The New York Court of Appeals held that a conviction for possession of child pornography, found in “cache files,” or temporary internet files, under New York law, requires the prosecution to show that the defendant knew that pornography could be found in such files. Furthermore the court held that merely viewing web pages with child pornography under New York law does not constitute either possession or procurement of child pornography.

James D. Kent was convicted on two counts of procurement of child pornography and 134 counts of possession. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions as to two counts. These two counts refer to a web site, entitled “School Backyard” found in the cache on his computer. While the presence of the site in the computer’s cache indicates that Kent viewed the site there is no evidence that he “downloaded, saved, printed or otherwise manipulated or controlled the image while it was on his screen.”

New York law requires that both procurement and possession require possession and control of the pornography. But in relation to the “School Backyard” website, where there was no evidence that Kent knew the site was being kept in his cache and where, unlike in the other 134 counts he did not save the photographs it cannot be said that he possessed or controlled the photographs.

The court pointed out that unlike New York law Federal law makes it illegal to “knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view” child pornography. It does not require possession or control of the photographs or the website. It merely requires accessing photographs or web pages with the intent to view them. As a result if Kent had been tried in Federal court Kent could have been convicted on the two counts and the court suggested that New York could amend its laws to adopt the Federal language.

While the court remanded Kent’s case for resentencing it is doubtful that he will benefit from the the reversal on the two counts. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent indeterminate prison terms of one to three years. Thus, unless the trial court has a change of heart he is likely to get the same one to three year sentence.

The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Michael J. Brown on sexual assault charges over claims that the admission of of a DNA report processed by a subcontractor laboratory to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) through the testimony of a forensic biologist from OCME violated the right of confrontation as discussed in Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts.

At trial there was evidence that the defendant followed a nine year old girl into the apartment house of a friend in Queens and sexually assaulted her in 1993. She was unable to identify him. In 2002 OCME submitted the rape kit to a private licensed laboratory, Bode. It matched the DNA of Brown who had been arrested on unrelated charges in Maryland. An analyst from OCME then compared the two samples. At trial she introduced several reports and graphs developed by Bode in its comparison of the DNA.

The Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz ruled that affidavits prepared by a forensic chemist were testimonial under Crawford. Citing Crawford, Melendez-Diaz stated

“Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent–that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements … contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”

The Court in Melendez-Diaz had little trouble finding that the chemist’s affidavits were testimonial and that their admission violated the Confrontation Clause.

The New York Court of Appeals attempts to differentiate the DNA reports from the chemist’s reports in Melendez-Diaz by saying that the chemist in Melendez-Diaz drew the conclusion that the item tested was cocaine while the reports in Brown did not draw any conclusions. It was the analyst from OCME who testified who drew the conclusions that Brown’s DNA matched that taken from the victim. But the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz rejected the respondent’s claim that the chemist’s personal appearance was not necessary because it was the “result of neutral, scientific testing.” The New York Court is making the same claim and it should not hold up under the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz.

The affidavits in Melendez-Diaz are under oath whereas the reports in Brown are not under oath. Some might argue that this makes the Brown reports less testimonial. But it also makes them less reliable and more in need of cross examination. Furthermore they were made for the purpose of litigation and in expectation that they would be introduced into evidence. As such their testimonial nature should not be questioned.

The Supreme Court reversed a New York Court of Appeals decision finding that a state statute (Correction Law Section 24) preventing state trial courts from hearing state and federal law suits brought against correction officers unconstitutional.

42 USC 1983 is a Reconstruction era law allowing plaintiffs to sue state officers who violate the civil rights of individual under color of law. In recent years it has been used frequently to sue corrections officers for violations of inmate’s civil rights. Under long standing law plaintiffs can raise 1983 issues in either Federal or State Courts.

The New York legislature made a finding that most suit against correction officers were frivolous or vexatious. Therefore it passed a law denying jurisdiction to its trial courts for suits brought by inmates against correction officers, whether it be based on Federal or State grounds.

Under Correction Law Section 24 state courts could continue to hear 1983 litigation brought against anyone who is not a corrections officer.

The State alleged that Correction Law Section 24 came under “neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts” exception to the requirement that state courts hear 1983 litigation. Such exceptions to the rule have long been recognized. The New York Court of Appeals found that since Correction Law Section 24 prohibited trial courts from hearing both state and Federal monetary actions against corrections officers it was neutral and therefore appropriate under the neutral state rule exception.

The Supreme Court, in Haywood v. Drown, et al.,found that Correction Law Section 24 violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. It ruled that while neutral jurisdictional rules can forbid a state court from hearing 1983 litigation, the rules cannot be content based. For example a court can refuse to hear a 1983 matter if its rules of venue prevent it from hearing the case but it cannot refuse to hear a case such as Haywood solely because the state has decided that it disagrees with the Federal government decision to hold liable a particular group of defendants or because the Federal rule governs a particular type of behavior.

The Supreme Court held that Correction Law Section 24 allowed the state to effectively modify the Federal statute and therefore it violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.