The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held last week that a waiver of Miranda rights by a man with an IQ level in the sixties and who had a brain aneurysm decreasing his IQ by approximately 10 points was valid.

James Collins was convicted of murdering his girl friend in the early morning hours of May 1, 2001 after they spent several hours smoking crack cocaine. He had a long history of mental illness and the trial court heard the testimony of five experts before allowing the Mirandized testimony into evidence. After his arrest on the morning of the death, Collins gave several statements, some of which admitted to killing Flora Lanier. The testimony of witnesses was mixed and it is doubtful that they could have gotten a conviction without his statements.

A waiver of the right to remain silent must be knowingly and intelligently made. Furthermore the waiver must be “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” In other words Collins must have understood what he was doing when he waived his right to remain silent and he must have had some degree of understanding of the possible consequences of the waiver.

After the conviction Collins appealed and the appeal was denied. Then he filed a writ of habeas corpus in the state appellate court. It was denied and the Illinois Supreme Court refused to hear the matter. Then he filed a writ in the Federal District Court. It was denied but he was given permission to appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit while agreeing that there was no question that Collins was mentally deficient found that he did not meet the standard for habeas corpus. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) “a federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim either ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The Seventh Circuit found no Supreme Court precedent requiring the police “to take ‘special care’ that a suspect with a mental disability understands his rights.” Therefore the state court did not violate “clearly established Federal law.” Furthermore while the experts were divided the Seventh Circuit held that it cannot be said that the state courts was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. When talking to the police Collins was rational. He understood the question and gave logical answers. As a result Collins met the relatively low bar and he had sufficient knowledge of what he was doing when he waived his right to remain silent.

The Supreme Court ruled that in order to assert Miranda rights an arrestee must verbally tell the officer that he/she does not want to talk to the officer or that he she wants to maintain silence.

Van Chester Thompkins was charged with murder in a Michigan Court. After his arrest in Ohio two Michigan police officers traveled to Ohio to interrogate him. They spent three hours questioning him but during most of that time he was silent. Towards the end of the interrogation the officers asked him if he prayed to god to forgive him for the murder. He said yes and the answer was used against him at trial after his motion to suppress the answer was denied.

On habeas the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Thompkins did not invoke his Miranda rights and that he waived the right by answering the officer’s question, a position rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals but accepted by the Supreme Court.

Justice Sotomeyer wrote the dissent. She pointed out that in the Supreme Court held that “If [an] individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent” or if he “states that he wants an attorney,” the interrogation “must cease.” It would seem that a two and three quarter hour silence would be an indication that Thompkins wanted to remain silent. In Miranda the Court wrote:

“Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.”

As Sotomeyer points out this seems to be pretty much on point but it was ignored by the majority. As the Court stated in Miranda: “a valid waiver will not be presumed … simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”

Perhaps the most ironic part of the decision is that arrestees must now verbally assert their desire to remain silent. The common Miranda right read to arrestees says that the arrestee has a right to ask for an attorney and the right to remain silent. It says nothing about stating that the arrestee must state that he/she wants to remain silent.