Randall Lee Fields, a prisoner in a Michigan jail was taken from his cell to a separate part of the building sometime between 7:00 pm and 9:00 pm. He was then interrogated by two armed officers for five to seven hours. He was not given his Miranda rights although he was told he could go back to his cell if he wanted to. During the interrogation he admitted to having sexual acts with a 12 year old prior to his current interrogation. His admission was admitted at trial. The question the Supreme Court faced in Howes v. Fields was whether Fields’ Miranda rights were violated. Under the seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona a defendant’s must be warned of the admissibility of a statement and the availability of counsel prior to making a statement if the defendant is in custody and if the statement is the result of interrogation.

Since Fields’ conviction was upheld in the state courts and comes to the Supreme Court as an appeal by the state of a grant of habeas corpus by the Federal Court the primary question is whether the State Court decision clearly violated Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court, this week, ruled that it did not. The Supreme Court reviewed its prior decisions regarding the use of Miranda in interrogations of defendants who are in custody for unrelated matters and found no decision setting a categorical rule regarding the applicability of Miranda to in custody interrogations regarding unrelated matters. In previous case it either refused to consider the issues or assumed that Miranda applied without decided whether it applied. Therefore, the Court reversed lower court decisions granting the writ of habeas corpus.

But the court went further, in what must be considered dicta, and stated that Miranda was not applicable to the situation in Fields.

For Miranda purposes the Court ruled the phrase “in custody” has a special meaning. “In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of ‘the objective circumstances of the interrogation, . . . a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’” The Court gave three reasons for finding that Fields was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. First, it stated that questioning a person who is in custody does not effect the same type of shock that questioning a person who has recently been arrested. Second, a prisoner is unlikely to give an incriminating statement as one who has recently been arrested since his/her release date will not be effected by the statement. Finally, the interrogating officer has less authority to affect the release date on an in-custody inmate as compared to a recently arrested defendant.

While it is true that Fields was told that he could go back to his cell if he did not want to answer the officers questions, ¹the feeling of coercion when being interrogated in a jail setting is strong. Jailers have near complete control over inmates while they are in custody. Inmates are constantly called before custodial officers for disciplinary hearings. There is no Miranda right in these hearings and they can be disciplined if they fail to answer the officer’s questions. They can be thrown for extensive periods of time into solitary confinement. Commissary and phone rights can be taken away. They can be denied the right to have visitors. And perhaps most importantly they can lose “good time” and have their release date delayed. Thus, the coerced nature of in-custody statements is great and to deny those interrogated while in custody the right to remain silent or the right to have an attorney present violates the basic requirements of Miranda.

Jimmy Brown was placed in a squad car on a firearms charge. He was then given his Miranda rights. When asked if he understood them. his response was “pshh.” He then answered several questions and asked for a “deal.” ¹ He was later given the Miranda warnings again as the station house. This time he responded, “Yeah.”

Prior to his trial Brown moved to suppress his answers to the questions. The District Court denied the motion and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It held that his request for a “deal” and his selective answering of questions was sufficient evidence that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

To me, it sounds as if it is, at most, a conditional waiver. He may be saying, if you give me a “deal,” I will talk. For that matter is the continued questioning of Brown after he asks for a deal an agreement by the officer to give Brown a deal?

Brian Rogers, a non-commissioned Naval officer at the Brunswick Naval Air Station, sold a computer he no longer needed. But he failed to remove the child porn from it. The buyer reported the pornography to the local police who initiated an investigation. To assist they brought in the state computer crimes unit and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

A search warrant was obtained for Roger’s house and plans were made to serve it while he was on the base. His commanding officer agreed to order him to go home at the scheduled time for the search.

Once he got home, he was interviewed by the local police and the state computer crimes unit. They told him that he was not going to be arrested that day and they did not read him his Miranda rights. After some time he agreed to go the police station with them where they continued the interrogation. Eventually an officer from NCIS joined the interrogation, first giving him the military version of the Miranda rights.

Under Miranda a statement generally cannot be used against a defendant unless it is the result of interrogation occurring while the defendant is in custody. Here there were basically three statements. The first occurring at the house. The second at the station by the police officers and the third by the NCIS officer after giving Rogers his Miranda rights.

The primary question here was which, if any of the three statements were made while Rogers was in custody.The First Circuit in an oppinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter ruled that the first statement was made while he was in custody since he had been ordered by his commanding officer to go home and presumably to cooperate with the police when he got there. The second statement was basically a continuation of the first and was also done without the benefit of Miranda warnings. While the NCIS officer gave the equivalent of Miranda warnings it was not sufficiently distinguished from the first two statements. Rogers had already given two statements and it is doubtful that anything said in the third had not already been said. Furthermore the NCIS officer told him that she was not in the command structure and therefore she could not countermand his officer’s order,

The Circuit Court remanded the case to the District Court to determine if sufficient curative action occurred to distinguish the statements. If not the conviction must be reversed.

