Despite a recent order by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that Jared Lee Loughner, who is accused of killing six people and shooting another fourteen including Congress member, Gabrielle Giffords, not be forced to take psychiatric medication pending a Ninth Circuit hearing on the matter next month, doctors at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri where Lorghner is housed by the Bureau of Prisons have begun medicating him again. According to the doctors he is suicidal and a danger to himself without the medication.

The order issued prior to the recommencement of forced medication said that there was no evidence that Loughner was a danger to himself or others. If he is now suicidal it may be a sufficient change in circumstances to allow forced medication. The Ninth Circuit, Friday denied an emergency request to enforce the preliminary injunction forbidding forced medication and suggested that any motion to forbid the current medication be made in the District Court. According to documents filed with the court Loughner asked a psychiatrist to kill him. He paced in circles in his cell, screamed loudly, cried for hours at a time and claimed to hear messages from a radio.

Loughner, who has been diagnosed as being schizophrenic and who is on suicide watch denies being suicidal.

Walter Bagdasarian made two comments prior to the 2008 election on an internet chat page. He said “Re: Obama fk the niggar, he will have a 50 cal in the head soon” and “shoot the nig.” He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3) with making a threat to kill or do bodily injury to a major candidate for president. ¹

The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction finding that neither of the statements were threats within the meaning of the law. Threats are a particularly difficult area of the law. As speech they are protected by the First Amendment. But the Supreme Court has ruled that “True Threats” are not protected by the First Amendment. A “true threat” is one in which the “speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Thus the constitution requires that a conviction for any threat case be based upon subjective evidence as to the intent of the defendant. Some statutes including 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3) also require objective evidence that “the statement would be understood by people hearing or reading it in context as a serious expression of an intent to kill or injure a major candidate for President.”

Neither of Bagdasariian’s statements indicate that he was going to kill Obama. In one he says that Obama will be killed soon and in the other he is asking other people to kill Obama. Therefore there is no evidence that he subjectively planned to kill Obama. Nor would someone reading his internet message assume that he was going to kill Obama.

Jared Lee Loughner is charged with the attempted murder of Congress member Gabrielle Giffords. Six people were killed and 13 were injured during a political rally in Tucson, Arizona on January 8, 2011.

A district court judge found him incompetent to stand trial. This does not mean that he is insane or not guilty by reason of insanity. Rather it means that he cannot help his lawyer or that he does not understand the legal process sufficiently to make decisions regarding his defense.

After the district court’s decision the Bureau of Prisons housed him at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. The purpose of sending him to the Medical Center was to make him competent to stand trial. Doctors at the Medical Center ordered that he be given psychotropic drugs. He refused to take them and the Medical Center attempted to force them on him. His lawyers moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Medical Center from involuntarily medicating him. The District Court refused to grant the injunction. He appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction one must show that he/she is likely to succeed on the merits, that the failure to grant the preliminary examination could result in irreparable harm and that the balance of the equities support the granting of the preliminary injunction. Since Loughner has not been convicted he is presumed innocent and has greater civil rights than one who has been convicted. Forced medication may cause significant and irreversible side affects including death. While the government has strong reasons for wanting to return Loughner to competency the equities favor Loughner. The length of the injunction will be short and he has a strong interest in controlling what drugs are injected into his body. As a result the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and granted the temporary injunction. It set the case for an expedited hearing on August 29 to determine the issue of forced medication on the merits.

At 13 years old the respondent, in a Supreme Court case, began sexually assaulting a ten year old boy on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana. The assaults continued for two years. In 2005 the respondent admitted to juvenile delinquency allegations in Federal Court. He was sentenced to two years of juvenile detention followed by juvenile supervision until his 21st birthday with the first six months of the supervision served in a prerelease center.

In 2006 Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) which requires sex offenders to register wherever they live, work or go to school. The attorney general determined that SORNA retroactively applied to convictions occurring prior to SORNA’s enactment.

In 2007 the respondent was found to be in violation of his prerelease conditions and he was sentenced to an additional six months and required to register as a sex offender at least until his 21st birthday.

He appealed the registration requirement. By the time the Ninth Circuit ruled on the appeal he was 22 years old. The Ninth Circuit ruled that “that applying SORNA to juvenile delinquents who committed their offenses before SORNA’s passage violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.”

