Last week the Supreme Court ruled on another case clarifying the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In Gonzalez v. Thaler The AEDPA requires that prior to appealing a denial of a petition for habeas corpus to the Circuit Court the petitioner get a certificate of appealability from either the District Court judge or a judge of the Circuit Court. The first question determined that the requirement that the COA indicate the requisite constitutional to be considered is a mandatory requirement but not a jurisdictional requirement.

Habeas appellate jurisdiction is found in 18 U. S. C. 2253, part of the AEDPA. Subdivision “c” which covers the area involved in this question states:

“(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals . . .
. . . . .
“(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
“(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).”

Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas. After appealing his conviction unsuccessfully in Texas and having his state habeas denied, Gonzalez file a habeas in the Federal District Court. The District Court judge denied the habeas but granted Gonzales a COA. However the judge did not indicate which if any constitutional issue for which Gonzalez had made a substantial constitutional argument. The government did not challenge this failure in either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. However they did raise the issue of the lack of jurisdiction, citing section 2253 in the Supreme Court. This is important to Gonzalez because if the requirement is jurisdictional the Supreme Court will dismiss the case. But if it is mandatory but not jurisdictional, the failure of the government to raise the issue in the District Court or the Circuit Court waives the issue and the Supreme Court can hear the case.

The court found that the requirement was not jurisdictional. The Supreme Court will not find a requirement jurisdictional, unless Congress has made a clear statement that it intends the requirement to be jurisdictional. In this case the Supreme Court found no proof that Congress meant the the requirement of a constitutional statement in the COA to be jurisdictional.

Subsection 2253(c)(1) is clearly jurisdictional. It says that under certain conditions “an appeal may not be taken.” But the question before the court comes under subdivision three. When comparing the language of subdivision one to subdivision three it is clear to the court that the latter is not jurisdictional.

But Gonzales is not out of the water. The second issue is whether his appeal was timely. The statute says that a timely appeal must be filed within one year of when the lower court decision becomes final. Gonzalez appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals but he did not appeal to the higher court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the year began to run when the appellate court decision became final or when the date to appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals expired. Gonzalez argued that the decision became final when the decision became final. The government argued that the decisison became fine when the time to appeal to the higher court expired. As you can guess if the government was right, Gonzalez loses and if Gonzalez is right his appeal is timely. The court sided with the government. It found that when the deadline for filing an appeal with the Texas Court of Appeals passed without an appeal having been filed, the year began in which the Federal habeas had to be filed. Gonzalez missed the deadline and the court through out the habeas. Its decision was based upon prior decisions finding that a decision became final either when the highest court issues a decision completing direct review or when the date to appeal to the highest court passes without an appeal being filed. Therefore, since Gonzalez did not appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal and the deadline for that court occurred over a year before the habeas the court was filed Gonzalez’ appeal was time barred.

In November we wrote about Shirley Ree Smith. She was convicted of killing her grandchild. The death was credited to shaken baby syndrome (SBS). It was alleged that she shook her grandchild to death.

The Supreme Court denied her appeal, showing deference to the jury’s verdict and state court decision uphonding her conviction it reversed a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling granting her habeas. The issue was the suffficiency of the evidence. While all agree that the evidence against Smith was weak, the Supreme Court set the standard for reversal in Jackson v. Virginia. In that case it said that it would not reverse a jury’s finding of guilt if any reasonable jury could have fournd the defendant guilty. Using this standard and considering what we knew about SBS at the time of the trial in 1997 a reasonable jury could have found Smith guilty. Five experts testified at trial, three for the prosecution and two for the defense. The prosecution witnesses testified that the baby died from SBS, the defense witness testified that the baby died from other causes. If the jury believed the prosecution experts, as they apparently did, they could have reasonably found Smith guilty. In all likelihood the defense experts were right.

The child probably died from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). When Smith discovered that the child was not breathing she shook the child slightly. But the child was already dead.

But the problem is that we now know a lot more about SBS. There is a real question whether SBS exists and if so whether it is fatal. As Justice Ginsburg wrote in the dissent it is unlikely that if the trial was held now that the state’s experts would have testified in the same manner and Smith may not have been convicted.

