The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed denial of a writ of habeas corpus due to a failure to comply with the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have counsel present at all critical stages of the prosecution after the initiation of the adversarial process. Thus once charges are filed the prosecution cannot deny the defendant the right to have counsel present at significant events in the case. One of those significant event, of course, is the giving of a statement by the defendant. ¹

David Ayers was a security guard for the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority. As part of his compensation and to insure the safety of the residents he was given a low cost apartment in the building. Accompanied by one of the residents he went to the apartment of Dorothy Brown to pick her up after she fell down. The next day her body was found with numerous injuries. Ayers was eventually arrested and indicted.

While he was in custody he was befriended by Donald Hutchinson, a fellow inmate assigned to the same jail pod as Ayers. Hutchinson contacted the inspectors assigned to Ayers’ case and told them that Ayers had admitted to murdering Brown. After the officers apparently hinted ² to Hutchinson that they needed to know what weapon Ayers used and how much money he stole from Brown, Hutchinson returned to the cell and obtained the information from Ayers. He then contacted the officers again and gave them the information.

In the trial court Ayers moved to suppress the statements given to the officers at their second meeting with Hutchinson. The trial court denied the motion but the appellate courts granted the writ of habeas corpus finding that the police use of Hutchinson to “intentionally create a situation likely to induce Ayers to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel” violated the Sixth Amendment.

Here is the problem with jail house snitches. Hutchinson, who was in custody for crimes of moral turpitude involving financial misconduct, gave three different stories on different occasions regarding what he had been told by Ayers. Therefore he is not very trustworthy and the use of his testimony at trial is questionable. Furthermore since the police could not questions Ayers without his attorney present without violating the Sixth Amendment, they should not be allowed to manipulate the situation by either hinting to Hutchinson that he find out the nature of the weapon and the money stolen or by asking him to find out the information.

Wesley Lanham and Shawn Freeman were corrections officers at the Grant County, Kentucky, Detention Center on February 14, 2003 when a deputy brought “J. S” into the jail on a traffic charge. “J. S.” was 18 years old, six foot tall and weighed 125 pounds. He has blond highlights in his hair and on that Valentines Day holiday he wore a bright colored shirt and underwear with red hearts.

Sergeant Shawn Sydnor the supervising officer on duty at the jail told “J. S.” that he was cute and that he would make a good girlfriend for an inmate. He told Lanham and Freeman that “J. S.” needed to be scared. While pretrial arrestees were generally kept in the detox cells Sydnor asked Lanham and Freeman to find a cell in general population with convicted criminal serving their terms for “J. S.” Lanham found him a place in Cell 101 in 26 Hall. Twenty-six Hall was notorious for being a very rough place and for numerous incidents of sexual predatory behavior. Prior to placing “J. S.” in cell 101 Lanham and Freemen went to the cell and spoke with Bobby Wright. Lanham told Wright that they wanted the inmates to f-ck with “J. S.” Lanham and Freeman took “J. S.” to the cell and left hem there all night without checking in on him. Victor Zipp an inmate in the cell with a reputation for walking around nude raped “J. S.” and with help from other inmates roughed him up.

The next day Syndor, Lanham and Freeman agreed to report that they had placed “J. S.” in the general population because they needed to decontaminate the detox cells.

“J. S.” was released the next day and two days later his father took him to a doctor who confirmed the rape.

Lanham, Freeman and Sydnor were indicted. Sydnor plead guilty and cooperated with the prosecution. Lanham and Freeman went to trial and were convicted of conspiring to violate “J. S.’” civil rights and making a false report.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. They found that while the judge should have excluded two jurors who could not promise to be impartial the defendants were not prejudiced since they used peremptory challenges to exclude the two. The Court did not find that the lack of two of the defense’s peremptory challenges affected the trial.

The defendants objected to limitations placed on their cross examination of Sydnor. But since they did not complain at trial they were limited to plain error analysis and since various appellate courts are divided on the issue any error is waived under the plain error analysis. “To obtain a conviction for conspiracy to violate civil rights under § 241, the government must prove that defendants knowingly agreed with another person to injure the victim in the exercise of a right guaranteed under the Constitution. . . The government also must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was specific intent to commit the deprivation.” The prosecution met the sufficiency of the evidence test. There was sufficient evidence that Syndor, Lapham and Freeman agreed to place “J. S.” in a cell knowing that he was likely to be abused and raped. To meet the sufficiency of the evidence test ir is only necessary that there be sufficient evidence that any rational trier of the fact could find the elements of the offense. Here there was sufficient evidence of both conspiracy and making a false report. As a result the conviction was upheld.

The Supreme Court ruled that in order to assert Miranda rights an arrestee must verbally tell the officer that he/she does not want to talk to the officer or that he she wants to maintain silence.

Van Chester Thompkins was charged with murder in a Michigan Court. After his arrest in Ohio two Michigan police officers traveled to Ohio to interrogate him. They spent three hours questioning him but during most of that time he was silent. Towards the end of the interrogation the officers asked him if he prayed to god to forgive him for the murder. He said yes and the answer was used against him at trial after his motion to suppress the answer was denied.