The Supreme Court reversed, finding that at the time the Ninth Circuit ruled, the issue was moot. An issue is moot on appeal unless there is “an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’ In most criminal cases at the time of the appeal the defendant is either incarcerated, on parole or on probation–all of which are considered “actual injuries.” In the present case there were two possible injuries. One was the confinement and supervision but that terminated prior to the Ninth Circuit decision and the other was the registration required which terminated at his 21st birthday. ¹ Thus the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling. The only real effect of the reversal is that the Ninth Circuit decision does not serve as a precedent for future cases. ²

The Supreme Court affirmed a decision of a special three judge district court finding that California State prisons are overcrowded to the point where they violate the Eighth amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment in that they are unable to provide decent medical and psychiatric care to inmates. Furthermore, the Court upheld the appellate decision requiring the state of California to release approximately 40,000 inmates in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) set the procedure for challenging prisons overcrowding on Eighth Amendment grounds. It required a special three judge panel be appointed prior to the release of any prisoners for an Eighth Amendment violation. It required that any order releasing inmates be narrowly tailored to release only those inmates necessary to comply with the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, inmates can only be released after the District Court has issued a less intrusive order requiring the state to take steps to comply with the Eighth Amendment and the initial order failed to obtain compliance with the Eighth Amendment.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals combined two district court cases challenging overcrowded state prisons. In Coleman v. Brown the District Court found that prisoners with serious mental health problems failed to receive treatment complying with the Eighth Amendment and California v. Plata involved the failure to provide timely and sufficient medical treatment in the prisons.

The three judge panel ruled that the prisons have two years to reduce inmate levels from twice the design capacity to 137 per cent of capacity. The prisons were designed to hold 80,000 inmates but at the time of the three judge panel decision were holdin 156,000 inmates.

As a result of overcrowding the suicide rate for California inmate is 80 percent about the national prison average. Psychiatric prisoners are often kept in a box, the size of a telephone booth, while awaiting treatment. Prisoners often go months and even years waiting to see a specialist. One patient died after seventeen months without treatment for testicular cancer. Insufficient space and the lack of cleanliness lead to the spread of contagious diseases in prison hospitals. The prisons have been unable to fill even the limited number of medical positions authorized by the legislatures. Doctors often resign after being unable to sufficiently treat inmates.

The PLRA requires that prior to an order releasing prisoners

“(i) a court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied through the prisoner release order; and

“(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court orders.

“(B) In any civil action in Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court in accordance with section 2284 of title 28, if the requirements of subparagraph (E) have been met.

“(C) A party seeking a prisoner release order in Federal court shall file with any request for such relief, a request for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to demonstrate that the requirements of subparagraph (A) have been met.

“(D) If the requirements under subparagraph (A) have been met, a Federal judge before whom a civil action with respect to prison conditions is pending who believes that a prison release order should be considered may sua sponte request the convening of a three-judge court to determine whether a prisoner release order should be entered.

“(E) The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that —

“(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right; and

“(ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.

The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy in a 5 to 4 decision agreed with the District Dourt panel that the lack of care violated the Eight Amendment. The District Court gave the state two years to reduce the number of inmates to 137 percent of design capacity. ¹ Part of the reduction can be accomplished by constructing new prisons or housing inmates out of the state but the court found that the state did not have the ability to sufficiently reduce the number of prisoners without releasing some of the prisoners prior to the completion of their term. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly took into consideration, as required by the PLRA, the public safety needs of the state and that reducing the number of prisoners can be accomplished without unnecessarily affecting the public safety.

Dissents written by Justices Scalia and Alito which were joined by Justices Roberts and Thomas objected to the Federal Courts ordering the state to reduce its prison population. They felt that the problem was a state problem and that the state should handle it. They stated that less intrusive means were available to deal with the problem and they worried about the public safety problems that may be incurred.

Douglas Miller was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to thirty years to life. Under Oregon law he applied for early parole after twenty years. It was denied and he filed a habeas in Federal court after exhausting his state court remedies. The Ninth Circuit denied his appeal.

Following Ninth Circuit precedent it ruled that there is no Federal due process right to parole but that the Federal constitution guarantees that states will follow state derived due process rights. Thus the first question is whether Oregon law guarantees the right to early consideration of parole. Comparing the Oregon law to the laws of California, Montana, and Idaho where the Ninth Circuit has previously found a right to parole, it found that Oregon guarantees a liberty right to parole.