Smith was sentenced to fifteen years to life. The Ninth Circuit after reversing her conviction released her from prison. But now she will have to go back to prison unless California Governor Jerry Brown grants her clemency. The Supreme Court suggested that she apply for clemency and she filed a request with the governor’s office to commute her sentence to time served.

I rarely ask my readers to take any action, but I’m asking that you read the linked Supreme Court decision, as well as the New York Times editorial, and the Sacramento Bee article, both of which are also linked. Then I ask that you write a letter to California Governor Jerry Brown asking him to commute the sentence of Shirley Ree Smith. His address is:

Governor Jerry Brown
c/o State Capitol, Suite 1173
Sacramento, CA 95814

Herbert Watkins Skinner received another reprieve from the death penalty. He was convicted of killing his girlfriend, Twila Busby, and her two adult sons. A previous execution date was suspended when the Supreme Court ruled that he had the right to sue the State of Texas to allow DNA testing of a number of items involved in the murder. But the Texas attorney general continued to fight in the lower courts to prevent the DNA testing. Last week the trial court agreed with the district attorney, but today the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ordered a delay in the scheduled Wednesday execution to allow a full consideration of changes in the Texas law regarding DNA testing. Since the Supreme Court decision Texas has expanded the situations under which a defendant can obtain post conviction DNA testing of evidence.

Among the items Skinner wants tested are ” vaginal swabs from Busby contained in a rape kit; clippings from her fingernails; two knives, one found on Busby’s front porch and the second found in a plastic bag in the living room; a dish towel; and blood and hairs from a jacket found next to Busby’s body.” The Texas Attorney General argues that there is so much evidence against Skinner that even if the items had been tested before the trial and the DNA tests were negative Skinner would still have been convicted. After the murder Skinner was found at a friend’s house four blocks from the murder. There was a trail of blood from the murder scene to the friend’s house. The authorities claim that Skinner’s hands were cut with the same knife used to stab Busby’s sons. DNA tests on items already tested implicate Skinner. But as the foreman of the jury stated in a letter to the Dallas Morning News, “Since the trial, I and many of my fellow jurors have grown increasingly concerned that key pieces of DNA evidence from the crime scene remain untested,” the foreman, Danny Stewart, wrote. “Either the tests confirm Skinner’s guilt or prove his innocence and prevent the state from making an irreversible mistake. There is simply no downside.”

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Shirley Ree Smith for assault on a child resulting in death.

The incident resulted from allegations of shaken baby syndrome (SBS). Smith was convicted by a jury of killing her grandchild. The California Court of Appeals upheld the convict and the California Supreme refused to review the case. Smith’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the U. S. District Court. But the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction.

The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction finding that while the Ninth Circuit used the correct test it excced its authority in reversing the conviction. It held, as it has in the past that “[a] reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” While there is no doubt that there was sufficient evidence at the trial to find Ms Smith innocent the jury’s verdict cannot be reversed since there was evidence to support its verdict and since reasonable people can disagree on the verdict.

The per curiam opinion is rather pedantry but the dissent by Justice Ginsburg ¹ is more interesting. She argues that the court erred in granting certiorari and that it should never have considered the case. Generally the Supreme Court does not take cases because it feels that the case was wrongly decided. It only takes case where the lower court either used the wrong test or the Supreme Court wants to announce a new rule. In this case the lower court used the correct rule but applied it wrong.

As both the per curiam decision and the dissent point out there is a real question about Smith’s guilt. She spent ten years in prison on a fifteen years to life sentence prior to being released after the Ninth Ciruit reversed the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus. Now, barring a pardon by the governor, she will have to return to prison.

Scientific advances regarding SBS have raised question as to wherther there was sufficient medical evidence for a finding that Ms Smith’s grandchild was a victim of SBS. A prosecution expert testified that “cerebral edema, subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, bleeding at the joints of theback of the neck, bruises on the arms, fractures of the ribs, and internal injuries to the buttocks” are generally present in cases of SBS but few of these could be found on Ms Smith’s grandchild.