A thirteen year old North Carolina boy was removed from his classroom by a uniformed officer. He was taken to a room where he was interrogated by a police officer, a school security guard, and an assistant principal. He was not Mirandized. During the interrogation he made statements that incriminated himself in two burglaries.

An unmirandized statement cannot be used against a defendant if the statement was made while the defendant was being interrogated while the defendant is in custody. The question in juvenile court proceedings and on appeal was whether the teenager was in custody at the time of the interrogation . The defendant does not actually have to be in custody. It is sufficient if the defendant is in a custody-like situation. The juvenile court ruled that he was not in custody. On appeal his attorneys argued that in determining whether the teenager was in custody the juvenile court should have taken into consideration that the teenager was a juvenile. The state argued that the same definition of custody should be used for all regardless of the age of the defendant.

The Supreme Court held last week that the juvenile court should have taken into consideration the defendant’s age. The Supreme Court ruled that a minor’s age must be taken into consideration due to the increased pressure juveniles feel to answer questions posed by law enforcement officials.

Justice Alito dissented saying that the purpose of Miranda was to create a uniform rule. Necessarily when you create a uniform rule it is both over inclusive and under inclusive. Miranda covers some people who do not need the warnings and other people who need stronger warnings. By giving children more protection you are destroying the uniformity of Miranda and opening up the door to more exceptions. However, the Court ruled that it was more important to prevent police from circumventing Miranda than providing one rule for both adults and juveniles.

Casey Anthony has sure done a good job of convicting herself.

Ellis Wood was arrested on allegations that he hired Rasheen Harry (“Harry”) to kill Carlisle Hall (“Hall”). Wood believed that Hall raped Wood’s girlfriend, Nisha Bernard (“Bernard”). He was interrogated a number of times and kept in the police station over night.

After a final interrogation he was asked if they could videotape his statement. He responded: “I think I should get a lawyer.” New York Detective Charles Arnao (“Arnao”) gave him a phone and left the room. When the detective came back Wood appeared to be finishing a friendly conversation. Arnao had another officer bring video equipment and read Wood his Miranda rights before videotaping an interrogation.

At trial, on appeal, and in his writ of habeas corpus before the Second Circuit, Wood raised Miranda questions. Both the appellate courts and the United States District Court found the admission of the video to be a violation of Wood’s right to counsel, they found the admission to be harmless error. However, the Second Circuit found the video had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for either retrial or dismissal.

After an arrestee unequivocally requests an attorney, a police officer must immediately terminate the interrogation and it cannot be restarted until either the arrestee has an attorney present or the arrestee initiates the conversation.The Second Circuit, like the District Court and the new York state appellate courts, found, “I think I should get a lawyer.” to be an unequivocal request. The statement does not show any doubt about the need for a lawyer nor does he question his decision. Thus the violation of Miranda is clear.

Perhaps a little less clear is whether the violation is harmless error. To determine whether the admission of the evidence was harmless the court looks at the importance of the evidence and the strength of the prosecution’s case. The prosecution had only two witnesses, Harry and Bernard. Harry had been convicted of the murder and was looking for a shortened sentence. He had a long rap sheet and he is subject to strenuous cross examination. By the time of trial Bernard had ended her tumultuous relationship with Wood. Not only was she looking for revenge but she was subject to deportation. As a result the government’s case was not very credible. The only thing that made it believable was the videotape which corroborated Harry’s testimony. The Second Circuit found that without the videotape Wood may have been found innocent.

Thus the videotape was not only important to the government’s case but it buffered an otherwise weak case. Furthermore, the government found the videotape to be important. The U. S. Attorney repeatedly brought the videotape up during closing and told the jury that they should pay attention to the videotape to support the conviction.

“SJ” a fifteen year old girl found nude pictures of herself on her guardian’s computer. She also found a hidden camera in the bathroom. She reported her findings to the police.

They performed a “knock and talk” at the residence of Jon R. Hughes. ¹

Prior to the “knock and talk” the police learned that Hughes’ mental state was very fragile and that he needed involuntary hospitalization. They did not plan to arrest him at the end of the “knock and search.” Instead they planned to get consent to search his computer and to hospitalize him.

Eventually he was arrested and raised search and Miranda issues before the Federal Court. The officers twice interview Hughes.The first time was during the “knock and search/” The court ruled that Miranda warnings were not necessary. Miranda warnings are only mandated when there is a interrogation and the person is effectively in custody. In this case the Court ruled that Hughes was not in custody. The interview occurred in his home. The police did not plan to arrest him and he was not arrested on that day. His mental state was poor. In fact he had an anxiety attack in the middle of the interview. But that standing alone does not show that the interview was involuntary.

Hughes claimed that his consent to search the computer was not voluntary due to his mental state. The court founhd that Hughes consent to search the computer or his lack thereof was immaterial. By the time the officers requested his consent he had already given them enough information to get a search warrant. Therefore under the theory of inevitable discovery his consent was immaterial.

