Friday, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the conviction Reginald Ellison, Sr. on various drug charges. The only question on appeal was the sufficiency of the nexus between the residence that was the subject of a search warrant and crime.

Neither a search warrant or the affidavit supporting a search warrant must name an individual suspected of committing a crime. The warrant need only name a place to be searched. The affidavit must show probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found at the place. In order to show probable cause, inter alia, it must show a nexus between the place to be searched and a crime. It is certainly possible that a search warrant is issued and a search is performed where a significant amount of contraband is seized but no one is found in possession of the contraband and no one is arrested.

In Ellison an informant ¹ tells a government agent that he/she saw “Short” ² exit the house, make a sale of drugs to “Red,” and return to the house.

This was an easy case for both the trial court and the Sixth Circuit. Certainly if “Short” came out the residence and returned to the residence after the sale it is likely that more drugs will be found in the residence. It is also likely that the money “Short” received for the sale of the drugs will be found in the residence. This creates a sufficient nexus between the residence and a crime to obtain a search warrant.

Prior to obtaining the search warrant the police determined that the utilities were in Ellison’s name. Presumably once in the residence they found evidence that Ellison was involved in the crime and arrested him. ³

Stiven F. Polanco was convicted in the District Court for Rhode Island of various heroin and weapons charges. He appealed alleging inter alia ¹violations of the Fourth Amendment.

David Contreras made a number of heroin sales to an undercover agent. ² Each sale occurred as the same mall in Providence. Polanco was present at the sales and drove Contreras to the mall in Polanco’s red Toyota Camry.

Finally the task force decided to arrest them but it was afraid to do so at the mall since someone might get hurt. The agents moved the plans for the final sale to a parking lot in Warwick. They arrested and searched Contreras and Polanco, but they did not find anything. Then they searched the vehicle, finding a hidden compartment with heroin and a gun.

After they were indicted Polanco challenged the search, citing Gant v. Arizona. One of the exceptions to the Warrant requirement is for searches performed incident to a lawful arrest. In Gant the Supreme Court limited the exception where an automobile is searched to searches where the arrestees have access to the vehicle and can destroy evidence or where it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” But what Polanco ignored was that the search was not justified by the search incident to a legal arrest exception to the search warrant requirement. Rather it was justified by another exception. Under the automobile exception, an automobile can be searched anytime there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle. ³ Since automobiles are mobile the courts feel that it is not reasonable to make law enforcement officers get a warrant while the car may be driven away.

The appellate court had no problem finding that the agents had more than sufficient evidence for a finding of probable cause to search the vehicle. Not only was Polanco present at the time of the sales, but his car was used. Contreras and Polanco made numerous calls to each other around the time that Contreras was arranging each sale. An expert testified that someone who was not involved in the sale would probably not be allowed to be present and that after the sale Contreras and Polanco appeared to examine an unknown item together. This, according to the First Circuit Court of Appeals easily provided probable cause.

The California Supreme Court in People v. Diaz upheld the delayed search of a cell phone seized at the time of an individual’s arrest. The Court found that the search of text messages and other information found on a phone can be searched pursuant to the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant clause.

Citing United States Supreme Court precedent, the state supreme court distinguished between property that is immediately associated with the arrestee’s person which can be searched in a delayed search and other property seized in an search pursuant to a legal arrest which must be searched immediately. Finding that a cell phone is immediately associated with a person’s body the court upheld the search. ¹

But Justice Werdegar, in dissent, points out that we must review and reinterpret old Supreme Court cases in light of modern technology. After all the cases cited by the majority all preceded the invention of cell phones and other hand held computers. These devices, unlike the defendant’s clothing, preserve tremendous amounts of personal data and are extremely private. While individuals being arrested may expect their clothing to be searched after it is seized as part of their arrest, few expected text messages from their spouse or confidential messages from clients or business partners to be searched.

Furthermore, as the Supreme Court stated in Gant the purpose of the arrest pursuant to a legal arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause is to protect officers from possible dangerous or lethal weapons and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Information on a cell phone or a PDA can neither injure an officer of be destroyed once the defendant is in custody. ² To sacrifice the basic reasons for the Fourth Amendment, our privacy from unreasonable governmental searches in exchange for government snooping that will neither protect law enforcement officers or prevent the destruction of evidence is unnecessary and unreasonable. It is not too much to ask that officers get a search warrant before searching modern cell phones once the phone is in police custody.