Furthermore there was no evidence that Ms Smith who was sleeping on the floor next to the child’s couch showed any anger towards the child and the child’s mother who was in the next room did not notice anything.

Most SBS cases do not involve grandparents, particularly those who are not the primary caretaker of the infant. Current medical thought raises considerable questions regarding whether an infant can be killed from SBS and it is unlikely that the experts who testified for the prosecution would testify in the same way today.

Considering these factors and the fact that the court did not conduct a full inquiry into the case ² Justice Ginsberg argues that justice would have been met if the court allowed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to go unreviewed and to allow Smith to remain in the care of her family.

In Davis v. United States the Supreme Court took another blow at the Exclusionary Rule. It ruled that the good faith exception should be applied to situations in which the police rely upon settled law that is later overturned by the Supreme Court.

In 2007 relying upon Eleventh Circuit interpretation of Belton v. New York, Greenville, Alabama police arrested the two people in an automobile, handcuffed them and placed them in a police car. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun. Willie Gene Davis, the passenger in the car, was then charged with possession of a gun by a convicted felon. The Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court agreed that the search was illegal, based on Gant v. Arizona in which the Supreme Court in 2009 held that the search of the interior of an automobile, pursuant to an arrest, can only occur if the passengers are in a position where they can reach items in the car or there is probable cause to believe that contraband can be found in the vehicle.

Since Davis’ conviction was not final when the Supreme Court ruled on Gant, Gant’s finding applied to Davis. But the Supreme Court ruled that just because the finding applied to Davis, the remedy of exclusion does not necessarily apply. The sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police from performing illegal searches. The deterrent value must be weighed against the societal harm caused by the suppression. In this case the Supreme Court found that there was no deterrent value since the police in searching the vehicle were complying with the then settled law. Therefore while the search was unconstitutional, the remedy is not suppression. The Court did not attempt to define any remedy, although in other cases they have stated that the remedy could be limited to a civil suit.

As the dissent, by Justice Breyer, points out the decision may have serious consequences. While few searches will directly be affected. It is rare for the Supreme Court to reverse prior decisions. But police are generally assume to follow the law or at least to try to follow the law. It is rare that they intentionally violate the Fourth Amendment. There is language in Justice Alito’s majority opinion which can be cited to support the refusal to apply the exclusionary rule in any case in which officers are acting in good faith. If officers are acting in good faith then there is little deterrent value in later excluding the fruit of their search.

I have trouble with the view that deterrence is the only reason for the exclusionary rule. An unconstitutional search violates the privacy rights of those who are the subject of the search. This was recognized in Terry when the Supreme Court ruled that a search was any action which violated the privacy rights of an individual when those privacy rights are accepted by society. If one of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy rights then in order to redress the injury the fruit of the illegal invasion of a person’s privacy should not be entered into evidence against the person at trial.

The Department of Justice is urging the Supreme Court to take up the Fourth Amendment issue of Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Various courts have ruled on the constitutionality of the use of GPS without getting a warrant and rulings have come down on both sides of the issue,

The Ninth and the Seventh Circuits have ruled it constitutional while the D. C. Circuit found it unconstitutional. Courts in New York, Massachusetts, Washington and Delaware have found it unconstitutional while courts in Ohio and Virginia have approved of the practice.

The Justice Department is challenging a D. C. Circuit opinion that overturned the conviction of Antoine Jones on cocaine trafficking charges after GPS evidence played a mayor role in his conviction. The DOJ argues that since law enforcement officers could have followed Jones as he traveled on the public roads he could not have had a legitimate expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment only applies to individuals who have an expectation of privacy that is recognized by society.

However his attorneys argue that using a GPS device on Jones’ Jeep Cherokee for over a month and reporting his whereabouts every seven seconds was a tremendous invasion of his privacy and is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

The Courts that have upheld warrantless GPS searches have cited the 1983 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Knotts in which the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man in a methamphetamine case after the wholesaler of necessary chemicals placed a beeper in a barrel of chemicals. The barrel was placed in a codefendant’s vehicle and followed by agents to the suspect’s residence.