The Department of Homeland Security learned that there was pornography on computers at Terry Boll’s residence. They got a search warrant. They discover that seven people live in the house and there are ten computers. Eventually they learn that there is child porn on three of the computers and that two of these computers belong to Boll. ¹ This should be the end of the case. There is no way the government is going to be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Boll possessed the pornography. Any criminal defense attorney worth his/her salt can convince a jury that there is a reasonable doubt that someone else put the pornography on the computers even if boll owned them. ² t is unlikely anyone will be charged.

But Boll apparently has not listened to enough police shows on TV. If he had he would have heard the police give the Miranda warning regularly. He seems to know that anything he says can be used against him. ³ Just the same, he answers the agent’s questions:

Agent Scherer: I asked him if he had an explanation about why there was child pornography on his computer.

Government: How did he respond?

Scherer: He replied I guess you caught me.

Government: How did you respond to that?

Scherer: I asked him further questions about how the child pornography got on there, and he stated, well, they are my computers, aren’t they.

Case lost. Not only did Boll lose the case but his attorney had the nerve to argue insufficiency of the evidence on appeal. His answers to the questions gave the government all it needed to convict.

Generally the police won’t ask any questions unless they need the information to charge a crime or get a conviction. Often if you refuse to answer police questions they walk away without even charging you. But by answering the questions you give them the information they need to charge you or to get a conviction.

Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani the first Guantanamo detainee to be tried civilly was sentenced to life in prison yesterday after a trial on charges stemming from the bombing of the 1998 U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya that killed 224 people by U. S. District Judge
Lewis Kaplan. A New York jury convicted him of one count of conspiracy to damage or destroy U.S. property and found him not guilty on 284 counts of murder and conspiracy.

Ghailani was accused of buying gas tanks and a truck used in the embassy attacks. He did not actually participate in the attack. He flew to Pakistan the day before the attack. ¹After the bombing he worked as a driver and a bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden.

The life sentence was not unexpected. The judge has said that he thought the government was the victim of a lenient jury. While some have questioned the not guilty verdicts on the 284 murder and conspiracy charges, the truth of the matter is that the jury has spoken. The government did not prove its case on the remaining 284 counts beyond a reasonable doubt. Part of this is due to the suppression of evidence seized as a result of torture and the failure to Mirandize Ghailani prior to interrogating him. But this is the law which protects due process and prevents coerced self incrimination. Unlike those who are upset with the not guilty verdicts because they assumed guilt regardless of the facts, the important thing is that Ghailani got a fair trial.

The problem with the sentence, however, is that it does not take into consideration the fact that he was found not guilty on 284 out of 285 counts. Ghailani would have gotten the same sentence if he had been found guilty on all of the counts. While the judge may think that he is guilty on all counts the jury only convicted on only one and a lesser sentence is appropriate based on the sole conviction of a relatively minor count.

A nine month investigation led to the arrest of William Capers, a post office employee, for theft of money from Express Mail envelopes. Capers and a co-worker were arrested on the job, after postal inspectors set up a sting by watching them after the inspectors put cash and money orders inside Express Mail envelopes. Capers was interrogated in a supervisor’s office without Miranda warnings. Ninety minutes later he was again interrogated by the same inspector at another postal facility. This time he was Mirandized.

At trial Capers moved to exclude both statements and the Court granted the motion. The government appealed claiming that the second statement given after the Miranda warnings should have been admitted.

In Missouri v. Seibert. the defendant also gave an unMirarandized statement followed by a Mirandized statement. The Supreme Court plurality in Seibert held that it was unlikely that the defendant could believe that he could effectively waive his Miranda rights after he gave a full confession during his earlier statement. Justice Souter, speaking for the plurality named five criteria to be used to determine the voluntariness of an Mirandized statement given after an unMirandized statement:

(1) “the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation,” (2) “the overlapping content of the two statements,” (3) “the timing and setting of the first and second” interrogation, (4) “the continuity of police personnel,” and (5) “the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.

But since Souter did not speak for a majority a number of circuits have followed a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy. Kennedy would first determine whether law enforcement officers intentionally used the two step routine to obtain a confession. If they did he would then determine whether curative steps had been taken to assure that the confession was voluntary. ¹ If there was no steps were taken to cure the unMirandized statement Justice Kennedy would exclude the Mirandized statement at trial.

Applying Kennedy’s concurrence the Second Circuit found that the postal inspectors intentionally violated Caper’s Miranda rights and took no step the cure the violation. Inspector Hoti, said that he did not Mirandize Caper’s first statement because he was in a rush to determine whether the codefendant was involved and to seize the money used in the sting. The Court found this to be an incredible reason and used it to find an intentional violation of Caper’s Miranda rights. Hoti was an experienced officer and he admitted he could have given Miranda warnings.

The second interrogation was a continuance of the first interrogation. The same three officers were present and it covered much of the same ground. Also Capers was not told that the first statement was probably inadmissible.

Thus the government did not meet its burden to show either the lack of deliberateness on Hoti’s part or that the violation of Caper’s Miranda rights was cured.