have found the use of GPS to not be a search. The Supreme Court has several options. It can find Knotts to be decisive or at least persuasive and therefore find that the use of GPS is not a “search” and therefore a search warrant is not necessary. It can accept the D. C. Circuit’s distinction based upon the length of the search or it can reverse Knotts.

A unique option would be to find the search illegal under state law and rule that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded. The placing of the GPS device on the vehicle was clearly a trespass and trailing the vehicle for four weeks is stalking. But the Supreme Court has never excluded evidence based upon a violation of state law.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to a search. The defendant claimed that the search exceeded the legitimate scope of the search warrant. In a methamphetamine case the defendant claimed that the police had no authority to seize a video when the warrant, authorized among other things the seizure of photographs in order to identify the residents of the home. The Third Circuit refused to decide whether the seizure of the videos exceeded the scope of the warrant.

Rather it upheld the search on the grounds that the admission of the video at trial, even if it was seized illegally was harmless error in that that there was overwhelming evidence of Anthony Joseph Tenerelli’s guilt on methamphetamine and gun charges regardless of whether the videotape was admitted or not. Among the other evidence admitted at trial was evidence about a controlled buy made by a “confidential reliable informant” from Tenerelli which was monitored by a police officer, approximately 100 grams of methamphetamine, drug notes in Mr. Tenerelli’s handwriting, a digital scale, drug packaging materials, a 9mm semi-automatic pistol, and 9mm ammunition. The gun and the methamphetamine were found near Tenerelli, in his living room, at the time of the search. The Court found that he would have been convicted regardless of whether the videotape was entered into evidence and therefore the conviction was valid even if the videotape was seized illegally.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied immunity to a prosecutor who reviewed a search warrant affidavit for the residence of an on-line journalist at the University of Northern Colorado.

Thomas Mink published The Howling Pig. For its editorial column he chose the name of Junius Puke with an altered photograph of Junius Peake, a professor at the school. Mr. Peake was not amused. He contacted the Greeley police. They drafted a search warrant affidavit for the home that Mink shared with his mother and presented it to Susan Knox, a deputy district attorney for review.

Mink eventually filed suit, naming among others, Knox. Knox moved for summary judgment claiming immunity and qualified immunity as a prosecutor.

The Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments. It ruled that prosecutors are only entitled to immunity for the work of an advocate and that the review and approval of a search warrant affidavit is not advocacy.

The Court stated, “Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” However it found that Mink alleged that Knox violated his clearly established constitutional rights and therefore she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

To successfully allege that one’s constitutional rights have been violated it is necessary to show a casual relationship between the defendant’s action and the violation of constitutional rights, an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights and that the law was clear at the time of the violation. The Tenth Circuit found that Mink met all of the criteria. There was a direct causal relationship between Knox’s approval of the warrant and the illegal search. The search was illegal in that it was without probable cause and it was overly broad. It was without probable cause because parody is constitutionally accepted and it cannot be criminally charged as libel. Furthermore the warrant was not sufficiently particularized in that it ordered the seizure of all computers found in the residence without specifying what they were looking for on the hard drive. Thus no reasonable district attorney could believe that the affidavit met Fourth Amendment mandates for problable cause and specificity.

Eddie Garcia and Nancy Martin Perez were pulled over due to having an obstruction hanging from the windshield of their truck. Their identification, registration and insurance was checked. They were interviewed separately and gave contrasting statements on where they were going and why. A computer check was initiated. During the check the officer asked to look in their trailer. He took a 30 second look with Garcia and they shut the trailer. After the computer check is completed Garcia is given a verbal warning. Garcia and Perez are told they can leave. Garcia shakes hands with the officer.

As they begin to leave the officer asks permission to search the trailer. Perez gives permission. The officer search the trailer. He finds a fake wall hiding marijuana.

Garcia and Perez are arrested. Garcia pleads guilty reserving the right to challenge the search.

There is no question that the initial seizure is legal. The officer stopped Garcia and Perez due to a violation of the traffic laws. The officer carried out a legal check of licenses, registration, and warrants. This was done in a prudent manner without extending the time of the detention. The detention ended and the couple were told they could leave. Then the officer asked to search the trailer. Perez gave permission. Since they were free to leave at this point they were not coerced into giving permission. Thus the search was legal.

Assuming the facts in the decision are accurate the only question is why was Perez so stupid as to give permission for a search, knowing that the truck was full of marijuana. The Fourth Amendment prescribes searches in all case except where specific exceptions occur. However anyone can waive that right. In Arizona v. Miranda the Supreme Court ruled that a waiver of the right to remain silent must be knowing and intelligent. Furthermore it required that the waiver be shown on the record through the use of what is now well known as the Miranda warnings. Isn’t it time that similar waivers be mandated prior to a waiver of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches?