Wesley Lanham and Shawn Freeman were corrections officers at the Grant County, Kentucky, Detention Center on February 14, 2003 when a deputy brought “J. S” into the jail on a traffic charge. “J. S.” was 18 years old, six foot tall and weighed 125 pounds. He has blond highlights in his hair and on that Valentines Day holiday he wore a bright colored shirt and underwear with red hearts.

Sergeant Shawn Sydnor the supervising officer on duty at the jail told “J. S.” that he was cute and that he would make a good girlfriend for an inmate. He told Lanham and Freeman that “J. S.” needed to be scared. While pretrial arrestees were generally kept in the detox cells Sydnor asked Lanham and Freeman to find a cell in general population with convicted criminal serving their terms for “J. S.” Lanham found him a place in Cell 101 in 26 Hall. Twenty-six Hall was notorious for being a very rough place and for numerous incidents of sexual predatory behavior. Prior to placing “J. S.” in cell 101 Lanham and Freemen went tp the cell and spoke with Bobby Wright. Lanham told Wright that they wanted the inmates to f-ck with “J. S.” Lanham and Freeman took “J. S.” to the cell and left hem there all night without checking in on him. Victor Zipp an inmate in the cell with a reputation for walking around nude raped “J. S.” and with help from other inmates roughed him up.

The next day Syndor, Lanham and Freeman agreed to report that they had placed “J. S.” in the general population because they needed to decontaminate the detox cells.

“J. S.” was released the next day and two days later his father took him to a doctor who confirmed the rape.

Lanham, Freeman and Sydnor were indicted. Sydnor plead guilty and cooperated with the prosecution. Lanham and Freeman went to trial and were convicted of conspiring to violate “J. S.’” civil rights and making a false report.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. They found that while the judge should have excluded two jurors who could not promise to be impartial the defendants were not prejudiced since they used peremptory challenges to exclude the two. The Court did not find that the lack of two of the defense’s peremptory challenges affected the trial.

The defendants objected to limitations placed on their cross examination of Sydnor. But since they did not complain at trial they were limited to plain error analysis and since various appellate courts are divided on the issue any error is waived under the plain error analysis. “To obtain a conviction for conspiracy to violate civil rights under § 241, the government must prove that defendants knowingly agreed with another person to injure the victim in the exercise of a right guaranteed under the Constitution. . . The government also must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was specific intent to commit the deprivation.” The prosecution met the sufficiency of the evidence test. There was sufficient evidence that Syndor, Lapham and Freeman agreed to place “J. S.” in a cell knowing that he was likely to be abused and raped. To meet the sufficiency of the evidence test ir is only necessary that there be sufficient evidence that any rational trier of the fact could find the elements of the offense. Here there was sufficient evidence of both conspiracy and making a false report. As a result the conviction was upheld.

Glen Marcus was convicted of engaging in unlawful forced labor and sex trafficking between January 1999 and October 2001. The problem is the statute making forced labor and sex trafficking illegal was not enacted until 2000. Therefore much of the evidence at trial concerned acts that were legal at the time they were committed.

Of course someone cannot be convicted for committing a legal act. The Constitution and basic rules of fairness prohibit ex post facto laws which penalize events that happened prior to the passage of a statute making an event illegal. For some reason neither defense counsel nor the judge realized that some of the acts were performed prior to the effective date of the statute. Therefore no instruction was given to the jury informing them of the effective date of the statute.

Marcus’ appellate attorney caught the error and raised the issue before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The problem is that generally you cannot raise an issue that was not raised in the trial court. An exception occurs however for “plain error.” The issue raised before the Second Circuit and before the Supreme Court is how to define “plain error.”

The Second Circuit ruled “if it was possible for the jury—wh[ich] had not been given instructions regarding the date of enactment—to convict exclusively on [the basis of] pre-enactment conduct, then the conviction constitutes a violation” of the Ex Post Facto Clause and must be reversed.

The Supreme Court, while not ruling on the issue of whether “plain error” occurred, returned the case to the Second Circuit finding that its definition of “plain error” was wrong. Citing Puckett v. United States the Supreme Court ruled that a five part test exists to find “plain error:”

(1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The Second Circuit’s “possibility test” fails to meet the third and fourth element. A mere possibility neither affects the outcome of the trial or the fairness of the trial. therefore the Supreme Court returned the case to the Second Circuit for further consideration.

Justice Stevens dissented. He pointed out that Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which mandates the use of the “plain error” test merely states:

A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.

Therefore Justice Stevens believes that the only issue should be whether the use of evidence of events that occurred before the law was enacted and the failure to inform the jury of such violated a substantial right of Glenn Markus and he would reverse the conviction. It makes sense–doesn’t it.

The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the failure of an attorney to object to the government’s disavowal of a plea bargain is subject to the plain error rule.

Normally the failure of a side to object to an error before the trial court forfeits the right to raise the issue on appeal. Under the Plain Error Rule (Section 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) an issue may be raised on appeal even if it was not raised in the trial court under limited conditions. To obtain relief under rule 52(b) one must comply with four prongs. They are 1) there has been an error or defect that has not been waived by the defendant, 2) the error must be clear and obvious, 3) the error must have affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and 4) it can be granted only if the appellate court, using its discretion, finds that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the court.

In Puckett v. United States, at the time the plea was taken, the U. S Attorney agreed that in exchange for a guilty plea in a bank robbery case the government would agree to a three level reduction in the sentencing guidelines for acceptance of responsibility and that Puckett would be sentenced at the bottom of the guideline. But due to the defendant’s health problems three years passed before sentencing. During that time Puckett admitted to further criminal activity. As a result at sentencing, the government refused to agree to the three level reduction and the Court said it would not give the reduction, in any case, because of the intervening criminal behavior.

At sentencing Puckett’s lawyer failed to mention the plea agreement and failed to request that Puckett be allowed to withdraw his plea.

On appeal the Supreme Court found that Puckett met prongs one,two and four of Rule 52(b). But he did not meet prong three: that a substantial right be affected because the the judge was not going to grant the three level reduction regardless of what the U. S. Attorney did.

Well now comes the habeas for incompetence (IOC) of counsel. But see yesterday’s post on IOC. The seven justices in the majority here (Scalia, Roberts, Ginsberg, Breyer, Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy) seem to have decided that Puckett was not prejudiced by the government’s turn around and that means trouble under Strickland.