Under Oregon law any inmate with an indeterminate sentence can apply after spending twenty years for early parole. But first the inmate must show by the preponderance of the evidence that he/she is likely to bee rehabilitated within a reasonable amount of time. The State of Oregon argued that by putting the burden on the inmate the state denied early parole as a matter of right. But the Ninth Circuit found that in Oregon. like Montana, Idaho, and California, an inmate has a liberty right to parole if certain precursors are met. In the case of Oregon the precursor is that the inmate is rehabilitatable within a reasonable amount of time.

But the Ninth Circuit upheld the Oregon decision not to grant parole. Miller argued, following Ninth Circuit precedent that the Oregon decision is not supported by “some evidence.” However the Ninth Circuit decision holding that “some evidence” is necessary has been reversed by the Supreme Court which held that it is only necessary for the state to show that it complied with procedural due process. In Swarthout v. Cooke the Supreme Court held that it was only necessary to show that the inmate had a fair hearing and there was no evidence that Miller did not have a fair hearing. As a result the parole denial was upheld.

The Department of Justice is urging the Supreme Court to take up the Fourth Amendment issue of Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Various courts have ruled on the constitutionality of the use of GPS without getting a warrant and rulings have come down on both sides of the issue,

The Ninth and the Seventh Circuits have ruled it constitutional while the D. C. Circuit found it unconstitutional. Courts in New York, Massachusetts, Washington and Delaware have found it unconstitutional while courts in Ohio and Virginia have approved of the practice.

The Justice Department is challenging a D. C. Circuit opinion that overturned the conviction of Antoine Jones on cocaine trafficking charges after GPS evidence played a mayor role in his conviction. The DOJ argues that since law enforcement officers could have followed Jones as he traveled on the public roads he could not have had a legitimate expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment only applies to individuals who have an expectation of privacy that is recognized by society.

However his attorneys argue that using a GPS device on Jones’ Jeep Cherokee for over a month and reporting his whereabouts every seven seconds was a tremendous invasion of his privacy and is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

The Courts that have upheld warrantless GPS searches have cited the 1983 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Knotts in which the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man in a methamphetamine case after the wholesaler of necessary chemicals placed a beeper in a barrel of chemicals. The barrel was placed in a codefendant’s vehicle and followed by agents to the suspect’s residence.

Knotts has been cited by the courts in upholding warrantless GPS decisions. Most of the Courts have said that if it was constitutional to follow a car with a beeper, it is constitutional to keep track of a vehicle with a GPS deviced placed under the car’s carriage while it is either parked on the street or in the defendant’s driveway.

But while the lower courts do not have the power to reconsider Knotts the Supreme Court does. It is a decision that may have had some validity 30 years ago but with the technological advances in the last 30 years allowing greater and greater invasions into citizen’s privacy it is time for the Supreme Court to reconsider the decision.

In Gant v, Arizona the Supreme Court ruled that without probable cause to search a vehicle an automobile could not be searched in a search incident to a legal arrest once police removed the occupants from the car.

Yesterday the Ninth Circuit upheld the search of a vehicle and of folded up money found in the car based upon probable cause. Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputy Jeffey Dokie stopped a car driven by Sandra Vera for having an expired registration, There were two passengers in the car, Michael Smith and Shawn Ewing. Smith was on parole. After finding out that Smith was on parole Doke noticed folded up currency in the weatherstripping of the right front door. Ewing was acting nervous and he talked fast indicating that he was on drugs. Doke thought that the attempt to hide the money was indicative of a drug courier. Doke decided to search the car and he seized and unfolded the currency. Upon examination he determined that the money was counterfeit. Ewing admitted to manufacturing the money.

After he was arrested he moved to suppress the money. Specifically he wanted to suppress the officer’s observations after he unfolded the money. The court found that while he did not have a privacy interest in the vehicle and therefore could not move to suppress evidence found in the car, he did have a privacy interest in the money and therefore had standing to move to suppress the money. He argued that while the officer may have had probable cause to search the vehicle, the unfolding of the money was a separate search requiring a separate finding of probable cause.