Knotts has been cited by the courts in upholding warrantless GPS decisions. Most of the Courts have said that if it was constitutional to follow a car with a beeper, it is constitutional to keep track of a vehicle with a GPS deviced placed under the car’s carriage while it is either parked on the street or in the defendant’s driveway.

But while the lower courts do not have the power to reconsider Knotts the Supreme Court does. It is a decision that may have had some validity 30 years ago but with the technological advances in the last 30 years allowing greater and greater invasions into citizen’s privacy it is time for the Supreme Court to reconsider the decision.

The Supreme Court in Michigan v. Bryant yesterday seriously limited the 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington. In Crawford the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause mandated that testimonial hearsay only be admitted into evidence if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior chance to cross examine the witness.

But Crawford did not define “testimonial” well. Generally testimonial statements are statements that could be used as evidence. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a statement is testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indi-cate . . . that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Post Crawford cases exempted statements that had a “primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” But this turns out not to be very clear either and in the view of the Bryant majority not very comprehensive.

The police received a phone call in the early hours of April 29, 2001 stating a man had been shot and that he was at a gasoline station. Five officer independently arrived on the scene. Each officer asked the man, what happened, who did it, and where did it happen. He told them that Rick shot him and that it happened at Rick’s house. The victim, Anthony Covington later died of the injuries.

The prosecutor then entered Covington’s statements into evidence at trial. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the conviction on confrontation grounds and the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in a decision by Justice Sotomeyer yesterday reversed the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court. The U. S. Supreme Court held that Covington’s answers to the questions were not testimonial in that the police were fulfilling their duty to protect citizens during an ongoing emergency.

The court came to the conclusion that the police officers were attempting to prevent other people from being shot by trying to find out where the shooter was located and whether the victim was in danger of being shot again. But as Justice Scalia points out in dissent the questions asked by the police were clearly testimonial. They did not ask questions regarding the serious injuries to Covington. All five officers consecutively asked the same questions to make sure that the testimony would not change and one of the officers admitted that considering the fact that the testimony would be preserved if Covington died. There was no shooter nearby and it would be unlikely if there was a shooter nearby that he/she would shoot anyone with five police officers surrounding Covington. The crime had been commited and there was no current emergency. As a result there was no public emergency that needed to be handled and the police were carrying out their duty to collect evidence and testimony for trial. Both Justices Sotomeyer and Scalia agree that the statements must be looked at objectively. But Sotomeyer looks at the statements from the point of view of the police while Scalia looks at the statments from the point of view of the witness. After all it is the witness’s statement that must pass confrontation grounds approval. It is clear that Covington was attempting to provide information that could be used in a prosecution.

In its first criminal justice decision of the 2010-1011 session, Abbott v. United States the Supreme Court tackled a split in the circuits over 18 U. S. C. Section 924(c). Section 924(c) criminalizes possession of a weapon while being involved in a violent or drug-related offense. It states in pertinent part:

(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime -
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. . .

The question deals with the first phrase. Kevin Abbott and Carlos Rashad Gould in separate cases were convicted inter alia with violations of Section 924(c) Each argued in the trial courts and on appeal that the first phrase prevented them from being punished for violating the section. They claimed that since they were convicted of other offenses that mandated a minimum sentence of over five years they could not be punished for a violation of Section 924(c). After all the statute says, ” Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law.” Gould argued that the ten year mandatory sentence he received for possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute it prevented the court from imposing Section 924(c)’s five year mandatory minimum sentence and Gould argued that his fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a weapon by a convicted felon also prevented imposition of the 924(c) sentence.

But the Supreme Court unanimoulsly ¹ruled that the “other provision of law” clause referred only to statutes that outlawed conduct identical to Section 924(c). It pointed out that the questioned language was added to the section in 1998 as part of an effort to strenghthen the law and accepting the defendant’s argument would weaken the law. Accepting the defendant’s interpretation would allow some defendants not to be punished at all for possessing a gun where they have a higher mandatory minimum under other provisions of law. Also because those convicted only of lesser crimes would get the additional five years and those convicted of greater crimes would not in some case those who are guilty of only lesser crimes might do more time than those guilty of greater crimes.