Conservation Officer Jeremy King cited Dale Thurman for illegally baiting deer on property that his father owns. The property had a two story house on it with the address 1025 Zeller Avenue and a mobile home with the address 1035 Zeller Avenue. Thurman told King that he lived in the mobile home. After being cited Thurman asked King if he could use pistols to hunt deer. King told him he could. Thurman said he had pistols and pointed towards the two story house. King later learned that Thurman was a convicted felon and could not legally possess the pistols. He got a warrant for “1035″ Zeller, which the affidavit wrongly claimed was the two story house. In the affidavit it said that Thurman possessed “1035″ Zeller without giving any basis for the statement.

At trial and on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Thurman argued that the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue a warrant for 1025 Zeller.

Of course the question is not whether Thurman lived at 1025 Zeller ¹ Rather the question is whether the affidavit exhibited probable cause to search 1025 Zeller. The Eighth Circuit said it did. Thurman’s pointing to 1025 Zeller when he told King that he had pistols apparently was sufficient cause to search the residence.

Thurman also argued that the affidavit did not particularly describe the place to be searched, a basic requirement under the Fourth Amendment. It described the residence as “the two story framed residential dwelling and outbuildings of 1035 Zeller Ave. located approximately one & two thirds mile north of Hwy. 96 on Zeller Avenue”. The Court found that even though the actual address was 1025 Zeller, the description provided sufficient guidance to the searching officers that they knew which residence to search and therefore it met the Constitutional requirements.

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In an editorial last week, The New York Times urged Congress to pass a law limiting border searches of computers to cases where agents have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity and requiring probable cause and a judicially signed warrant to hold a computer more than 24 hours. Under current law any agent checking luggage or carry-on baggage at a border can indiscriminately search and detain a computer. A supervisor’s permission is only needed if it a laptop, smart phone, or similar device is held for over five days.

The New York Times points out that laptops are depositories of our most private information. But the issue goes much deeper. There are two primary reasons for border searches: 1) to enforce customs laws and 2) to prevent terrorist acts. Historically the purpose of border searches was to enforce tariffs and customs laws. But recently it has become necessary to prevent the importation of bombs and other weapons of terrorism. Certainly it is reasonable, under the Fourth Amendment. to perform searches to prevent acts, such as the attempt to import a bomb into Detroit. as was attempted by a Nigerian terrorist last year on Christmas. But searches of computer hard drives and memory sticks cannot produce either bombs or items for which tariffs are due. There is a significant difference between a search of a physical item such as an automobile or a suitcase and the search of an electronic memory. Physical items can be used as terrorist weapons or may have tariffs due on them but electronic items such as the memory on a computer cannot be used as a weapon and are not taxed. Few would object to the opening of a CPU to determine if a bomb or other contraband is hidden inside but this does not necessitate the search of the hard drive.

There is no need to detain hard drives or to search them. To detain them and search them, without cause, not only invades an individual’s privacy but may have a significant detrimental effect on the person’s business, schooling, or personal life.

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Antoine Jones’ conviction for distribution of cocaine and cocaine base due to Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking of Jones’ vehicle without a search warrant.

Jones’ conviction was based, in part, on the use of a GPS tracking device which was attached to his vehicle for four weeks. The Court found that the failure to have a valid search warrant ¹for the use of the GPS device, violated Jones’ legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore the Fourth Amendment.

In order to find that GPS devices require a search warrant the Court had to distinguish the use of GPS devices from the use of beepers in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Knotts. In Knotts the Supreme Court ruled that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” In Knotts a manufacturer of chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine alerted the police of suspicious sales. The manufacturer then at the urging of the police planted a beeper in a five-gallon container of chemicals purchased by Tristan Armstrong. The police monitored the progress of the car carrying the beeper, to Knott’s Wisconsin cabin. The Supreme Court found that since Armstrong’s vehicle could have been followed on the public streets by a police car the use of a beeper to assist the police did not violate the driver’s legitimate expectation of privacy.