However the court found that Ewing’s nervousness, the attempt to hide the money, and Ewing’s apparent drug intoxication gave the officer probable cause to search the vehicle. Since the money was the subject of the search, probable cause to search the vehicle included probable cause to unfold the money and search it. A separate finding of probable cause was not needed and therefore the trial court was correct in refusing to suppress the evidence.

The Supreme Court reversed another Ninth Circuit grant of habeas corpus. In Cullen v. Pinholster the Supreme Court not only denied Pinholster’s writ of habeas corpus but it also severely limited the type of evidence a Federal Court can consider in habeas corpus proceedings reviewing the denial of habeas corpus by state courts.

The Court ruled that in reviewing state court actions Federal courts can only consider the evidence heard by the state court.

Pinholster was convicted of first degree murder in California and sentenced to death. In the penalty phase of his trial his attorneys called only his mother as a witness who testified about his troubled childhood. His lawyers consulted with a psychiatrist but decided not to call him when he said that Pinholster was not psychotic.

On habeas he argued incompetency of counsel due to his lawyer’s failure to follow-up on the psychiatric report. It was denied by the state courts including the California Supreme Court.

According to the Supreme Court the job of a Federal Court reviewing a state court action is not to seek the truth. Rather it is to guarantee the petitioner received due process in the state courts. Specifically if the state court decided the issue on the merits, Federal courts are limited to reversing the state court action if it:

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

Furthermore, since the goal is to insure that the court below used used the proper process to rule on the merits the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Courts are limited to considering the evidence that was presented to the State Courts. Pinholster presented additional experts and evidence of trial counsel’s incompetence to the Federal Courts but the Supreme Court ruled that this evidence was inadmissible since it was not presented to the state courts.

One difference between appeals and writs of habeas corpus is that appeals cover matters that happened in the courtroom. Thus since there is a court reporter’s transcript of the matter there is no reason to allow evidence on appeal. The questions on appeal are legal questions. They are settled by consideration of brief written generally by attorneys giving legal reasons that errors were made in a trial court.

On the other hand writs of habeas corpus generally consider matters, such as incompetence of counsel that may not be evident from the transcripts and are settled by judges after hearing evidence. Thus to ask a trial court (eg. the Federal District Courts) to rule on a habeas without taking evidence is an anomaly and is contrary to the way the common law system operates.

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) prevents governmental bodies from placing a substantial burden on an individual’s religious activity by its land use policy or in institutions including jails and pretrial detention centers built with Federal money.

The statute reads in pertinent part:

(1) GENERAL RULE- No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution–
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Souhair Khatib and her husband plead guilty to misdemeanor welfare fraud in Orange County, California. They were sentenced to three years probation and thirty days of community service. As the period to complete the community service was ending, they went back to court to request an extension of time. For an unstated reason the judge was angry and revoked their probation. They were immediately incarcerated in the Santa Ana Courthouse’s holding facility. Khatib, a practicing Muslim, was forced to remove her hijab. This caused her considerable anxiety, aggravation, and embarrassment. Later in the day the judge called Khatib back into the courtroom, reinstated her probation and extended the time to complete the community service.

She sued in Federal Court. Orange County moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the holding facility was not an institution under the RLUIPA. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The three judge appellate panel upheld the dismissal but an en banc decision unanimously reinstated the matter.

The court held that the holding facility was both a pretrial detention center and a jail. Since neither “pretrial detention center” or “jail” is defined in the statute the Court looked to the ordinary and common meanings of the terms. The court held that pretrial detention is simply the “holding of a defendant before trial on criminal charges.” Since the holding facility confines people waiting for court appearance and for trial it meets the definition. The court quotes Webster’s as defining a jail as a “building for the confinement of persons held in lawful custody (as for minor offenses or some future judicial proceeding).” Orange County describes the holding facility as a “secure detention facility . . . for the confinement of persons solely for the purpose of a court appearance.” Using this description there is no question that the facility is a jail.

Finding that the facility is an institution under the RLUIPA the Ninth Circuit remanded the matter to the District Court with orders to reinstate the action. But the next question for the court will be does prohibiting the wearing of the hijab promote a compelling government interest. Among the issues will be does the hijab create a security problem? Can it be used in an assault or a suicide attempt? But we can note that both Federal and state prisons allow women to wear hijabs. The county will argue that the temporary nature confinement in the holding facility creates problems not found in prisons.