On habeas the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Thompkins did not invoke his Miranda rights and that he waived the right by answering the officer’s question, a position rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals but accepted by the Supreme Court.

Justice Sotomeyer wrote the dissent. She pointed out that in the Supreme Court held that “If [an] individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent” or if he “states that he wants an attorney,” the interrogation “must cease.” It would seem that a two and three quarter hour silence would be an indication that Thompkins wanted to remain silent. In Miranda the Court wrote:

“Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.”

As Sotomeyer points out this seems to be pretty much on point but it was ignored by the majority. As the Court stated in Miranda: “a valid waiver will not be presumed … simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”

Perhaps the most ironic part of the decision is that arrestees must now verbally assert their desire to remain silent. The common Miranda right read to arrestees says that the arrestee has a right to ask for an attorney and the right to remain silent. It says nothing about stating that the arrestee must state that he/she wants to remain silent.

Jerry Flanory was an involuntary resident at Michigan’s Newberry Correctional Facility. The Classification director told him that he had to take a GED class. He told the director that he already had a GED from Sarvis Educational Center and an AA degree from Montcalm Community College. The institution refused to confirm his information. When Flanory refused to go to GED classes he was placed on restriction. As part of his restriction he was not allowed to participate in the Indigent Program. Without participating in the Indigent Program he was unable to buy toothpaste for 337 days. After he was readmitted to the Indigent Program he was diagnosed with a periodontal gum disease and he had to have a tooth extracted.

He sued for a violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court threw out his case for failure to state a cause of action. The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court decision finding that Flanory stated a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment prohibit prison authorities from “unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain by acting with deliberate indifference to inmate’s serious medical needs.” the court had little problem finding that Flanory’s medical needs were serious. It points that he was in considerable pain and that he had to have a tooth extracted.

But Flanory also had to show that the authorities acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. It is insufficient to show negligence. But in this case the knowing refusal to provide toothpaste met the test and the District Court’s decision was reversed.

Franklin Woods plead guilty to conspiring to manufacture fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 108 months. In determining his sentencing guidelines the District Court applied an enhancement for possession of a firearm. There was no evidence that Woods had a firearm or that he knew that a firearm was present. The evidence of manufacturing was found in a co-defendant’s residence. But the District Court assumed that Woods knew that there was a high likelihood that a gun would be present in a residence used to manufacture methamphetamine.

The District Court found that Woods was responsible for 53.64 grams of methamphetamine, which has a value of approximately $5,000. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. Previously it has determined that when there is a large amount of narcotics it is safe to assume that one of the defendants has a gun. But in those cases, barring evidence to the contrary, it has never assumed that a co-defendant had a gun when the value of the drugs was less than $60,000.

What I do not understand is why based solely upon the value or the quantity of the narcotics one can assume that a gun is present. Certainly it is not unusual to find a gun when narcotics are present. Often a gun may be present when the value of the narcotics is considerably under $60,000. But if we assume that those who would conspire together to manufacture of sell drugs know each other fairly well, based upon their knowledge of each other or the history of their relationship they may know whether a gun is likely to be present or not be present. Certainly there are any number of cases where guns are not present.

Joseph Carey plead guilty to conducting an illegal gambling business in 2003. As a convicted felon he is ineligible to possess a gun. In Heller the Supreme Court specifically excluded convicted felon from those who could possess weapons.

Carey now wants to have a gun. Therefore he moved in the United States District Court to expunge his record. The motion was denied, without a hearing, on the basis that the court did not have jurisdiction.

Carey appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit held that “[a]n order on a motion to expunge a conviction is within the equitable jurisdiction” of the District Court. Therefore the proper action for the Sixth Circuit to take is to return the case to the District Court for it to consider whether or not, using its equitable jurisdiction it should grant the motion to expunge. But instead the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court decision saying that the District Court properly used its discretion in denying Carey a hearing and in denying his motion. The problem is that the District Court never used its discretion in denying the motion since it wrongly decided that it did not have jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court in Berghuis v. Smith looked at an appeal from a grant of habeas corpus in which the question, again, is not whether the trial court was right or wrong but rather whether the state court decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

“prohibits federal habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’. . . or ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,’”

In Smith the issue is whether Diapolis Smith, an African American, was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury consisting of a cross section of the population. He was convicted of murder by an all white jury in Kent County, Michigan. The lower courts in finding a constitutional violation cited Duren v. Missouri in which the Supreme Court developed a three part test “a criminal defendant must make to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

In Duren the underrepresented group was woman. The court found that women made up 54 per cent of the jury-eligible population but only 14.5 per cent of the weekly venires. In contrast the court in Smith found that African Americans in Kent County made up 7.28 per cent of the jury eligible population but only six per cent of the jury pool. In Duren the law did not require women to sit on juries. They were allowed to exclude themselves and if they did not answer jury summons they were assumed to have excluded themselves. Contrasting this to the system in Kent County where Smith claimed that the jury selection system which gave priority to the District Courts and allowed them to get first choice at minorities instead of the Circuit Court which tried felonies such as that with which he was charged.