The Circuit Court distinguished the use of GPS on Jones vehicle from the use of the beeper on Armstrong’s vehicle by the fact that the use of the GPS lasted around the clock for four weeks while the beeper was only monitored during a short ride from Minneapolis to the cabin in Wisconsin. But just as the police could have followed Armstrong’s vehicle on the public streets they could have followed Jone’s vehicle. The Circuit Court pointed out that it would be much more difficult to follow a vehicle for four weeks and that during a prolonged period one learns significant private details about a person’s life that one does not learn during a short trip. Also the Supreme Court in Knotts specifically did not decide what would happen in technological advances allow long term trailing of a vehicle.

However, I find it difficult to accept the supposition that a short term trailing of a vehicle is not a violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy and a longer term trailing is a violation. With the increased use of GPS the issue may well appear before the Supreme Court. The Circuits have split. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, relying on Knotts, have found the use of GPS to not be a search. The Supreme Court has several options. It can find Knotts to be decisive or at least persuasive and therefore find that the use of GPS is not a “search” and therefore a search warrant is not necessary. It can accept the D. C. Circuit’s distinction based upon the length of the search or it can reverse Knotts.

A unique option would be to find the search illegal under state law and rule that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded. The placing of the GPS device on the vehicle was clearly a trespass and trailing the vehicle for four weeks is stalking. But the Supreme Court has never excluded evidence based upon a violation of state law.

The State of New York Court of Appeals strictly limited “all persons-present” warrants in People v. Mothersell. All persons-present warrants are used in New York to search individuals present at the scene of a search being conducted pursuant to a search warrant.

The search warrant authorizes the search of a particular building and allows the searching agency to search all people present at the time of the search. The police used an informant to make two controlled buys from a residence. In one case the informant bought from “Tom” and in the other case from an unnamed man. Then the police got a search warrant for the residence and all persons present at the time of the search. The affidavit said that it was likely that all people in the residence were involved in drug transactions.

While the Court of Appeals said that in some circumstances such a warrant might be good, the affidavit in support of such a warrant would have to provide probable cause to believe that each person in the house would be in possession of contraband and that was not done here. Factors that might lead to a legitimate all persons-present warrant would include “the nature of the illegal activity believed to be conducted at the location, the number and behavior of the persons present at the time of day or night when the sought warrant was proposed to be executed, and whether persons unconnected with the illicit activity had been observed at the premises.” Here the warrant was insufficiently detailed to provide probable cause that each person in the residence was in possession of narcotics. It only said that two sales had been made at the residence. It did not indicate who else might be presence or how the building was used. The mere fact that the affiant did not know the names of the narcotics traffickers did not provide probable cause to search each person in the building. In some cases the building might be used as a shooting gallery or as a warehouse for keeping drugs. In those cases an all persons-present warrant may be acceptable. But here there was no evidence of that.

Not only was Mothersell searched despite the fact that the affidavit provided no factual reason to believe that there was probable cause to search him but he was strip searched and narcotics were found in his anus. The Court found that a strip search was particularly invasive and in order to perform one there must be not only probable cause to search but probable cause to believe that he was secreting contraband under his clothes. There was no evidence of that in this case. In fact one of the officers testified that as a matter of course in serving all persons-present warrants those present were strip searched regardless of whether probable cause existed to believe that contraband could be found under their clothes.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Generally the exclusionary rule prevents the admission of seized evidence, the seizure of which does not comply with the Fourth Amendment. But the Supreme Court decided in Leon that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment was admissible as long as the officers seizing the evidence acted in good faith.

In United States v. Henderson the Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of child pornography, though the search warrant for the computer failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment. The affidavit supporting the search warrant stated that Special Agent Robert Leazenby received information that a computer with a particular Internet Protocol located at the residence of Harold G. Henderson downloaded and shared two videos each of which had a secure hash algorithm (a digital fingerprint) value associated with child pornography. But the affidavit failed to mention how Leazenby found out this information. Therefore the information was not sufficiently valid to meet Fourth Amendment requirements. But in any case since Leazenby acted in good faith in serving the seach warrant in that the search warrant was not devoid of factual support for the finding of probable cause, the evidence was admissible.