Considering these factors the Supreme Court decided that Congress could not have wanted the five year mandatory minimum to apply only to those not convicted of any other offense with a mandatory minimum of five years or less.

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Antoine Jones’ conviction for distribution of cocaine and cocaine base due to Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking of Jones’ vehicle without a search warrant.

Jones’ conviction was based, in part, on the use of a GPS tracking device which was attached to his vehicle for four weeks. The Court found that the failure to have a valid search warrant ¹for the use of the GPS device, violated Jones’ legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore the Fourth Amendment.

In order to find that GPS devices require a search warrant the Court had to distinguish the use of GPS devices from the use of beepers in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Knotts. In Knotts the Supreme Court ruled that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” In Knotts a manufacturer of chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine alerted the police of suspicious sales. The manufacturer then at the urging of the police planted a beeper in a five-gallon container of chemicals purchased by Tristan Armstrong. The police monitored the progress of the car carrying the beeper, to Knott’s Wisconsin cabin. The Supreme Court found that since Armstrong’s vehicle could have been followed on the public streets by a police car the use of a beeper to assist the police did not violate the driver’s legitimate expectation of privacy.

The Circuit Court distinguished the use of GPS on Jones vehicle from the use of the beeper on Armstrong’s vehicle by the fact that the use of the GPS lasted around the clock for four weeks while the beeper was only monitored during a short ride from Minneapolis to the cabin in Wisconsin. But just as the police could have followed Armstrong’s vehicle on the public streets they could have followed Jone’s vehicle. The Circuit Court pointed out that it would be much more difficult to follow a vehicle for four weeks and that during a prolonged period one learns significant private details about a person’s life that one does not learn during a short trip. Also the Supreme Court in Knotts specifically did not decide what would happen in technological advances allow long term trailing of a vehicle.

However, I find it difficult to accept the supposition that a short term trailing of a vehicle is not a violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy and a longer term trailing is a violation. With the increased use of GPS the issue may well appear before the Supreme Court. The Circuits have split. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, relying on Knotts, have found the use of GPS to not be a search. The Supreme Court has several options. It can find Knotts to be decisive or at least persuasive and therefore find that the use of GPS is not a “search” and therefore a search warrant is not necessary. It can accept the D. C. Circuit’s distinction based upon the length of the search or it can reverse Knotts.

A unique option would be to find the search illegal under state law and rule that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded. The placing of the GPS device on the vehicle was clearly a trespass and trailing the vehicle for four weeks is stalking. But the Supreme Court has never excluded evidence based upon a violation of state law.

Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of two drug related misdemeanors in Texas, First he was convicted of possession of less than two ounces of marijuana and then he plead guilty to possession of one anti-anxiety pill without a prescription.

Normally conviction of a misdemeanor does not result in deportation. But under Federal law and under Texas law a second possessory conviction can be charged as a felony. Narcotics related felonies are considered aggravated felonies and are subject to deportation. Furthermore those convicted of aggravated felonies cannot request discretionary cancellation of removal which allows a judge to determine whether an individual should stay in this country despite he/she being deportable.

The district attorney in Texas had the option of charging Carachuri-Rosendo as a recidivist with a felony. But they did not. None the less, the Federal government moved for deportation because under Federal law he could have been charged as a felon and be deported.

In 2006 the Supreme Court ruled in Lopez v. Gonzales that only those narcotics related crimes that are chargeable under Federal law as felonies subject a person to deportation. In other words, if a person is convicted of a felony in state court but under Federal law it is a misdemeanor the person cannot be deported. For example, if possession of a drug is a felony in some states but can only be charged as a misdemeanor in Federal Court the person cannot be deported.

The Court of Appeal therefore decided that since it could have been a felony if if it had been charged in Federal Court, it should be treated as an aggravated felony. But the Supreme Court found that since he had not been convicted of a felony it was not an aggravated felony. While Carachuri-Rosendo is deportable he is subject to cancellation of removal and the District Court must use its discretion on whether or not he should be deported.