The California Supreme court ruled in People vs McKee that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP) is subject to an equal protection challenge.

Proposition 83, also known as Jessica’s Law,passed by California voters, changed the SVP from a civil commitment that had to be renewed every two years, only if the government proved by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard that a person met the SVP requirements, to an indefinite commitment where the committed person must prove that he/she does not meet the standards by a preponderance of the evidence standard.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with an order to hold a hearing, using a strict scrutiny standard, to determine if the SVP violates equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires equal treatment for people equally situated. This does not mean all people must be treated equally. But it does mean that people who are similar circumstances, as to relevant criteria must be treated equally. In this case the California Supreme Court determined that those alleged to be sexually violent predators are similarly situated with those alleged to be mentally disordered offenders (MDO) and those found to be not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). All three groups involve people who committed violent felonies as a result of mental illness. While the predicate felonies for each of the categories is somewhat different, they all involve violent offenses and they are all determined to be a danger to society.

But unlike the MDO and NGI, the SVP ia given an indeterminate sentence and is not given a jury trial, after the initial determination, where the jury must find that the people have proven their case by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The MDO is give a one year commitment. After the initial commitment the SVG has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard. The NGI’s term is limited to the maximum for the alleged crime.

On remand the people must attempt to show that there is a reasonable distinction between those who come under the SVP and those who are either MDO or NGI and that as a result of that distinction indefinite commitments and putting the burden of proof on the person committed is reasonable. If they cannot do that, pending any changes the legislature wants to make in the law those alleged to be sexually violent predators will be dealt with in the same manner as mentally disordered offenders.

The Supreme Court reversed a finding of incompetence of counsel (IOC) made by the Ninth Circuit in Knowles, Warden v. Mirzayance. Mirzayance was convicted of first degree murder of his 19 year old cousin. Under California law the trial was bifurcated. During the first part of the trial the jury found Mirzayance guilty of murder. At the beginning of the second phase Mirzayance, on the advice of counsel, waived his right to a trial on whether he was not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). The issue on habeas was whether his trial attorney was incompetent when he advised Mirzayance to waive the NGI defense.

Counsel’s plan at trial was to convince the jury that due to his mental condition, Mirzayance could not form the intent to murder his cousin and therefore he was guilty of only second degree murder. When the jury rejected the mental health evidence and found Mirzayance guilty of first degree murder, his lawyer felt that any NGI defense was futile and urged him to waive his right to a trial on the NGI defense.

The lead Supreme Court decision on incompetence of counsel is Strickland. Under Strickland, in order to reverse a conviction the court must find on habeas that the attorney did not perform as reasonably competent counsel would act and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Ninth Circuit instead of applying Strickland found that counsel was incompetent in that there was no strategic reason for surrendering the only possible defense which could help Mirzayance. After all, he had already been convicted of first degree murder and there was no downside to going ahead with the NGI phase of the trial. The chances of winning might not have been great but there was nothing to lose.

On habeas the Federal courts will not intervene unless the state court decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. Here it was not the state court but rather the Ninth Circuit that misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent.

Assuming that the Supreme Court is correct and that the trial counsel’s performance failed to meet the Strickland standard in that it did not show that counsel either failed to perform as a reasonably competent attorney would perform or that Mirzayance was prejudiced since the jury rejected the mental health evidence the first time around.

Regardless of whether or not counsel met the Strickland
standard, counsel acted poorly. When you have only one defense and you have nothing to lose, particularly in a first degree murder case, you must go with it. Besides surrendering the only chance your client has to prevent a life sentence, the failure to use the defense, can only result in a habeas, a civil trial for IOC and considerable bad will. Any reasonable attorney would use the Ninth Circuit’s “nothing to lose” standard. But the Supreme Court, at least in this case is not willing to accept it.