As we all know the government has a policy of wiretapping suspected terrorist group without getting court mandated approval. The wiretapping is super secret. Those who are wiretapped are not told even after the wiretapping is finished. We only know about the policy since George Bush admitted the existence of the wiretaps in 2005. The wiretaps, performed without judicial authority are probably illegal. Does the government stop using such wiretaps because I or numerous experts say it illegal–NO. How do you get the government to stop doing something illegal. Well hopefully they would stop if the court orders them to stop. After all not following a court order would be illegal. Does the government care–probably not. So who will sue the government. One of the fundamental rules of our jurisprudence is that only someone who is injured by an action can sue to stop it. Well certainly those that were wiretapped were damaged by the government’s policy. But the catch 22 is that the names of the victims of the government’s wiretapping are secret and therefore not available to sue the government.

But the government made a mistake. It accidentally released a document showing that the Ashland, Oregon branch of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation was subject to a wiretap. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation was a branch of a Saudi Arabia charity and according to the government a front for Al Qaeda. It is now defunct. It sued the government for damages resulting from the wiretapping. But to continue the Catch 22 the government got an order stating that the document accidentally release can not be used to prove standing. So now the government (with a straight face?) argues that Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation does not have standing even though everyone knows that the document proves that Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation does have standing.

Wednesday in the courtroom of U. S. District Court Judge Vaughn Walker in San Francisco the government argued that the case should be dismissed on the grounds that if the case goes to trial the parties will have to release government secrets in the discovery process and at trial. The state secrets privilege originated during the McCarthy era. Prior to the George W. Bush regime it was primarily used to ban the use of government secrets in a civil trial. But under Bush and Obama it has been expanded to allow the dismissal of entire cases, A bill introduced last year by Senators Kennedy, Leahy, and Spector would have limited the privilege to excluding state secrets from trial. The documents would have been presented to a judge in camara who could have excluded part or all of a document but who could not have dismissed a case because of the admission of a state secret.

During his campaign for president, Barrack Obama said. “warrantless surveillance of American citizens in defiance of (the 1978 law) is unlawful and unconstitutional.” Yet government attorneys argued that the case challenging the warrantless wiretapping of American citizens should be dismissed. Furthermore, also on Wednesday, the Attorney General released policies governing the warrantless wiretapping of American citizens. While the new policies strictly limit the use of wiretaps they continue to violate the law by allowing their use. The new policies are effective October 1 and therefore apparently do not affect the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation suit against the government.

The government is apparently using the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation suit to obtain a ruling that warrantless wiretaps in the name of national security are legal and that will be the precedent to support the new limited government policy allowing the Attorney General to order warrantless wiretaps in the future. Of course there is nothing to prevent the attorney general or his successor from modifying and broadening the policy in the future to allow even greater use of warrantless wiretaps.

As Jon Eisenberg attorney for Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation said, quoting President Obama “where’s the change we can believe in?”

Last week a Federal/State task force raided two Los Angeles area marijuana dispensaries. At first blush it would appear that the Feds were violating the promises made by President Obama during the campaign and later by Attorney General Holder not to interfere with state medical marijuana laws.

While the DEA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Torrance Police Department and Culver City Police Department all took part in the raids, the raids appear to have been directed by State authorities with the feds only helping out. The Los Angeles Police Department applied for the Search Warrant which was granted by a Superior Court judge. This would indicate that the affidavit supporting the search warrant alleges a violation of state law. But no one involved–neither the police department or the DEA are publicly admitting what violation occurred.

The task force raided Organica Collective in Culver City, and the Overland Gardens Collective in West Los Angeles . The clubs are owned by Jeffrey Joseph. His house was also raided and he was arrested. He is now out on bail. They seized 100 pounds of marijuana, 200 live plants, and $100,000 in cash. None of this necessarily indicates anything other than a dispensary which sells marijuana to patients who have the approval of their doctors to legally possess marijuana.

The Organica Collective posted a statement on opposingview,com denying any violation of state law.

The law requires that the police file the search warrant affidavit within ten days of the search and it then becomes public. Therefore it should be filed within the next week and we will know the allegations.