But the Supreme Court did not find that the alleged discrimination in Kent County violated any “clearly established” decision of the Supreme Court. The figures in Duren cannot be compared to the figures in Smith. The Supreme Court has given the states wide discretion in determining how to meet constitutional jury requirements and no Supreme Court precedent clearly supports the Sixth Circuit decision supporting the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

Aiding and abetting requires (1) an act contributing to the commission of the crime; and (2) the intent to aid in the commission of the crime. In United States v. Bronzino the Sixth Circuit, yesterday, found Vincenzo Bronzino guilty of aiding and abetting money laundering.

Bronzino paid an illegal betting debt to Peter Messina using 15,000 dollars worth of legally obtained betting chips. Messina was reluctant to take the chips. He was afraid that if he tried to cash them in he would have to give his name. Bronzino told him not to worry. That as long as he cashed less than 10,000 dollars of chips in at a time he would be okay. The law requires that anyone involved in a cash transaction of over ten thousand dollars provide their name and identity as well as the source of the money.

However the offense of structuring a money laundering transaction is accomplished by manipulating an event by using multiple transactions to avoid the ten thousand dollar limit. Bronzino did not deny that Messina committed money laundering when he used multiple transactions to convert the fifteen thousand dollars of gambling chips into cash. But he argued that by encouraging Messina to use multiple transactions he was not aiding and abetting the crime.

The Sixth Circuit found that Bronzino committed an act contributing to the commission of the crime with the intent to aid in the commission of the crime. Specifically he contributed to money laundering by “teaching” Messina how to perform multiple transactions in an attempt to avoid detection. As such he was a catalyst without which the crime would not have occurred.

Second, as to Bronzino’s intent, Bronzino argued that he did not have the intent to violate the money laundering laws. He merely wanted to encourage Messina to take the chips in payment of the debt. To be guilty of money laundering one must have the specific intent to violate the same law as the individual committing the offense. The Court found that while they had different motivations they had the same intent. Both wanted “to make the illegal venture succeed.” They both “shared the common purpose of consummating the transaction without triggering the federal reporting requirement,” The Sixth Circuit finding both an act and the intent upheld the conviction.

Nashville police went to the residence of Derrick Archibald to serve an arrest warrant. It took approximate ten minutes from the time they knocked on the door for Archibald to open the door. During that time the officer nearest the door only heard one person inside.

When Archibald opened the door an officer momentarily stepped inside the residence, grabbed him, pulled him outside, handcuffed him and arrested him. Then officers conducted a protective sweep of the unit. During the sweep the officers found cocaine on a table. They used the cocaine to show probable cause for a search warrant. Whille searching the residence pursuant to the search warrant they found a gun. He was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a gun.

In Maryland v. Buie

the Supreme Court . . . identified two types of warrantless protective sweeps of a residence that are constitutionally permissible immediately following an arrest. The first type allows officers to ‘look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.’ . . . The second type of sweep goes “beyond” immediately adjoining areas but is confined to “such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers. ‘. . . The first type of sweep requires no probable cause or reasonable suspicion, while the second requires “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.’

Before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals the government argued both Buie prongs. But the court found that the government had not argued that the search was permissible under the first prong which does not require probable cause but which does require the search to be in an area adjacent to the arrest before the District Court and therefore it waived the argument.

But in any case the court found that the search of the residence did not meet either Buie prong and therefore the search warrant was not based upon probable cause and the gun must be suppressed. It did not meet the first prong because the arrest occurred in the doorway and therefore the`search of the entire unit was not in the`area immediately adjacent to the arrest. Nor did it meet the second prong. The officers did not have articulable facts to base a reasonable belief upon that there was another person in the residence. The government’s argument that Archibald was a dangerous criminal is not relevant since it is not related to the requirement that there be facts showing that the officers were in danger from other people in the unit.

The Sixth Circuit found that probable cause supported the search warrant in United States v. Dyer and affirmed the conviction.

A Tennessee police officer swore out an affidavit for a search warrant for a cabin rented by Stacy Lee Glance and used by Glance and Kenneth J. Dyer. The bulk of the information in the affidavit came from an unnamed confidential informant who was facing drug charges and hoping to get the charges dismissed in exchange for his/her assistance in convicting Glance and Dyer. Glance went to trial and was found not guilty. Dyer entered a conditional plea allowing him to challenge the search warrant on appeal.

The informant claimed to have seen a drug deal involving methamphetamine in the cabin. The authorities corroborated some minor details of the informant’s statement. The informant took the officer to the cabin. Cars owned by Glance and Dyer were outside the cabin. Furthermore Dyer and Glance were seen at the cabin. Dyer and Glance have criminal records for methamphetamine related crimes and Dyer had an outstanding warrant for methamphetamine from North Carolina.

On this information the Sixth Circuit found that probable cause supported the warrant. The issue here is the reliability of the information received from the informant. The problem with this is that all of the corroborating evidence involves innocent behavior. All we really know is that the informant knows Glance and Dyer. We also know that the informant has reason to provide false information since any information that he/she provides will be used to dismiss the charges against him/her or to ameliorate the sentence for his/her criminal behavior.